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Abstract 
 
The following dissertation intends the exposition, through the tools of  analytic philosophy, of  the 
theology of  the New England divine Charles Chauncy (1705-1787), minister for over sixty years of  
Boston’s prominent First Church. 
 Particularly, our aim has been to explicate our subject’s theology on the doctrines of  original sin, 
the atonement, and his thoughts concerning the afterlife. It has been also our attempt to lay out the 
manner in which these strands of  his theological reflection can be made rigorous, and the contribution his 
ideas could make to contemporary philosophical theology. 
 As the pages of  this work will reveal, he had an original doctrinal proposal for the dogma of  
original sin, an exemplarist understanding of  the doctrine of  atonement, and a novel, and in various 
respects forward-looking proposal for the process by which indeterministically free and rational creatures 
attain salvation, and hence union with their maker. 
 Our theologian was probably the most eminent representative of  a religious movement that in a 
relatively short period of  time would break away from traditional Puritan orthodoxy and would come to 
embrace more rational, and thus liberal, forms of  religious expression. We believe that a closer look at his 
theology, something which has been rather neglected by academic research, could shed new light on a 
period of  history that proved crucial in the evolution of  American religion. 
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Introduction 
 
This work has for its main purpose the inquiry and exposition —through the tools of  analytic 
philosophy— of  the theology of  the reverend Charles Chauncy of  Boston’s prominent First Church (Old 
Brick). And since introductions, so I am told, are supposed to both provide a synopsis for the text they are 
supposed to present and must also attempt to entice the reader, I will begin by mentioning the reasons that 
drew me to this subject in the hope that whoever reads these words will find them appealing and worthy 
of  a study such as this one. 
 As the first chapter will make clear, we are not dealing with an obscure theologian or monastic 
hermit, but with a relatively well-known preacher and public figure of  his time. He was an embattled figure 
who took a leading role in some of  the most significant controversies during the period prior and after the 
North American colonies’ war of  independence―whether in ecclesiastical matters as the preeminent 
spokesman in the colonies’ rejection of  an Anglican Bishopric in British North America; or in more 
elevated theological disputes as exemplified by his exchanges with Jonathan Edwards and their divergences 
concerning the awakenings that characterized the middle and second half  of  the eighteenth century; and 
even in more secular terrain as one of  the leading ministers in the struggle for political independence from 
England (some writers attribute him the title of  the ‘theologian of  the American Revolution’ [Gibbs & 
Gibbs 1990: 259]); among others. 
 Now it should be obvious that an individual with so many noticeable facets for his time could not 
have gone entirely unnoticed by historical and academic research, and in this respect a couple of  works 
could prove of  some interest for those in search of  knowledge of  his life and thought: Charles H. Lippy’s 
Seasonable Revolutionary: The Mind of  Charles Chauncy (1981); Edward M. Griffin’s Old Brick: Charles Chauncy of  
Boston, 1705-1787 (1980), and Norman B. Gibbs’ The Life and Thought of  Charles Chauncy (2011). All these 
books provide some valuable historical and biographical information, but particularly Lippy’s ideas 
concerning Chauncy’s theology have come under some criticism by Norman Gibbs. 
 Furthermore, in the generation that succeeded Chauncy in New England, particularly among his 
Congregationalist brethren in Boston, one can discern a progressive distancing from orthodox Puritan and 
Calvinistic dogma; a steady liberal tendency in theological (if  not social) reflection that will eventuate in 
the early 1800s in schisms like that of  the Unitarians and Universalists.1 The exact relation of  Chauncy’s 
reinterpretation of  Puritan and Calvinistic theology to these developments in New England has been a 
 
1 Norman B. Gibbs and Arthur B. Ellis talk of  a Unitarian takeover, shortly after Chauncy’s death, of  the 
First Church of  Boston by no later than 1808 (Gibbs & Gibbs 1992: 218; Ellis 1881: 228; cited in Gibbs & 
Gibbs 1992). 
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topic of  contention since the nineteenth century, for though it is clear that some of  the earliest leaders of  
Unitarianism like William Ellery Channing claimed Chauncy as a sort of  ‘forerunner of  their own 
movement’, they tended to so do rather uncritically and with little documented support from Chauncy’s 
own work (Gibbs & Gibbs 1992: 218). We are afraid that issues of  Christology and the Incarnation lie 
outside the scope of  the present work, but they surely represent a possible focus of  future research on our 
author. 
 It is also important to bring to the reader’s attention a theological kinship Chauncy has with some 
ancient Greek non-apostolic fathers of  the church such as Clement of  Alexandria, Irenaeus of  Lyon, and 
specially Origen. And we mention this since it is believed that the origenistic influence in theology 
reappeared only with the work of  the German theologian F. D. E. Schleiermacher in the nineteenth 
century. We trust this dissertation will prove that some years prior to Schleiermacher’s publications 
Chauncy was already reconnecting with this ancient and more rational and ethical manner of  theological 
reflection. But before providing a summary and layout of  this dissertation, we think a few words 
concerning the questions that guided this work are warranted. 
 After learning more about the life of  our subject and of  the theological environment in which he 
moved —particularly as pertains a theological debate concerning the doctrine of  Original Sin to which we 
will briefly allude to in the first chapter of  this work— it became clear that Chauncy was in a sense bound 
to tackle this issue. He had been dragged into the debate, and as it was not altogether uncommon in him, 
he had managed to disappoint those he was supposed to support (Peter Clark and his defence of  
orthodoxy) without necessarily ingratiating himself  with the other side of  the argument (Samuel Webster 
and his pro-John Taylor tract) (Griffin 1980: 121-122). In doing so Chauncy had shown that he had by 
then abandoned the traditional position in this matter, but he had likewise manifested serious misgivings 
about John Taylor’s reinterpretation of  the doctrine (ibid., p.122). So upon stumbling with Chauncy’s major 
theological work on this topic, our first research question became apparent: what was Chauncy’s 
reinterpretation of  the doctrine of  Original Sin, and in what sense did it differ from both traditional 
North American Calvinism and from the optimistic views on human nature that were beginning to 
influence New England clergy? 
 As for our other major research question, this was the outcome of  our early engagement with our 
theologian’s new body of  divinity. We were aware that he was a soteriological Universalist, but in the title 
page of  one of  these major works, he makes it clear that he advocates a rather strong (indeterministic) 
conception of  free will. As our reader will no doubt understand, we wondered how he had managed to 
piece together these apparently incongruous components of  his thought. To state it more precisely, our 
second major research question became: how did Chauncy manage to reconcile the idea of  universal 
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salvation with an indeterministic understanding of  free will?      
 Now linking these two major dimensions of  his theology—human nature (or his take on the 
doctrine of  Original Sin) and our ultimate destiny (Universalism)— is the work of  Christ on the cross. So 
we were, in a sense, pushed to unearth his ideas on the doctrine of  atonement, which is a rather tricky 
endeavour because it is a doctrine he is less explicit about; but it is clear that, to the best of  our knowledge, 
the motif  of  Christ’s life and death as an example to believers is at the centre of  his ideas on the doctrine. 
 Our overall research questions could thus be stated as: what is Chauncy’s theology of  the doctrine 
of  Original Sin, the atonement, and the afterlife? how might it be made rigorous? and what contribution 
might it make to contemporary philosophical theology? The following work attempts to answer these 
questions. 
 The layout of  this thesis is the following. There are three major themes around which this work is 
organized: Original Sin, Redemption, and the afterlife. Each of  these sections is subdivided into a 
theological chapter where we will advance our author’s main ideas on these issues (Chapters 2, 4, and 6), 
and a philosophical chapter where we will analyse in greater detail the philosophical implications and 
problems that his views give rise to (Chapters 3, 5, and 7). 
  With the intention of  better contextualizing Chauncy’s theological concerns, we commence with a 
concise historical chapter aimed at describing the main theological and intellectual currents in eighteenth 
century North America. Special attention will be devoted there to the social and cultural phenomenon of  
the awakenings―particularly to what was called the ‘First Great Awakening’ of  the 1740s―and to the role 
that Chauncy played in the theological debates that ensued as the leader of  those segments of  New 
England society who were decidedly against them. As anyone acquainted with that period of  American 
history can tell, Chauncy’s theological rival was the most prolific and sophisticated defender of  the 
revivals: Jonathan Edwards. As the following pages of  this work will reveal, this was not the only point of  
disagreement between them. 
 Chapter 2 sets out to provide Chauncy’s main theological ideas on the topic of  Original Sin, and as 
will be the case with chapters 4 and 6, we provide at the outset a brief  historical background to the 
theological topic at hand and then describe our author’s theological conceptions more directly related to 
each of  these headings. The topics to be covered in this chapter will revolve around the concepts of  
human nature and the Imago Dei; the importance of  moral agency for Chauncy’s overall theology; his 
Lockean epistemology; his rather instrumental conception of  moral evil; and his ideas regarding sin and 
Original Sin, and therein his attack on theological realism on this doctrine, and the views of  Jonathan 
Edwards. We will be presented in this chapter with, inter alia, Chauncy’s conception of  man as an 
indeterministically free moral agent; with his empiricist epistemology and its ramifications in his account 
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of  the Fall; his conception of  an a priori moral sense that is similar to Aquinas’s (optimistic) objective 
moral standard; the manner in which sinning is unavoidably connected to the exercise of  our moral 
agency; and the indirect manner in which the original lapse became the source of  our own sinning. The 
connection our author draws between what some have called metaphysical evil and our proclivity to 
wrongdoing will be analysed as well. 
 In chapter 3 we embark on a philosophical reconstruction of  our subject’s theology on Original 
Sin. To do so we bring attention to what we consider is the main philosophical problem that the doctrine 
gives rise to, and we list the solutions (ethical and metaphysical) that have historically been offered. In our 
framing of  the problem and its solutions, we are indebted to the work of  Michael Rea and Gary Watson. It 
was precisely Watson’s work that provided us with the conceptual tools to organize the solutions that have 
been given to the doctrine of  Original Sin: a distinction between aretaic responsibility (understood as 
attributability), and responsibility as accountability; and the issue of  control in a given moral situation. In 
this respect we believe that the views of  Chauncy are novel and thus worthy to be highlighted: a position 
that eschews any notion of  inherited guilt, but that nonetheless sees us as rightfully attributed with the 
primeval transgression of  the first couple. 
 In the fourth chapter we advance our author’s thoughts regarding the process of  redemption, but 
before doing so and in part owing to the richness of  theological reflection on the issue, we both concern 
ourselves with providing an overview of  the different models or theories of  the atonement available, to 
then pay due attention to some ancient accounts of  the doctrine that evince significant similarities with 
Chauncy’s ideas on this issue―from some noted non-apostolic Greek fathers of  the church like Clement 
of  Alexandria, Irenaeus of  Lyon, and Origen, to the eminent medieval theologian Peter Abelard. It will be 
our purpose there to not only advance our reasons for portraying Chauncy as an exemplarist, but to bring 
to the fore those plausible (though never made explicit) sources of  inspiration for our author in the topic 
of  redemption. The last part of  this chapter is reserved for Chauncy’s thoughts more directly concerned 
with the redemption process. 
 In our fifth chapter our aim will be to situate Chauncy’s exemplarist understanding of  the doctrine 
of  atonement in the current philosophical debate about theories of  the doctrine. We do this by providing 
a summary of  some of  the most relevant literature on the topic, starting with Richard Swinburne’s well- 
known satisfaction account of  the doctrine; to continue with Steven Porter’s utilitarian (and reformative) 
rehabilitation of  the theory of  penal substitution as a response to Swinburne; Mark Murphy’s vicarious 
punishment account as, among other things, an attempt to circumvent what has become one of  the most 
known points of  contention in this debate —the semantic and/or logical incoherence (under an 
expressivist understanding of  punishment) of  punishing an innocent person; to finally describe William 
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Lane Craig’s renewed defence of  penal substitution as a response to Murphy’s criticisms against the penal 
substitutionary account. Now, as we will make clear in the chapter, Chauncy’s theory of  the doctrine not 
only avoids the logical (or semantic) concerns raised by Murphy, but also rejects any model of  the doctrine 
in which a transaction of  some sort, be this a ransom payment, a compensation, or some form of  
retribution (whether imparted in a substitute or a vicar) was necessary for mankind’s redemption. 
 We will also dedicate a section to analyse the different conceptions of  divine punishment, viz., 
what are known as the Augustinian (or Calvinistic) and the Irenaean positions on the topic, with the hope 
that in exposing their merits and drawbacks, we come to a better understanding of  Chauncy’s stance. 
 Finally, we pay attention to some criticisms―coming mostly from feminist theology―raised against 
exemplarist versions of  the doctrine of  atonement, owing to what these theologians rightfully believe to 
be the nefarious consequences in both pastoral efficacy, and in the general cultural context, where this 
understanding of  the doctrine seems to raise concerns of  epistemic injustice. 
 Chapter 6, the last of  our theological chapters, presents Chauncy’s ideas more directly related to 
the topic of  the afterlife. As with chapters 2 and 4, we begin with a brief  historical exposition to 
eschatological locations, where we will explicate the main contours of  a Christian understanding of  the 
nature of  heaven―chief  among them the concept of  the beatific vision―, and hell. We then move to 
summarize our author’s concerns on these issues, beginning with a cardinal theme for Chauncy, and 
probably the centre of  his entire theology―love as the essential moral trait or feature of  divinity. Other 
important and related concepts to the divine nature will be: Chauncy’s use of  the concept of  Middle 
Knowledge and its role in his entire soteriological scheme, and the analogy of  God as our heavenly father. 
The remainder of  the chapter covers other significant ideas of  our theologian such as the adequate 
interpretation of  the word everlasting in Scripture; his belief  in the existence of  afterlife purgatorial stages 
or locations; his enunciation of  an argument that in the course of  the next century will become known as 
the ‘proportionality objection’ against the traditional doctrine of  hell; and his Millennialism. We will also 
devote a segment to describe his more scriptural reasons in favour of  a universal understanding of  
salvation, and particularly to the Pauline parallel he draws between Adam (as our first representative) and 
Christ (as a second Adam). 
 In the last chapter (7) we make use of  Chauncy’s ideas on redemption to provide what we believe 
is a possible solution to a philosophical debate that confronted Thomas Talbott and William Lane Craig in 
the early 1990s; a debate that we term as a ‘problem of  hell’. This problem arises from an orthodox 
understanding of  divinity in which He is both omnibenevolent (filled with a perfect form of  love for His 
creatures) and omnipotent; and an equally orthodox conception of  hell according to which at least some 
of  His creatures will forever be separated from Him, and (for some) subjected as well to perennial physical 
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torments. In general terms the debate alluded to pits William Craig’s Arminian or free-will theist position, 
in which, God’s sincere desire for universal salvation notwithstanding, He is unable (in a morally 
permissible way) to bring about the redemption of  all of  His creatures, and Talbott’s Universalism, which 
carries with it the unfortunate prospect of  divine tampering with the free-will of  those obdurate creatures 
unwilling to become redeemed. We will explain the demerits of  each of  these positions and explain how 
Chauncy’s alternative (his eschatology) overcomes such problems and allows us to reach a dialectically 
superior solution to the problem of  hell. Suffice it to say at this point that Chauncy’s solution is based on 
three elements: his conception of  the divine nature as essentially loving, his use of  the Argument from 
Infinite Opportunity (AIO), and his Molinism for universal salvation. 
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Chapter 1. 
Theological and Intellectual Environment in XVIII C. British North America. 
 
Theological Streams 
At the beginning of  the XVIII C., religion in what was then British North America seemed ossified, 
lacking the original impetus that its earlier settlers had infused it with; particularly in the Northeastern 
colonies of  New England (Congregationalists in Massachusetts and Connecticut) and in the Middle 
colonies of  New Jersey and Pennsylvania (Presbyterians), where Puritanism had gained its strongest 
footing. Membership began to decline. The new Massachusetts Charter of  1691, which transformed the 
colony from a private and religiously oriented enterprise into a royal colony where franchise no longer 
depended on religious profession, and a series of  scandals (e.g. Salem in 1692) all eroded the prestige and 
credibility of  Puritan institutions within the region (McGrath 2007: 155; Reichley 1985: 61; Brockway 
2003: 9, 46, 201). 
 Perhaps even more decisive to the substantial changes in the religious landscape that ensued, the 
continuous and growing influx of  immigrants into the hinterland2―particularly of  German Pietists in the 
Middle colonies of  Pennsylvania and of  Scotch-Irish Presbyterians coming from Northern Ireland 
(Ulster)―, coupled with the rapid modernization of  social and economic life in the colonies (Kelleter 
2009: 163; Brockway 2003: 33), paved the road for the series of  revivals that began in Northampton, 
Hampshire County in late 1734 (what some historians termed the ‘Little Awakening of  1735’[Gura 2005: 
71]) and years later spread to the rest of  the colonies. 
 Other factors that contributed to this growing sense of  anxiety in prerevolutionary colonial 
population were the still present fear of  invasion or attack from the wilderness (the French and Indian 
Wars [1754-1760]), epidemics that periodically ravaged cities and towns (e.g., diphtheria alone kills between 
the years 1735-1737 over 20,000 people in the colonies), and as it is sadly common nowadays, economic 
modernization for those in the lower echelons of  colonial society did not translate into an improved 
economic situation; in fact, by 1745 the colonies’ standard of  living reached its lowest point for that 
century (Ferguson 1997: 50). Therefore, one distinguishing and defining feature of  ‘prerevolutionary 
revivalism’ is ‘its insistence upon crisis’ (id.). 
 Although it has always been a topic of  contention among historians, especially since Jon Butler’s 
publication in 1982 of  Enthusiasm Described and Decried: The Great Awakening as Interpretative Fiction, we will 
 
2 The colonial population not only moves substantially during the first two thirds of  the eighteenth 
century, but rises from under 300,000 in 1700, to over 2,000,000 by 1770 (Ferguson 1997: 50). 
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side with those who prefer to consider them in hindsight as part of  a single event and label them The 
(first) Great Awakening of  the mid 1730s and early 1740s in colonial North America. But academic 
debates aside, massive religious gatherings (of  up to 20,000 people at times) between 1735 and 1745 in 
New England reverted a downward trend in both assistance and church membership, and perhaps more 
consequential, in the role of  religion in public life (McGrath 2008: 157). It also endowed American religion 
with its evangelical ethos (e.g., a penchant for extempore preaching), and among its detractors, it fostered 
the ‘proto-Unitarian tendencies’ that eventuated during the following century (Brockway 2003: 18). 
 The scope and impact of  the revivals was greatly aided by ‘two literary circumstances’: (1) by the 
fact that the writings of  famous revivalist preachers like Jonathan Edwards, Gilbert Tennent, or Samuel 
Davies were available to both popular and educated segments of  the colonies, and in this respect it is 
important to bear in mind that until 1765, religious publications in British North America outnumbered all 
other publications combined (Ferguson 1997: 45, 53); and, of  still greater significance for this work, (2) 
that these publications in defence of  revivalism generated a response in kind, that is, literary, among those 
sectors of  colonial society who were decidedly against them, such as our own Charles Chauncy. 
 As a clarifying note, way before the events just described, there was already a widening gap within 
Puritanism during the first decade of  the eighteenth century having to do with preaching style, 
notwithstanding the still prevailing doctrinal consensus among both Congregationalists and Presbyterians, 
the two major branches of  Puritanism in the colonies. Conservatives tended to favour a ‘scholarly and 
restrained’ approach, while others espoused a more emotional preaching style, one that more directly 
spoke to the emotions of  its flock. Already too, a critical point of  contention was a growing debate about 
the nature and spiritual reliability of  ‘sudden conversion experiences’ (Brockway 2003: 9) which came to 
characterize the revivals a few years later. Thus, the philosophical principles of  the experience of  
conversion and the roles assigned in it to emotions (affections) and reason became one of  the main points 
of  contention in the religious debates of  the time, as evidenced by the theological exchanges on this issue 
between Edwards and Chauncy. This is an issue to which we will return to a few lines below. 
 Among the promoters of  this new outlook and practice within Puritanism, Jonathan Edwards 
figures second to none not only on account of  having been among the first to promote a more emotional 
and much less doctrinal approach to Calvinism, but also for becoming the most prolific and sophisticated 
apologist for the movement. Following the footsteps of  his grandfather Solomon Stoddard, who perceived 
that the legalistic and rigid type of  Calvinism endorsed by the New England establishment would not 
satiate the spiritual needs of  people in a frontier context, Edwards advocated a religious praxis 
undoubtedly aimed at stirring the emotions of  his parish. This Pietist thrust was encapsulated in the 
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famous phrase first used by the Hernhutters in Saxony but adopted by revivalists3 in America: a religion of  the 
heart, rather than the mind: a renewed appreciation of  the affections (emotions) and their role in spiritual 
conversion (Kelleter 2009: 169; McGrath 2008: 147; Reichley 1985: 69). 
 An important consideration to bear in mind before continuing has to do with the nature of  the 
Calvinism prevalent in the North American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was 
not classical or orthodox Calvinism (that of  the Reformation) of  the kind one would associate for 
example with the Institutes of  the Christian Religion (1536), but rather the one found in the creeds of  the 
Westminster Confession (1646) and regarded by historians as federal or covenant theology (Brockway 2003: 50-
51). It was federal in the sense that God does not ‘deal with humanity on an individual basis, but only 
through his federal representatives, Adam and Christ’ (id.); and it was covenant for the belief  that divinity’s 
relationship with mankind has consisted in a series of  contracts or compacts, of  which the most important 
for our work are the so-called Covenant of  Works between God and Adam―abrogated by Adam’s 
disobedience and which render ‘works’ as meaningless for salvation, at least in the mind of  theological 
determinists―, and the Covenant of  Grace, brought about by Jesus’ coming and through His sacrifice on 
the cross ‘the promise of  deliverance in the life to come’ (ibid., p.185). We will return to this topic when 
dealing with Chauncy’s understanding of  the process of  salvation. 
 It is also worth mentioning that contrary to popular opinion, Puritan orthodoxy was not a rigid 
and ‘harshly imposed complex of  beliefs that stifled all creativity and individual expression in its desire to 
enforce uniformity’; it tolerated a certain degree of  freedom and discord ‘over the finer points of  faith and 
practice’ (Chamberlain 1992: 336). Historical, geographical, social, and even structural (or ecclesiological) 
circumstances no doubt contributed to this doctrinal flexibility—in the absence of  an ‘external order’ 
against which to react, theological self-definition became increasingly important; the scattered nature, in a 
vast and poorly communicated region, of  small congregations; the high literacy and disposition to debate 
theological issues among the population; and even the structure of  congregational churches, that 
‘undermined by design the imposition of  any hierarchical authority’, all contributed to this doctrinal 
flexibility (ibid., pp.337, 339). 
 Central in the revivalists’ scheme was the concept of  immediate grace, i.e., the idea (opposed to 
orthodox Calvinism) that the reception of  divine grace by the convert occurred in a single, momentous 
and clearly identifiable occasion. With no need of  intermediaries of  any sort and after which the convert 
was a new creature; he had been born again due to the influx of  grace rendered by the Holy Spirit (Kelleter 
2009: 166). It was precisely this understanding of  the operation of  divine grace that seemed so 
 
3 Revivalism is, according to the definition given by Philip Gura (2005), ‘the encouragement of  religious 
renewal as communal experience’ (p.49), or what Solomon Stoddard called harvests of  souls. 
15 
 
troublesome to orthodox Puritans and could easily culminate, from their perspective, in Enthusiasm and 
Antinomianism. Enthusiasm refers to the belief  in unmediated personal communication with God, while 
Antinomianism to the charge, commonly hurled to groups such as the Quakers and other Anabaptists, of  
believing that God manifests ‘in impulses and impressions, [in] special revelations to individual persons’ 
(Brockway 2003: 187); and, as previously mentioned, and particularly vexing to the patrician Puritans of  
the age, in their conviction that God does not operate through mediators like ministers or priests. 
 It was against this background of  detractors and supporters of  the awakenings, of  Old Lights or 
Arminians (Old Sides for their Presbyterian allies in the Middle colonies) and New Lights (New Sides in 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania) or Antinomians respectively, that the writings and sermons of  Charles 
Chauncy, minister of  Boston’s prominent First Church, gained increased prestige and became, along with 
Jonathan Mayhew of  Boston’s West Church, the leader of  the defenders of  the New England Way, of  
orthodoxy: the Old Lights (Robinson 2012: 27; Gura 2005: 123; Brockway 2003: 10). 
 A word concerning Arminianism seems warranted at this point. In opposition to theological 
determinism or predestination that characterized conventional or orthodox Calvinism, Arminians, named 
after the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius (1560-1619), believed that human beings do have a role to 
play in the story of  their eternal destinies. Through the exercise of  free will, they can choose what is good 
and hence be among the elect. Therefore, for Arminians, Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross is atonement in a 
universal sense, not just for the elect as orthodox Puritans would claim. Also in a more general sense, 
Arminianism became a libel to be pronounced against anyone espousing or exhibiting any type of  liberal 
thought or behaviour in religion (Gura 2005). 
 But Arminianism was not the only religious response in the face of  Puritan theological 
determinism (i.e., Calvinistic predestinarianism). If  Arminianism tended to be the stance of  educated 
clergy (of  Old Lights), revivalism came up with optimistic millennialism (Ferguson 1997: 51-52). Joseph 
Bellamy, sharing the millennial leanings of  his mentor Edwards, writes in one of  the most widely read 
sermons of  the time (The Millenium [1758]) about how Christ’s re-entrance into human history and His 
establishment of  a thousand year reign ‘will change the nature and meaning of  history’ (ibid., p.52); and in 
so doing, it will also erase the dreaded prospect of  eternal damnation as the outcome of  divine 
predestination. It is not unwarranted as well to speculate about the role that this millennialist optimism 
might have played in the growing sense of  national identity and in the ensuing call to arms that separation 
from England entailed; for as Robert Ferguson remarks, millennialist optimism ‘pushes revivalism 
inexorably toward the notion of  harmony and union in this world, and, for that purpose, toward the need 
for conviction and action by a united people’ (id.). Edwards, particularly in Some Thoughts Concerning the 
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Present Revival [1743], is illustrative in this respect, but millennialist concerns were commonplace during the 
eighteenth century. As this work will also make clear, these were concerns also shared by Chauncy (id.). 
Antinomianism and Arminianism, ‘the classical heresies of  the Puritan tradition’, might deserve a 
few more words owing to their importance for our work, especially in the dialectical relation that they have 
with each other as latent tendencies inherent to Puritan orthodoxy (Chamberlain 1992: 340-341). Among 
the divine attributes, Christianity has historically given preeminence to divine benevolence and 
omnipotence; and in their intention to dispose of  the contradiction that seems to exist between them, 
theologians have emphasized or given relevance to one in detriment of  the other. Orthodox Puritans for 
instance, and Reformed theology more generally, provide us with a picture of  divinity that subordinates 
divine benevolence to divine omnipotence, and that claims to preserve the former by emphasizing ‘the 
original goodness of  created nature’ (ibid., p.341). 
Now this precarious equilibrium is clear to see in the Puritan quarrels over the process of  
redemption. Accordingly, orthodox divines, in their attempt to preserve the divine sovereignty through the 
redemption process, held fast to concepts such as free grace and solfidianism and presented a 
corresponding image of  human nature that ‘in its radical sinfulness is incapable of  effecting its own 
salvation’ (id.). The classical heresies in Puritanism just mentioned could thus be seen as exaggerations of  
inclinations or tendencies inherent to Puritan doctrine, and hence defined accordingly: antinomianism, ‘out 
of  a desire to glorify God and debase the creature’, unduly overestimates the role of  divine grace in the 
salvation process to the extent that it makes us mere spectators in the drama of  our own redemption;  
contrastingly, by empowering our capacity for achieving our own salvation, Arminianism appears to lose 
sight of  the divine initiative, with the result that ‘redemption becomes the product not of  God’s good 
pleasure but [solely] of  human effort’ (ibid., p.432). 
As the awakenings spread and the heightened emotionalism associated with them seemed to spiral 
out of  control, Edwards commences a series of  publications aimed at both discerning clearly what 
constituted affections that were the genuine outcome of  a work of  divine grace from those that did not 
(The Distinguishing Marks of  a Work of  the Spirit of  God [1741] and A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections 
[1746]), as well as to defend the revivals from their growing critics (Some Thoughts Concerning the Present 
Revival of  Religion in New England [1742]). It was as a response to Distinguishing Marks that Chauncy dived 
into the pamphlet battle with The Late Religious Commotions in New England Considered (1743), although he 
had already made a name for himself  a year before with his Enthusiasm Described and Cautioned Against, a 
hallmark of  anti-revivalist literature (Gura 2005: 123). 
 A Harvard graduate and a patrician through and through (grandson of  Harvard’s second 
President), Chauncy was an educated reader interested in both Science (Newton) and Philosophy (e.g. 
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Locke and the moral philosophers of  the Scottish Enlightenment) (Kelleter 2009: 173-174). He was also a 
charter member of  the American Society of  Arts and Sciences in 1780, and the undisputed intellectual 
leader of  the Arminian clergy and the chosen one among his camp to counter and give response to 
Edwards’ publications (Gura 2005: 123).  
To be sure, the issues that disturbed and angered most Old Lights had to do with the behaviour 
displayed by the revivalists that tended to unsettle traditional church structure and order. As professor 
Philip Gura (2005) explains, the attack of  Old Lights tended to revolve around three topics: (1) the 
conduct of  itinerant preachers and lay exhorters, that is, people without formal training in pastoral duties 
and who embarked in preaching and exhorting;4 (2) the antinomian tendency observed in the converts of  
the awakenings, and this associated with the concomitant tendency to rash judgment as to the spiritual 
state of  other people, particularly aimed at what they regarded as unconverted ministers (those having not 
experienced a spiritual rebirth); and, (3) the excessive emotionalism of  the awakened (p.111). All these 
topics are lengthy dealt with in Chauncy’s book Seasonable Thoughts on the State of  Religion in New England 
(1743). 
 But there were certainly other, more ethical objections raised by Old Lights like Chauncy against 
the behaviour displayed by revivalist preachers. Ava Chamberlain, drawing on the work of  the political 
theorist Judith Shklar, argues that the post-awakening Arminian ascendancy in New England was driven, 
to a large extent, by a revulsion to cruelty; a cruelty to be found not only in the uncharitable behaviour of  
these itinerant preachers, but as well in some key aspects of  Puritan doctrine like double predestination or 
the belief  in complete human impotence in matters of  salvation (1992: 347). Making use of  Shklar’s 
concept of  ‘ordinary vices’, she claims that the premodern moral world of  Puritanism, with its emphasis 
on sin against God (and therein with pride as the chief  transgression) tended to downplay more ‘ordinary 
vices’ (or sins) like cruelty, hypocrisy, treachery, snobbery, or misanthropy (Shklar 1984: 2; cited in 
Chamberlain). Chamberlain claims that the appearance of  cruelty and hypocrisy in revivalism―a cruelty 
that Chauncy saw clearly, for example, in the rhetoric of  the revivalist preachers and their use of  terror; 
and a hypocrisy evinced for our theologian not only in the censoriousness displayed by these itinerants 
against established ministers, but as well in the many he had believed to have been converted during the 
revivals, but that he saw going swiftly to their old ways― is central to explicating a ‘new 
sensitivity…[against] cruelty in orthodox Puritanism, [that] culminated some ten years later in an 
 
4 For instance, one of  the most popular sermons of  the period―The Danger of  an Unconverted Ministry 
[1740] by Gilbert Tennent likens those ministers opposed to the revivals to Pharisees and blames them for 
lacking the courage or ‘honesty to thrust the Nail of  Terror into sleeping souls’ (Tennent 1740: cited in 
Ferguson 1997: 54). 
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unabashed support for Arminianism by such prominent divines as Charles Chancy, Jonathan Mayhew, and 
Ebenezer Gay’ (Chamberlain 1992: 347).        
 Now one of  the fortunate outcomes of  the revivalists’ quarrels over ministerial preaching style and 
training was the creation of  a series of  educational institutions throughout the colonies during the middle 
and second half  of  the century. As expected, New Lights took the initiative by founding the College of  
New Jersey (later Princeton University) in 1746. As a response, Anglicans established King’s College 
(afterwards Columbia University) in New York in 1754. In 1764, Brown University commenced as a 
Baptist enterprise in Rhode Island. And in 1776, Dutch New Lights constituted Queen’s College, later 
Rutgers University in New Jersey (Ferguson 1997: 57). We should not forget as well the importance of  
Harvard College for Old Light theology. 
 Since, as we have explained, the concept of  conversion (of  being born again) through immediate 
grace was cardinal to the revivals, we deem it necessary to say a few more words about it, as well as the 
doctrinal or dogmatic context in which it operated: Puritanism and Evangelicalism. As Robert Brockway 
(2003) points out, theologically, the sources of  Puritanism include, along with Calvin, the writings of  the 
apostle Paul and those of  Augustine (354-430). All of  their soteriologies give an uppermost relevance to 
the concept of  New Birth, and all three also are predestinarians,5 i.e., they hold to the notion that God has 
decided or predestined all persons to ‘either damnation or redemption’ (p.180). In this scheme, the pious 
actions of  individual human beings (what was then called ‘works’) are of  no consequence to the decrees 
of  divinity. Redemption comes, if  at all, through a free and largely unmerited gift of  grace endowed by the 
operation of  the Holy Ghost. 
 And having in mind the Anglo-American political tensions of  the time, it seems important to bring 
our attention to other intellectual sources of  Puritanism, such as its inherent aversion to centralized 
authority, its primitivism, ‘the legalism of  covenant theology, and biblical exegesis as a regular cultural 
practice’ (Ferguson 1997: 46). Such sources, according to many, lend themselves easily to oppositional 
rhetoric, and do so, among other reasons, because a Puritan conversion experience ‘ritually exposes the 
sinful heart to public judgement [and] it also contrasts good and evil and relates individual morality to 
communal prosperity in compulsive ways’ (id.). Under such an ideological framework, the prospect of  
identifying and resisting an ‘unworthy leadership’ becomes more tenable (id.). 
 As for Evangelicalism, it is customary among historians of  religion in North America to regard the 
awakenings as the crucial period when religion in that part of  the world acquired its characteristic 
 
5 While many, perhaps even a majority, of  Christian theologians would bracket the apostle Paul in this 
predestinarian category with the likes of  Augustine or Calvin, there is a different strand of  Christian 
scholars that picture Paul as nothing less than a universalist (e.g. John Hick). 
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evangelical ethos, exemplified by the enormous gains in membership that sects like the Methodists and 
Baptists reaped during those years. And since sudden, dramatic conversions―of  the kind epitomized by 
the narratives of  Paul and his conversion on the road to Damascus, or of  Augustine’s touching conversion 
scene that we encounter in his Confessions―constitutes one, if  not the most fundamental aspect of  
Evangelical religion, we felt the urge to at least mention here the stages of  what an evangelical religious 
experience consists in: ‘conviction, conversion, and sanctification’ (Brockway 2003: 65). A process 
encountered in virtually all examples given by Edwards in his Faithfull Narrative of  the Surprising Work of  God 
in the Conversion of  Many Hundred Souls (1737), which is the work that catapulted him from provincial 
irrelevance to ‘the chief  American spokesperson for transatlantic evangelism’ (Gura 2005: 79, 85). 
 The Great Awakening in sum had convinced Chauncy that New England theology required 
revision, for he believed that a theology that insisted so severely in God’s rejection of  human depravity 
and that moreover ‘hammered home the [high] probability of  damnation’ for everyone, ‘lent itself  by its 
very nature to abuse’ (Griffin 1980: 110). If  social and ecclesiastical disorder were the assured outcomes 
of  an emotional religious reaction to dour Calvinism, then the tenets themselves might need some revision 
(id.). Thus, between the years 1745 and 1761 our author, with his characteristic intensity and diligence, 
embarked on the task of  creating a new ‘body of  divinity’ which he hoped would preclude the appearance 
of  other would-be Edwards or Whitefields, which he believed preyed on the fears and irrationality that he 
saw as the quid of  New Light theology (id.). In this task, however, he did not entirely reject his Puritan 
heritage, as the influence of  theologians like Richard Baxter or John Taylor evince, but it is clear that, as 
Norman Brantley Gibbs remarked and the pages of  this work will make clear, Chauncy was also open to 
eighteenth century optimism. 
 Before moving to our analysis of  the intellectual and political climate of  those years, we believe it 
is probably worth mentioning here as well what became the most significant theological debate in British 
North America in those years: the debate about the doctrine of  Original Sin. It was the work of  John 
Taylor (1694-1761) and his reinterpretation of  the moral condition of  the first couple―one in which, 
unlike orthodox Puritan belief, they were not the beneficiaries of  the preternatural gift of  original 
righteousness, but would be more accurately described as in a condition of  moral primitiveness―that 
precipitated the rebuttals of  defenders of  the ancient doctrine, chief  among them Jonathan Edwards (The 
Great Christian Doctrine of  Original Sin Defended [1758]) (Griffin 1981: 121-122). Chauncy knew and respected 
Taylor’s work, but he believed him ultimately mistaken in his reinterpretation of  the doctrine. As the pages 
of  this work will reveal, Chauncy would come up with a theoretical proposal of  his own for the doctrine. 
Symptomatic of  the theological times, in a relatively short period of  time New England Puritans would 
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pass from unanimous adherence to orthodoxy in this doctrine prior to 1750 to considerable modifications 
‘by some of  the most liberal thinkers’ (Smith 1955: 1; cited in Griffin 1981). 
 
Enlightenment and Politics 
An overview, however brief, of  the cultural context of  British North America in the eighteenth century 
must also take into account two variables of  relevance―one political and the other intellectual in kind―but 
both of  them closely linked to each other, as well as to the Puritan religion that was the outcome of  
seventeenth century New England: the Enlightenment, in the particular shape it took in that part of  the 
British Empire, and the war of  independence that in many respects officialised the relative autonomy of  
the North American colonies from England. 
 Americans receive, or better yet borrow, enlightened ideas within a context of  political conflict 
with London. Therefore, unlike the European Enlightenment and its belated sense of  urgency and 
historical crisis, in North America the Enlightenment ‘begins in the political arena, where it unleashes the 
earliest recognitions of  stress and disjuncture’ (Ferguson 1997: 38); i.e., it is not ‘the celebration of  
knowledge’ so much as the ‘struggle towards realization’, towards national and political realization that is, 
‘that creates meaning and interest’ in the American version of  enlightened thought (ibid., p.41). 
 American intellectuals of  the time, despite their penchant for enlightened ideas, are not so much 
concerned with the provenance or with the ‘details of  systems of  thought’, but with the adaptation and 
application of  those ideas in a context of  a new world and elitist republicanism (ibid., pp.34-35). This 
strange blend of  ‘decontextualized thought’ and of  yet sincere belief  in abstractions is made evident by 
the writings of  the leaders of  the American political revolt such as Thomas Jefferson (e.g. The Declaration 
of  Independence [1776]). This however should not be understood as an outright American rejection of  
intellectual traditions or as mere opportunism as Robert Ferguson remarks, but there is definitely, one 
could argue, a pragmatic and utilitarian approach to the way in which colonial intellectuals select, 
appropriate, and recast those ideas that would better suit with their political and social needs. These are the 
beginnings of  an intellectual tradition in North America that shuns all major social and philosophical 
systems of  thought; without a real centre of  intellectual gravity, and always prone to select and use, but as 
well to condemn and discard, those elements which it encounters in its path. But returning to our matter at 
hand, these colonial intellectuals came to understand such enlightened ideas, above all, ‘within the praxis 
of  a successful revolution’ (id.). 
 As for the countries and intellectual currents from which they borrowed―from England empirical 
investigation and epistemology; ‘Newtonian science and Lockean psychology; the Whig theory of  history... 
and the rights of  English subjects’ (ibid., pp.35-36). From France the application of  a philosophy of  
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history to political science, ‘a distrust of  organized religion’, the concept of  the man of  science or 
philosophe as citizen of  the world, and ‘a belief  in a natural order’ (id.). From Scotland the conservative 
tendency, plain to see in the political writings of  the time in the colonies, to furnish ‘a secular vocabulary 
that nevertheless keeps providence safely in mind’ (ibid., p.36); an emphasis on the importance of  public 
education, and the ideological basis for a colony’s right to revolt. And from continental natural lawyers (e.g. 
Grotius, von Pufendorf, Burlamaqui or Vattel) the idea of  a government that is the outcome of  a contract 
or ‘compact under the law’ (id.); and naturally, natural law.      
 As will become clear in the following chapters, there is a definite strand of  natural law in the moral 
and theological reasoning of  our minister. While some have attributed this to Chauncy’s acquaintance with 
the moral philosophers of  the Scottish Enlightenment―some of  which have a distant kinship with natural 
law―, it is perhaps worth remembering that ‘Grotian ideas of  natural law’ were fairly known in the 
English-speaking world of  the time, including British North America (Haakonssen 1985: 48). Moreover, 
natural law ideas of  Germanic and Swiss writers like Pufendorf, Vattel or Burlamaqui were commonly 
used in conjunction with conventional English law in both Britain and North America (id.). And it might 
not be entirely unwarranted on our part to draw a parallel―albeit with considerable provisions for 
differences in context and time― between how a Grotian appeal of  natural law was part of  a more general 
‘Arminian contribution to the upsurge of  religious and ethical rationalism in the face of  orthodox 
Calvinism’ and Antinomianism in England, and a North American colonial context who was likewise 
reacting to both dour Calvinistic dogma and Antinomianism. In England antinomian concerns reached 
their peak in the 1640s, while in North America they are usually associated to the times of  the revivals (id.). 
In this respect it is safe to state that this work will present Chauncy as both a decided enemy of  
Antinomianism as well as a religious rationalist. 
 But harkening back to the American Enlightenment and its similarities with its French counterpart 
and their shared distrust to organized religion notwithstanding, North American intellectuals avail 
themselves of  religious topics and vocabulary to advance their political agenda. They find it both safer and 
more effective to at least couch their social and political concerns in religious language. Thus, one of  the 
distinctive features of  the American Enlightenment is that it rests ‘in the common or shared rhythms and 
patterns that the Enlightenment has taken from Christianity’ (Ferguson, 1997: 42). In this manner the 
congregational dislike for centralized authority and its strong belief  in self-government pairs or joins the 
enlightened ‘use of  reason against mere authority’ (ibid., p.43). In keeping with the times, it should come as 
no surprise then that Chauncy rejects as immoral theological conceptions such as divine command theory. 
In sum, there is simply no way of  understanding this period of  American history without recognizing this 
‘interplay between religion and politics as a source of  liberty’ (ibid., p.45). 
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 Now this antiauthoritarian religious bent is plain to see in the apprehensions generated by the 
prospect of  the establishment of  an American Episcopacy, fears that reached their zenith between the 
years 1767-1770 and brought about significant acrimony throughout the colonies against the Church of  
England (ibid., p.47). And as proof  of  its significance, it fostered even more publications than the Stamp 
Act dispute ever did (id.). It is hence correct to regard such fears, however unfounded they might have 
been, as one of  the chief  factors in the ensuing revolt against England.    
 It is in this embattled context once again that Chauncy gains notoriety by becoming the most vocal 
minister in the struggle against the Church of  England in this matter (id.). Though it is likewise true that 
these publications served other purposes as well, such as that of  identification beyond religious lines, of  
ministers that tended to share a general political outlook that could be best described as separatist (from 
England that is) in kind; i.e., publications like Chauncy’s A Letter to a Friend [1767], written as a response to 
John Lord Bishop of  Landaff, not only served the cause of  antiepiscopacy, but are used by ministers and 
their readers to ‘recognize each other across denominational affiliations’ (id.). Such publications, moreover, 
play a crucial role in the growing ‘colonial self-recognition’ in the years prior to war with England, and one 
recurrent device for doing so is by portraying Britain in the most ominous terms possible. Again, Chauncy 
is illustrative in this respect, and the dichotomies he relies on usually posit an innocent and virtuous 
America, against a corrupted England; between ‘American piety’ and ‘British manipulation’; in sum, the 
whole contrast is reduced to a confrontation of  good versus evil (ibid., p.48). And under the context of  
liberty of  conscience that made ecclesiastical differences permissible in the colonies, Chauncy can 
excoriate British culture and yet remain free of  political charges of  dissent (id.). It is important to mention 
in this respect, that for the upper echelons of  Anglo-American society of  the time, the biggest concern 
was not heresy, but treason (id.). 
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Chapter 2. Chauncy’s theology of  Sin and Original Sin 
 
Before our philosophical treatment of  Charles Chauncy’s theology, we will devote the following chapter, as 
well as chapters 4 and 6, to outlining our author’s main theological ideas bracketed under the rubrics of  
Original Sin, Redemption, and the Afterlife respectively. Due to the nature of  the topics to be covered and 
in order to better situate Chauncy’s ideas within a bigger theological framework, a brief  historical 
background seems warranted and will therefore be provided at the outset of  each of  these chapters. 
The structure of  the following chapter is as follows: (1) we will provide a brief  historical survey of  
the concept of  Original Sin, and then move to consider Chauncy’s theological ideas gathered around the 
concepts of  (2) Human nature (and Imago Dei), (3) Moral Agency (and Empiricism), (4) Covenants, (5) The 
Problem of  Evil, (6) Original Sin, and finally (7) his attack on both theological Realism and some of  the 
ideas of  Jonathan Edwards. 
 
1.Theological and Scriptural Background to the Doctrine of  Original Sin. 
Christian thinking assumes that the created order, and humanity in particular, have fallen into disarray. 
That things are not, to borrow a phrase from a noted theologian, what they were meant to be and that this 
is mainly owing to the universality of  sin (McGrath 2011: 315). Since Paul, it has been argued that the 
prevalence of  misery in the world, the sinful proclivities that men evince, and the universal death that they 
are subjected to cannot be understood apart from the original lapse of  the first couple; a sin that is 
inherited by all of  his descendants (John Paul II 1993). Original sin has been the principal explanation 
given by Christianity to account for this pervasive turpitude, but as well for the connected assertion that 
everyone is in need of  a saviour (Rea 2007: 320).       
 It seems appropriate at this point to draw attention to some distinctions traditionally made by 
orthodoxy regarding sin. There are of  course regular or conventional types of  sin, usually termed actual 
sins, which have to do with particular breaches of  God’s law or will; but there is as well Original Sin, 
understood as the ‘radical and universal sinful human condition’ that is a direct consequence of  the 
primary lapse of  Adam6(Migliore 2004: 155). Our interest in this section of  our work will gravitate 
naturally towards this latter type of  sin. But there is another and more commonsensical distinction worthy 
to be mentioned here as well, a distinction related to the gravity of  the sin: there are mortal sins, that is, 
serious transgressions of  God’s law that supposedly ‘bring death to the soul, unless repentance follows’; 
and venial sins, lesser wrongdoings that do not compromise our relationship to God (Curtis 1950: 65).
 
6 By radical we are to understand that this sinful condition affects every aspect of  our lives (Migliore 2004: 
155). 
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 It is likewise significant to add that our understanding of  sin would be insufficient if  we see it 
merely as the violation of  certain rules or standards as encountered in a given moral code (the Decalogue). 
Instead, theologians down the ages have emphasized its relational aspect, viz., that sin is fundamentally a 
disruption of  our relationship with God (Migliore 2004: 151); a relationship that can be amended only 
through divine grace. A treatment of  the relationship of  grace with salvation will be deferred to a latter 
chapter of  this work, where the soteriological aspects of  Chauncy’s theology will be analysed (Ch.4).
 It certainly would be misleading to claim that there has historically been an agreed upon definition 
of  the doctrine of  Original Sin (from hereupon DOS). However, there are some distinctions that might 
prove of  help in our making sense of  the concept and that have been accepted by many theologians and 
philosophers alike: (1) the (sinful) disobedience by the first couple that initiated this corruption of  our 
nature (Crisp 2009: 227); (2) Original Sin as the inherited morally corrupt or vitiated condition that we 
receive from the first couple and that makes it certain that we will sin for ourselves; and, (3) our guilty 
condition from birth as a consequence of  this original lapse (id.). Point number three is usually referred to 
as the doctrine of  original guilt, and even though it is now sometimes treated as separate from the DOS, 
we will follow those that consider it as an integral component of  the doctrine, at least in this part of  our 
work (a distinction of  importance in our subsequent analysis of  Chauncy’s treatment of  this matter) (Rea 
2007: 319).          
It seems that, however brief, a historical account of  the DOS would be incomplete without some 
attention paid to the biblical account of  the Fall and the significance such an account has for both 
Catholic and protestant-oriented narratives of  the doctrine. The Catholic narrative of  the Fall―largely as 
encountered in the Council of  Trent, itself  heavily reflecting medieval Scholastic theology―, besides 
favouring a consideration of  it as an actual event in time, argues that the Fall did not corrupt human 
nature entirely (it is better to think of  it, as Catholicism does, as ‘a deprivation of  original holiness and 
justice... it is wounded in the natural powers proper to it, subject to ignorance, suffering and the dominion 
of  death, and inclined to sin’ [John Paul II 1993]), but that what was lost by the first couple, and for their 
posterity as well, was a sort of  supernatural or preternatural gift that purportedly enabled the first humans 
to always properly order their inclinations so as to always abstain from sinning; i.e., ‘an ordering of  the 
powers of  the human soul, and body, such that all of  them, including all the emotions and desires and all 
the functions of  the body, obeyed the highest part of  the soul, the reason’ (Adams 1999: 235). This 
supernatural gift is called ‘original justice’ or ‘original righteousness’ (justitia originalis), and it is not 
completely restored by baptism. What baptism does provide in its place is what is termed ‘sanctifying 
grace’, which although it potentially enables the soul to properly love God again―that is, provided the 
person makes due use of  its freedom―, it does not restore the previous and preternatural ordering of  all 
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the human powers; so that desires and emotions remain in an autonomous condition from our reason, a 
condition of  (natural) disorder termed concupiscence (id.).      
However undesirable this disorder might be, being natural, it is not altogether sinful according to 
Catholic theology. It could be called, as the Catholic Catechism does, ‘tinder for sin’ in the sense that this 
disagreement between desires and reason ‘can burst into flames if  sin comes along to set it off ’ (id.). 
Therefore on the Catholic view, any sin committed by a person after baptism would not be ‘original’, but 
‘actual’ sin (id.). Whereas the Reformers believed that the Fall did not entail the loss of  a supernatural gift, 
but something that could be regarded as belonging to human nature itself. It would be more precise to 
describe it, as M. Rea does, as a sort of  ‘positive addition of  a new kind of  wickedness to a once pristine 
human nature’ (2007: 323); that is, as a sort of  disposition or inclination to disobey God and which 
renders human nature (v.gr. Augustine and Calvin) as thoroughly corrupted. Since what we talk about here 
is of  our own nature becoming corrupted, the following disorder, also labeled concupiscence by the 
Reformers, cannot be excused on the grounds that it is ‘natural’ (Adams 1999: 235). For these writers, 
concupiscence itself  is sin (id.).         
 From what has been mentioned, it could be argued that the Catholic and Protestant accounts of  
the DOS have both epistemological foundations as well as subject matters that differ from each other 
(ibid., p.236). The Protestant account could be considered as empirical in the sense that it takes as its 
starting point (in a manner similar to Kant) the behavior of  both adults and children as encountered in 
everyday life, and from there assumes that this morally corrupt disposition must have existed in us before 
the commission of  any actual sins; a fact that also sheds light on the tendency observable within some 
sector of  Protestant theology (e.g. Schleiermacher, and Reinhold Niebuhr) to downplay the role that the 
traditional narrative of  the Fall plays in their conception of  the DOS and to regard it mainly in illustrative 
terms, that is, as being a sort of  parable, of  providing a kind of  model for the recognition of  our own 
baseness7 (ibid., p.235). Kant’s use of  Horace’s phrase sums up this outlook on the traditional narrative of  
the Fall―‘Mutate nomine de te fabula narratur ‘(change but the name, of  thee the tale is told) (Kant 1949: 37; 
cited in Crisp 2009).           
 It should be noted though, that the Fall narrative, as well as the concept of  Original Sin itself, has 
always encountered some resistance within Christianity or at the very least has never enjoyed unanimous 
acceptance. To provide but a few examples, in the patristic period, particularly among some Greek patristic 
 
7 Indeed, we can see the strength of  the claim that the Protestant doctrine of  the DOS is not entirely, or 
even primarily, about infants, whereas the Catholic doctrine is fundamentally about infants and based on 
the political context of  the time about non-Christian inhabitants of  newfound territories (Adams 1999: 
235). 
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writers, there is a conspicuous absence of  a Fall narrative, at least in terms of  a doctrine of  Original Sin as 
would become later associated with Augustine. For these classical theologians, sin is the outcome of  an 
abuse of  human free will.8 With the advent of  the Enlightenment and its desire to revise under rational 
and moral lenses every aspect of  Christian thought, the very notion of  inherited guilt as expressed in the 
DOS became increasingly suspicious. And in the nineteenth century, liberal Protestantism emerging from 
Germany considered that the DOS as construed by Augustine was due to a misreading of  Scripture by the 
North African writer, whose ‘judgement on these matters had become clouded by his over-involvement 
with a fatalist sect (the Manichees)’ (McGrath 2011: 82, 329).      
 Despite the different versions of  the DOS, Christian thought on this topic was heavily influenced 
by the ideas of  Augustine of  Hippo (354 – 430), so that a brief  perusal of  his thought seems warranted at 
this point. As is well known, the Pelagian controversy of  the fifth century was the catalyst that brought 
Augustine’s and the Church’s attention to issues related with sin, but also with human nature more 
generally as well as with grace and free will. We will therefore go over Augustine’s ideas on these issues 
within the bigger context of  such theological dispute (ibid., p.351), that is, as they were articulated in 
response to the Pelagian challenge.9         
 As a corollary to the Fall, Augustine believed humanity had been fundamentally affected by sin. 
Among its consequences, the chief  casualties would be our minds and wills―so that our minds are unable 
to think clearly as they have become darkened by sin; whilst our wills have been weakened or incapacitated, 
though not entirely destroyed through sin10 (ibid., p.352). Furthermore, we have no control over such 
condition, and our predicament is further increased by the fact that as it inhabits and pollutes our lives 
from the very beginning, this inherent bias towards evil guarantees that we will commit individual acts of  
sin thereafter (id.); that is, to what we previously referred to as actual sins.    
 In order to describe the nature of  Original Sin, Augustine relied heavily on analogies of  which we 
consider the following four to be particularly illustrative: (1) Original Sin as a disease, as some form of  
hereditary disease that is; a condition to which no human cure can be provided, and which in turn helps to 
account for Augustine’s conviction that the church should be regarded as a sort of  hospital, and where 
 
8 In stark contrast to what Augustine would later express, Gregory of  Nazianzus and Gregory of  Niza 
believed that children are born sinless (McGrath 2011: 350). 
9 Even though the key figures in this dispute were indeed Pelagius and Augustine, Pelagianism is better 
understood as a movement based on the ideas of  various writers located in Rome during the last years of  
the fourth century―Pelagius mostly, but Caelestius and Rufinus of  Syria as well (McGrath 2011: 351). 
10 In order for free will to be restored or healed on the Augustinian (and orthodox) account, the operation 
of  divine grace is imperative. Therefore, although Augustine does not deny the existence of  free will, it is 
nonetheless in our sinful postlapsarian condition ‘distorted, compromised, and weakened by sin’ (McGrath 
2011: 351). 
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Christians are merely those that have come to recognize their illness (ibid., p.355); (2) the Good Samaritan 
parable comes to mind at this point as well, where Augustine considered human nature to be like the man 
left for dead by the roadside and Christ as the Samaritan who rescues and heals our wounded nature (id.); 
(3) sin as a power that holds us captives: our free will on such analogy, and human nature in general, ‘is 
captivated by the power of  sin’ (liberum arbitrium captivatum), and can only be liberated by the power of  
divine grace (liberum arbitrium liberatum) (ibid., pp.353, 355); and (4) sin as guilt, as inherited guilt; one of  the 
central features of  Augustine’s doctrine on Original Sin and where Christ is regarded as bringing forth 
mercy and absolution (ibid., p.353).         
 From what has been mentioned so far, it is clear that there is a very close theological connection 
between issues of  human nature, sin, salvation, and the doctrine of  divine grace. Accordingly, these topics 
will be given special attention during the following pages of  this chapter as we now embark on the 
exposition of  Chauncy’s theological ideas on sin and Original Sin, starting with his thoughts on our 
common nature and the ways in which it relates to the divine. 
2. Human Nature and Imago Dei           
 Christianity has historically regarded mankind as the epitome of  creation: that man alone was created in 
God’s image (Gen. 1:26a). Unlike the rest of  creatures, man was not created through the ‘instrumentality 
of  second causes, operating according to established laws’ says Chauncy, but through a direct exertion of  
divine power (1785: 6). One way of  interpreting this likeness to God’s image is in the sense of  man, in his 
bodily (or outward) form, being of  a more eminent or excellent kind than the rest of  creatures, which is 
not to be confused with a corporeal likeness to God (anthropomorphism), ‘who is a pure spirit’ (ibid., 
pp.13-14). Similar to Augustine’s or Calvin’s interpretation of  the account of  creation in Genesis, Chauncy 
considers that when the biblical authors ascribe bodily parts or motion to God it is so done as a form of  
concession to our limited understandings.       
 Although the origins of  this tendency within theological language are to be found in Greek 
classical rhetorical theory―v.gr. Origen’s insistence that just as a father must adapt or, better yet, 
accommodate his language such as to be better understood by the limited intellectual resources of  his 
children, so God had to condescend and ‘come down to us, accommodating to our weakness’ so that we 
could comprehend his message and intentions [McGrath 2011: 192]―, it was Calvin in the sixteenth 
century who developed the theory now referred to as accommodation and that purports to explain how this 
immense gulf  between creator and creature is to be bridged in order for communication to take place11 
 
11 There is, according to a prominent Calvin scholar, ‘at least a twofold accommodation of  God’s nature’ 
to our limited capacities: (1) one connected to our inability to think and speak of  God in any other form 
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(Helm 2009: 28-29).          
 Moreover, says Chauncy, there are some that interpret this likeness to divinity in the sense of  God 
having endowed mankind with dominion over the rest of  creatures; a claim not without biblical warrant 
(Gen. 1:26) as our author himself  points out. On such an interpretation, man ‘resembles God in its 
exercise of  power and dominion over the other creatures’ (Migliore 2004: 140), but surely, according to 
Chauncy, this is not the entire meaning or ‘the whole of  that likeness to God in which man was created’ 
(1785: 14). This is the first instance of  a topic characteristic to eighteenth century intellectual life and to 
which our author, particularly in his major work on theodicy (The Benevolence of  the Deity...), gives 
endorsement to: The Great Chain of  Being as that overall system of  living creatures bound together by 
innumerable links, and arranged in a hierarchical scale from the lowest forms of  life, to the highest (God) 
(Griffin 1980: 114).           
 Being made in the image of  God is to be understood in His having endowed man with a 
constitution of  nature such that his intellectual and moral faculties could be developed gradually―under 
God’s guidance and due use of  them―towards perfection (Chauncy 1785: 18). Our author’s position on 
this is closer to another patristic position and generally regarded as the dominant interpretation, at least in 
the Western theological tradition, and which tended to interpret the image of  God in man in terms of  
human rational faculty; a faculty that somehow ‘mirrors the wisdom of  God’12 (McGrath 2011: 349; 
Migliore 2004: 140). It accordingly should not be read as if  the first couple was created already perfect in 
both moral and intellectual faculties. Therefore, Adam and Eve, despite having been created as adults 
when considering their bodily form, were completely deprived of  experiential or practical knowledge and 
could be considered as infants in this respect; an assertion with significant moral and epistemological 
implications as the following chapters of  this work will reveal (Chauncy 1785: 16-19, 23, 24). 
 In answering the claim that it would have perhaps evinced a greater goodness on God’s part if  He 
had created us in an already perfect state (morally and intellectually), Chauncy points to the Thomist 
connection between intellectual and moral improvements. The key concept here is the happiness or 
pleasure that is the outcome ‘of  a due use of  the faculties we are endowed with’ (ibid., p.32). Had God 
given to us this perfection as an ‘absolute gift’, there would have been no occasion or opportunity on our 
 
other than our ordinary human language, which is characterized by ‘subject-predicate’ articulation and by 
the necessity of  advancing from premises about God to conclusions about His nature; and (2) the other is 
the result of  God’s habit of  making Himself  known to us ‘in language that implies embodiment in human 
form, as well as him having passions and suffering change’ (Helm 2009: 28-29). 
12 For Aquinas and other classical theologians, this human rational faculty is ‘a participation in and 
reflection of  the divine logos or reason by which the world was created’ (Aquinas 1981: Pt. 1, q.93, a.4; cited 
in Migliore). 
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part for the attainment of  such pleasure, which is necessarily connected ‘with the idea of  any valuable 
quality’ (id.).            
 The corrupt nature of  Adam after the Fall is to be regarded as a superinduced quality, not essential 
to his character as instrument or medium, that, based on the law of  propagation, mediated the creation of  
the rest of  mankind. What we essentially derived from him was our quality as humans, as opposed to the 
rest of  creation, but in no way does this entail that we inherited his moral state or nature―for ‘neither 
virtuous or vicious character is transmitted by propagation’ (ibid., p.170) says our writer; just in the same way 
that experience teaches us that children do not necessarily inherit the qualities of  their parents, either 
virtuous or vicious. This could be regarded as another instance of  Chauncy’s theological heterodoxy 
concerning the doctrine of  Original Sin, and which leads him, as will become evident in the following 
chapter, to do away entirely with the concept of  inherited guilt.      
 All in all, we derive a nature from Adam that is neither totally depraved or devoid of  the principles 
that render love and obedience to our maker possible. But this is not the same as to favor an account that 
would portray it ‘as perfect as our first father received it from the creating hand of  God’, in the way of  
making us capable, as he was in his innocent state, to comply with His commands (ibid., pp.206-207). It 
should thus be manifest, says Chauncy, to anyone who is conversant with Paul’s epistles, particularly 
Romans, that we come into the world ‘under a disadvantageous state of  nature’, by which we are supposed 
to understand, incapable of  being justified or sanctified, upon the foot of  strict law (ibid., p.208). 
 Just as divinity thought fit for ourselves to inherit physical attributes from our immediate 
ancestry―attributes that doubtless posit some among mankind under considerable disadvantages from the 
outset, whether in mental or moral attainments―it is likewise prudent, and not in any way nefarious on His 
part, that we are brought upon in a condition that resembles that of  our fallen father:13 an inheritance of  
attributes, it should be remembered, that is a direct consequence of  our creation taking place through the 
instrumentality of  our progenitors; that is, according to a settled course of  nature, and that in turn 
explains our disadvantage when compared to Adam, of  our derived and tainted natures. We inherit 
therefore the essential features that constitute us as human beings, but we do so in a less perfect state 
owing basically to the folly of  those instruments God saw fit to establish as ‘intermediate secondary 
causes’ (ibid., p.235). This disadvantage in our inherited natures, it should be noted, was for our author an 
outcome sort of  bound to happen since there was nothing naturally inhibiting Adam to misuse his 
implanted powers. So for Chauncy, even if  Adam ‘had continued innocent, it is not certain that his 
posterity, from generation to generation, would have had his nature transmitted to them in the same 
 
13 Keith Wyma in Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Divine Justice [2009] spouses a position similar 
to Chauncy. 
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perfect degree’ he had received it from God’s hands (ibid., p.234).     
 And to conclude this section of  our chapter, in a rather Augustinian (and Neo-platonic) manner, 
Chauncy defines man as a compound of  ‘organized matter and an animating principle of  life’; i.e., a union 
of  body and soul (ibid., p.125). Chauncy’s animating principle or soul is likewise similar to Augustine’s 
definition of  it as the principle that ‘confers life on the body’ (Curtis 1950: 16)―the body, says Chauncy, is 
but ‘a mere useless machine [unless] actuated by the soul’ (Chauncy 1785: 126). Its characteristics sound 
also Augustinian: a simple immaterial substance that remains undissolved after its separation from the 
body. From all this, death is to be regarded not necessarily as the destruction of  either body or soul, but of  
their disunion for the purposes of  life. Ultimately and based on the ‘gospel scheme of  redemption’, they 
are capable of  being reunited in the ‘same percipient individuals’ (ibid., p.127). We will come back to the 
issue of  death and its connection to sin a few pages ahead; for the moment, let us turn our attention to 
Chauncy’s thoughts regarding moral agency and his definite empiricist outlook. 
3. Moral Agency, Empiricism and Death 
Like the rest of  us, Adam was brought into the world completely deprived of  the ‘objects of  knowledge’ 
(Tabula Rasa) (ibid., p.25). Other than immediate communication from God, the only manner he had for 
attaining such objects bears a clear resemblance to Lockean epistemology, viz., by the mediate agency of  
our bodily organs (the senses) that receive the impressions from the material world and transmit them to 
our minds. These sensorial impressions and the reflections that the mind makes of  them are the real ‘inlets 
to our knowledge, and the original source of  all our attainments in it’ (id.). 
 Moreover, as humans we are compounded of  both a material body, integrated by many and 
admirably combined parts, as well as of  a spiritual element or substance (its nobler part according to 
Chauncy) endowed with faculties such as thought, consciousness, and capable of  experiencing pleasure 
and pain. Between these two main components, divinity saw fit to establish a close union or connection 
such that the body is but a ‘mere useless machine, only as it is actuated by the soul, [nor] can the soul 
actuate it, to any of  the valuable purposes of  life, till by the organs of  sensation, it is furnished with the 
materials of  knowledge’ (Chauncy 1784: 280). This is the sense or manner in which we are constituted as 
‘living active agents’ for our author (id.). 
 Our faculties when we arrive into the world are mere ‘implanted powers, absolutely incapable of  
moral exertion’ (Chauncy 1785: 162): powers or faculties that are the outcome of  a ‘course of  nature’ that 
divine wisdom saw fit to establish (ibid., p.163). The only manner therefore in which we could be held 
accountable or blameworthy for our nature depends entirely on the use, ‘good culture, and proper exercise’ 
of  these implanted powers (id.). To illustrate this point, he rhetorically asks who could blame infants for 
their lack of  understanding in such an inexperienced condition―‘is it now any fault of  ours, that we come 
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into existence thus destitute of  actual knowledge?’ (id.). Once again, it could be only due to misuse or 
neglect on our part with respect to our rational faculties, and hence only after becoming moral agents that 
an attribution of  blame, sin, or vice could be hurled against us. And what has been said of  our rational 
faculties extends, on Chauncy’s thought, to the rest of  our capacities―‘They are all, at first, mere capacities 
only, neither fitted nor designed for present moral exertion’ (ibid., p.164); to speak of  moral perversion in 
them necessarily presupposes personal wrongdoing as to their use or exertion. 
 This empiricist demeanor in Chauncy’s thought can be directly attributed to his readings of  John 
Locke, but there are other important influences in our writer in this respect, such as that of  the eighteenth 
century British philosopher David Hartley and his Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His 
Expectations [1749], or more generally that of  Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, though naturally not an empiricist 
in a modern sense of  the term, did emphasize repeatedly the complete dependence of  the human intellect 
on data gathered through sense-perception. And as with many other dimensions of  his thought, Aquinas 
here is heavily indebted to Aristotle (Curtis 1950: 160-161). 
 This emphasis on our character as rational moral creatures leads Chauncy to endorse a rather 
optimistic view of  human nature in the sense that God has created us in such a way that we are unable, 
unless due to some perversion in our understanding that would ultimately be chargeable to ourselves, to 
not recognize through our ‘natural power of  discernment’ what is right and wrong; ‘or to perceive the 
beauty of  the former, and the deformity of  the latter’ (1785:204), which is why on his account those that 
choose evil over good do so at the expense of  acting against their consciences. So, it appears that one 
could lawfully suppose that a Thomist narrative of  human nature is present in our author, as he clearly 
conveys the idea that an objective moral standard is accessible to any normally functioning human 
intellect; an objective moral standard discernible through an a priori principle of  moral sense (or common 
sense) by which we become ‘enabled at once, without the labor of  a long train of  reasoning, to distinguish 
between moral good, and moral evil, in all instances that are of  primary importance...’ (Chauncy 1784b: 
120).             
 In order to better understand this Thomistic connection between moral obligation and human 
rational faculty that our author seems to endorse, it is necessary to say a few words regarding Aquinas’ 
very hierarchical general theory of  law. It is likewise important to state at the outset of  this fourfold 
classification of  law to which we now proceed that for Aquinas law was, as G. Sabine remarks, a cosmic 
fact; that is, he conceived of  human interactions and its institutions as just one more level of  the entire 
cosmic order, ‘in which the same principles obtain that manifest themselves in different forms on the 
other levels’ (Sabine 1961: 252). There is therefore no place in Aquinas’ thought (nor in that of  Chauncy) 
for the idea that either nature or society is governed by the (arbitrary) will of  God; by a mere fiat of  His 
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will (id.).            
 The first and highest law is what he calls the Eternal Law (Lex Aeterna), which can be equated with 
divine reason itself: a law that, though above and beyond the comprehension of  finite rational creatures 
like ourselves, is not contrary to reason. Next in this descending order we encounter Divine Law (Lex 
Divina), by which we ought to understand revelation as encountered in Scripture; accordingly, this level is 
further subdivided into the old law (Lex Vetus) and the new law (Lex Nova). We then have Natural Law 
(Lex Naturalis), and since it is impossible for man to know ‘by a direct vision of  the divine nature’ the 
commands he is bound to obey in the Eternal Law, this latter is imprinted in his soul or could as well be 
considered as a ‘reflection of  divine reason in created things’ (ibid., p.253). This (natural) law is manifested 
in all creatures’ tendency to seek the good and avoid evil, and more generally in their attempt to lead a life 
better suited to their natures, which in the case of  man translates into the ‘desire for a life in which the 
rational nature may be realized’ (id.). Lastly, we have Human (positive) Law, as those binding regulations 
which aim principally to regulate the interactions among people in society.    
 Thence, the spring of  moral obligation on such a narrative is encountered in Natural Law as the 
reflection of  God’s wisdom or reason in the minds of  men. Since both in society or in the natural order or 
in the celestial sphere as well, everything is governed according to reasons or at the very least operates 
according to clear ends; and furthermore, since God himself  is ‘very reason’ and created man in His own 
image, the moral law is part of  man’s nature and it is undoubtedly his duty to obey it (Curtis 1950: 189). If  
man acts contrary to reason then, if  through an abuse of  his free will he disobeys such internal moral 
code, he is at fault intellectually; a ‘disobedience to the will of  God [that] is called sin by the theologian’ 
(id.).             
 Now moving to the topic of  the relation of  death with sin, and when pondering the 
interpretations of  noticed theologians of  his time, among which those of  Samuel Shuckford (1693-1738) 
and Henry Grove (1684-1754) stand out, and that take Paul’s words, ‘for that all have sinned’ in a rather 
literal sense, that is, that though it was by Adam’s lapse that sin entered into the world, and death by sin, 
this death would not have ‘actually passed upon all men, if  all, as they grew up to reason, had not actually 
sinned’; that is, ‘had actual sins of  their own’ (Chauncy 1785: 257). To say that death is the outcome of  our 
own sinning is to contradict the apostle, for the real cause of  our dying ‘is to be fetched, not from the sins 
which men have committed in their own persons, but from the one offense of  the one man, Adam’ (ibid., 
p.258). Furthermore, such writers seem to forget that many of  those who die do so before they are able to 
be regarded as moral agents (children), and therefore it would be preposterous to consider them as having 
properly sinned (ibid., p.259). An issue which will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter of  
this work.            
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 His own version of  Paul’s words is―‘By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and 
thus, in this way, death passed upon all men, UPON WHICH, they have all sinned’14 (ibid., pp.273-274). It 
is doubtless then for our author that the original cause of  death and sin was indeed the original lapse of  
Adam. But since death and sin are different sorts of  evil―the former a natural, while the latter a moral 
one―, it is impossible that Adam should be the source of  both in the same manner. Death indeed came to 
pass upon all men due to the judicial sentence by God, but not sin since no judicial sentence, either from 
God or man, can ascribe sin to anyone without agency on their part; no one can be made a sinner ‘without 
their own wicked choice’ according to our author (ibid., p.274). Chauncy points in support of  this 
interpretation the fact that Paul’s words don’t mention that death and sin passed upon all men, only death. 
Chauncy argues that we are to read ‘death’ in Paul’s epistles in the same complex sense as Moses uses it in 
Genesis, viz., as death accompanied by its appendages of  ‘vanity, toil, sorrow, and suffering’, and not just 
death itself, simply understood as the termination of  our physical life (ibid. p.275).   
 It is precisely this understanding of  death connected with ‘the whole disadvantage[s] under which 
we hold life since the [F]all’ that explains how we ‘all become sinners UPON, or IN CONSEQUENCE 
OF’ our subjection to it (death) (ibid., p.275), and this because our temptations to sin are essentially 
connected to our mortal bodies: to their ‘situation and circumstances’ (id.). The fear of  losing one’s life, 
the desire to acquire the good things in life and avoid the evil ones, all circumstances having to do with our 
frail mortal condition provide the occasion for sinning in all its forms. A mortal condition that likewise 
explains our inability to reign in our sinful proclivities and hence go against our better judgement―‘IN 
CONSEQUENCE of  our present suffering mortal state, we are often induced to do that, which upon sober 
reflection, we cannot but condemn ourselves for’ (ibid., p.276). Insomuch that it is impossible we earn 
‘moral rectitude, as will avail to our justification, unless placed under a more favourable dispensation than 
that of  rigid law’ (id.). Chauncy’s picture here is akin to what the more philosophical heirs of  Augustine 
called metaphysical evil, or the disheartening fact of  finitude for any creature. As we will afterwards 
explicate, however, and similar to Catholic theology on this point, there is sufficient reason to believe that 
Chauncy does not regard the fact of  finitude as an evil in itself  but considers instead that if  there is to be a 
creaturely realm at all, physical finitude was necessary (Hick 2010: 38).   
 Connected with what was just mentioned, our author asserts that there are two different senses of  
bondage that the apostle Paul writes about: (1) of  man as being ‘under bonds to death’, as subjected to the 
mortal and frail bodily condition already mentioned; and, (2) as a consequence of  such bondage and upon 
the foot of  strict law and without the assistance of  grace, of  being in bondage to animal (bodily) appetites 
 
14 Capital letters here and after as encountered in the original. 
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and inclinations (Chauncy 1784: 109). Chauncy mentions in vindication of  his interpretation the fact that 
Paul, a couple of  chapters onwards, intends to convey this same idea of  sanctification (or moral rectitude) 
being unattainable on the base of  rigid law, and this owing, essentially, to the ‘operation of  appetites and 
inclinations, seated in our mortal bodies’, which render us ineluctably to perform that which our reason 
disapproves (Chauncy 1785: 276-277). Human nature, declares Chauncy again following Paul, is subject to 
an inherent internal warring condition between two opposing principles: one being what he terms the law 
of  our member, or the flesh, while the other as the law of  the mind, or the inward man. The apostle, 
according to the Bostonian, had it in view to show that it is owing to the former principle of  action (the 
flesh) that we both do what our conscience advices to the contrary, and we do not perform that which our 
reason suggests we should (ibid., p.277).        
 In order to dispel any possible confusion that might arise in connection with the manner of  
writing that Paul employs when he speaks of  men having sinned in their own persons (as a consequence 
of  the original lapse) as that ‘all have sinned’, when it was true that legions of  them had not even come 
into existence, and many of  those that had, had not properly sinned, since they had not yet arrived to a 
capacity for moral agency, Chauncy mentions that this is not an unusual thing to find in Scripture, viz., ‘as 
already come into fact, [that] which in time will certainly do so’ (ibid., p.297). Which is why in the same 
epistle the apostle also speaks of  death having passed upon all men, not because this was literally true, but 
because in due time, inevitably, this will become true for all men. Likewise with sin, for even though it is 
impossible to speak of  children as having sinned, as they reach to a capacity of  moral agency they will 
certainly do so. This is why, Chauncy argues, the whole of  mankind is in such a state as a consequence of  
the Fall, ‘that they may be spoken of, in the virtual and constructive sense, both as dead men and sinners’ 
(id.).             
 And just as was mentioned previously that death and sin are different types of  evil―the first a 
natural while the latter a moral one, and therefore with a different relationship to our moral agency―so 
too respectively are the advantages of  life and righteousness gained through Jesus’ exemplar obedience on 
the cross. In the same way that death, being a natural evil, could come upon mankind by virtue of  a divine 
constitution or decree without the intervention of  a misused moral agency, so too ‘deliverance from death 
may, by a like constitution of  God, be secured to the same mankind without any regard had to their own 
well-used agency’ (ibid., p.307).        
 Chauncy aligns himself  with historical orthodox Christianity on this topic, as the relationship 
between sin and death, at least since the Pauline assertion that ‘the wages of  sin is death’ (Rom. 6:23) has 
tended to believe that the first couple was created immortal and that death entered the world as a 
consequence of  their original lapse. This view however has been questioned in modern theology for 
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obvious reasons, of  which the following seem pertinent to mention: (1) owing to the fact that mortality 
marked life on earth from the outset; and (2) just as with Chauncy’s defence of  metaphysical evil, because 
to ‘speak of  immortality as intrinsic to our created humanity obscures human finitude and threatens to 
blur the distinction between creator and creature’ (Migliore 2004: 157).    
 But exactly how did Christ’s perfect obedience become the reason for our righteousness? Chauncy 
claims that ‘as in consequence of  this obedience […], and the constitution of  God grounded thereon, they 
are rendered capable, in a moral way of  becoming RIGHTEOUS persons’ (1785: 308-9). To think 
otherwise would be a moral impossibility, argues Chauncy, for ‘we can no more be made personally 
righteous by the righteousness of  another transferred to us, than we can be made sinners by the sin of  
another, transferred in like manner’ (ibid., p.309). Therefore, moral agency has a different connection for 
our author to both the disadvantages owed to Adam as well as the advantages available through Jesus 
Christ. In the case of  death and its deliverance, being a natural disadvantage and advantage respectively, 
they come upon men without a consideration being paid to their misused or well used moral agency. 
Whereas in the other part of  the effects, viz., sin and righteousness, as they are moral qualities, they are 
invariably dependent on moral agency.        
 We surely have clear by now the way in which our author affirms that the ascription of  sin for 
ourselves comes about. But how does the attribution of  righteousness apply to us through Jesus Christ? 
Because, in consequence of  His perfect obedience ‘and the constitution of  God grounded thereon, [we] 
will be wrought upon, sooner or later, in a moral way, such an one as is adjusted to moral agents, to 
become righteous persons’ (Chauncy 1784: 85). The exact manner in which this is to take place is the 
subject matter of  another chapter of  this work. 
4. Intellect and Covenants                 
Our author devotes considerable attention to the interactions between intellect and will, and particularly 
between the intellect and the passions; viz., the undue influence the latter could have in the operations of  
the mind. All of  which resembles Aquinas’ treatment of  intellect and will as part of  a dynamic system (ST, 
pp. IV, 2, 16, 418-419, 422; cited in Stump 2003). He accordingly exhibits a pervasive dislike for the 
excessive emotionalism characteristic of  the itinerant preaching and the revivalist ethos of  the time. When 
describing Enthusiasm for instance, he mentions that it discovers itself  in the disregard such persons hold 
against the dictates of  reason (Chauncy 1743). Moreover, there is also a traceable influence of  
Supernatural Rationalism in his consideration of  the affections as lesser or subordinate to the nobler 
operations of  the intellect. All of  which predispose him to favor what he terms a religion of  the 
understanding (ibid., pp. 2, 418, 419, 422).        
 A Thomist understanding of  the dynamic interactions between intellect and will reappears in his 
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treatment of  the differences he encounters between men and the rest of  created beings. He does not seem 
to believe that animals are completely deprived of  thought―for Aquinas the beasts were capable of  
forming mental images anyway (Curtis 1950)―, but since they do so in so low a degree, it is impossible for 
them to properly distinguish between moral good and wrong (Chauncy 1785: 38). For Aquinas, following 
Aristotle, believed that the will makes no determinations of  this sort on its own: judging of  things as good 
or bad is the business of  the intellect, which then presents them as such to the will (Stump 2003: 278). The 
other creatures then are unable of  resembling the deity, of  being images of  God in His moral and 
intellectual attributes (id.).           
 In Thomist fashion as well, our author grounds the essential difference between vegetative and 
animal life in the ability to think. The subsequent hierarchy Chauncy develops―based on an ever higher 
cognitive faculty from the lower animals to the purely spiritual beings such as the angels and God at its 
summit―brings to mind a similar one suggested by Aristotle but developed by both Dionysius The 
Areopagite and Aquinas, and that regarded mankind as a sort of  ‘mean between the pure intelligences 
[God and the angels] and the rest of  animal creation’ (Curtis 1950: 138); in Chauncy’s own words men are 
the ‘lowest order of  intelligent moral beings’ (Chauncy 1785: 39). Likewise, this is another example of  
Chauncy’s endorsement of  the widely diffused concept during the eighteenth century of  the Great Chain 
of  Being, here underpinned by the principles of  plenitude, gradation and continuity (Griffin 1981: 114). 
By the principle of  plenitude―again adopted by Augustine from Neo-Platonism―we are to conceive of  
the creation as a plenum formarum where every possibility of  creaturely existence is actualized or exemplified 
in the world of  sense, and where the ‘extent and abundance of  the creation must be... commensurate with 
the productive capacity of  a ‘perfect’ and inexhaustible Source’ (Lovejoy 1957: 52; cited in Griffin). 
Gradation refers to the hierarchical nature of  this living structure where the lower forms of  life are 
subordinated to the higher ones (Griffin 1981: 114). And by continuity, the idea that in this ascending 
order there are no gaps or voids, that is, missing species or links in the hierarchy (Lovejoy 1957: 56-57; 
cited in Griffin).           
 Now concerning the covenants established between the deity and mankind, Chauncy expresses 
that the law of  trial man was placed under in his innocent state, contrary to orthodox opinions, is not a 
covenant of  works. Such views are connected to the aforementioned misconception according to which 
Adam was portrayed to be, in his innocent state as endowed with a supposed perfection in his qualities, 
both moral and intellectual, that would have enabled him not only to discern what was expected of  him by 
every instance of  God’s law (intellectual perfection), but to actually comply with it (holy or moral 
perfection); i.e., to what we referred to before as the quality of  original righteousness (justitia originalis). 
Such a covenant or dispensation would have been too harsh on an otherwise intellectually and morally 
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infant creature like Adam (and Eve) was in his prelapsarian condition (Chauncy 1785: 50-51). The rule of  
trial Adam and Eve were placed under was a positive law given in a single instance through immediate 
divine revelation (Gen.II:16,17). It was as if, as E. M. Griffin remarked, God, in recognition of  their 
inexperience, gave them special help by pointing out clearly what was forbidden for them to do (1981: 
123). It was then by a ‘law of  faith’, in the sense that the obedience required could only have come 
through faith in God, that our first parents were tested in the great affair of  their eternal life (Chauncy 
1785: 54).            
 And for those who question why God decided to try Adam with a single positive command, 
Chauncy expounds that this was owing to the singular condition in which the first man found himself  in. 
It would have been futile to test him in something that couldn’t simply be done (v.gr. Adultery), and 
certainly no merit or virtue could have been found in the abstention from something that provoked no 
temptation in the first place―covetousness or stealing, for God had placed him in possession of  
everything that then existed. He could only be tried then with a command that in a way invited him to 
transgress (ibid., p.56). Temptation, apart from being a natural trait of  the world in which mankind is sent 
to, was, considering the singular situation in which the first couple found themselves in, possibly the only 
way ‘in which innocent man could have been induced to sin’ (ibid., p.74). And as for the predicament that 
such a temptation was provoked by an evil spirit, our author claims that it is not unreasonable to conceive 
of  the existence of  superior intelligent moral beings, that is, of  good or bad angels. Nor is it unreasonable 
to conceive that God makes instruments of  both in His divine government of  the world; so that good 
angels are to be thought of  as pastors ‘sent forth to minister to them who are heirs of  salvation’, whilst 
evil ones are permitted by Him to ‘work in those who are already the children of  disobedience’, and, most 
importantly for our matter at hand, for others, ‘in order to tempt them to be so’ (id.).  
 Likewise, it is not against reason to presume that God permitted this exertion of  Satan’s influence 
over them. The important issue here for Chauncy is that this takes place provided that He ‘superintends 
and governs the temptation’; i.e., that it be a ‘proper trial of  virtue’, adjusted to their then precarious 
intellectual and moral attainments (ibid., p.78).       
 How did it come to pass that such a temptation took place in human beings so deprived of  the 
necessary experience to be able to overcome it? Chauncy time and again mentions that the expression of  
God’s prohibition was a trial well suited to the first couple’s condition. A state that though lacking in 
experience, surely enabled them to overcome the temptation, and therefore in their failure it rendered 
them ‘justly chargeable with sin’ (id.). 
5. The Problem of  Evil             
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Contravening those who claim that God’s confining Himself  to bestowing existence on the posterity of  
Adam―not through a direct exertion of  His power, but attributable to an established course of  nature, 
such that owing to ‘the fatality of  settled connections in nature’ (ibid., p.225) they might suffer under the 
disadvantages they inherit from their ancestry―might speak unfavourably of  the divine wisdom and 
benevolence, Chauncy has the following remarks: (1) it is pointless and absurd to find fault with general 
laws unless one is able to show that a better outcome might reasonably have been procured with different 
or no laws at all; (2) as for those that think that the absence of  provisions or, as Chauncy calls them, 
‘interpositions’ in order to prevent the undesired suffering here talked about, likewise reflects unflatteringly 
on the deity, Chauncy replies that there is no way of  knowing that the only effect of  such interpositions 
would indeed be the prevention of  moral and natural evil. Our author clearly states that perhaps the only 
possible effective provisions would be those that imply the loss of  moral agency itself, which he terms the 
foundation of  the ‘greatest and most valuable happiness’ God has communicated to us (ibid., p.227), a 
position with significant philosophical and moral implications as a subsequent chapter of  this work will 
demonstrate.             
 Two remarks pertaining to this position are worthy to be highlighted at this point: (1) evidently, he 
seems to bring his by now old Thomist tenet that divinity would not act in a way that would undermine 
the nature of  His creatures, which here should be taken as portending that the deity would not impinge 
upon their freedom of  will, that is, in their being proper moral agents, capable of  deciding in an incorrect 
or morally wrong sense, if  such be the case; and (2) he also seems to align himself  with a philosophical 
tradition that finds a use and place for our proclivity to moral wrongdoing, in the sense of  making serious 
moral decisions (Cfr. Swinburne) and hence genuine virtuous moral choices possible (Stump 2012: 153-
154). In this view of  the matter at hand, without a propensity to do what is advantageous to oneself, 
independently if  this is morally laudable or not, we would be incapable of  exercising genuine free will, and 
with it, it would be difficult to properly speak of  ourselves as making morally sound decisions. The idea 
implied is that it is as if  God had concluded that the only possible worlds containing significant instances 
of  moral or righteous behaviour, and therefore worthy of  being created, were ones that also included 
significant instances of  moral wrongdoing, in the sense of  making moral decisions possible.15 This 
however should not be interpreted in a way that would place Chauncy in the eighteenth century optimistic 
 
15 Another instance of  this is to be found in Chauncy’s theodicy (The Benevolence of  the Deity, Fairly and 
Impartially Considered [1784]), where our author decries what he considers as inadequate conceptions of  the 
deity’s benevolence as that of  an ‘uncontroulable impulsive principle, necessarily urging on to the greatest 
communication of  good, and the total prevention of  evil; its prevention so as that it should have no place 
in the creation, in any shape or view whatsoever’ (1784b: VII). 
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view (such as that of  Leibniz for example) that this world is the best of  all possible worlds.16 
 From such a stance, it is easier to understand our author’s endorsement of  what was commonly 
called the two governments or kingdoms of  divinity. This distinction between the two governments of  
God―the moral government and the government of  power―is practically identical to the distinction 
established in some of  his works by Samuel Clarke, the Anglican theologian and philosopher (one of  the 
rationalists and main supporters of  the a posteriori design argument at the beginning of  the eighteenth 
century in England), to whose authority our author appeals to in a rather lengthy footnote, to which we 
now proceed (Gaskin 1992: XXII). The natural kingdom of  God, the kingdom of  his power, says Clarke, 
cannot be resisted; our very being lies in His hands and He could therefore reduce us all into nothing in 
the blink of  an eye. Which is why, Clarke argues, those who entertain such fantastic notions, such as the 
idea of  the devil’s rebellion against God as consisting of  an actual defiance, in terms of  force, for the 
dominion of  the universe, are very much mistaken. The devil’s rebellion is similar to that of  wicked men, 
in the sense of  disobeying God’s will (not in presuming to resist His power), precisely in those things 
‘wherein the nature of  virtue and vice, and the very essence of  moral government, necessarily requires that 
they should not be over-ruled and compelled by force, for here, the thing which God requires is the free 
consent of  the will’, a thing which in its very nature, says Clarke, is not subject to compulsion (Clarke 
1742: 198; cited in Chauncy 1784: 181).        
 Therefore, the kingdom of  God essentially consists ‘in his government of  reasonable and 
intelligent creatures; in his being served and obeyed by those, who, at the same time, are capable of  
disobeying’ (ibid., p.180). And in the same way that Chauncy argues, for Clarke, this kingdom of  God, ‘this 
his government over the hearts and wills of  the rational part of  creation, is opposed and withstood’ by sin 
(id.).             
 A similar contemporary account of  such a view can be found in what is one of  the most 
influential of  modern theodicies: person-making theodicy, of  which John Hick is probably its most adroit 
representative (Cfr. Evil and the God of  Love, and An Irenaean Theodicy in Encountering Evil [1966]). Hick draws 
a line between what he calls an Augustinian and an Irenaean theodicy, and argues that while in the former 
evil is to be regarded as the consequence of  sin, in the latter, ‘the possibility and experience of  evil are 
conditions of  the possibility of  growth toward free and mature humanity in the image of  God’ (Migliore 
2004: 130). To be sure, such potential for growth can be misused, but ‘without the real choice between 
good and evil, and without the possibility of  learning through hard experience, the formation of  character 
is simply impossible’ (id.). Just like Clarke’s account of  God’s moral government or kingdom, Hick 
 
16 Chauncy reasoned that a ‘better world than this, more perfect, and more powerfully adapted to make 
[men] happy, might be created by the Deity’ (1784b: 288). 
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contends that what the deity requests or longs for in this respect is the free consent and worship of  
undetermined creatures; God desires not puppets, but beings who ‘freely participate in the process by 
which they come to be what God intends them to be’ (id.). We will devote further attention to explicating 
Hick’s theodicy, particularly his earlier works, when going over Chauncy’s theological ideas concerning 
redemption (Ch.4).           
 Chauncy was thus convinced that evil and sufferings have a purpose, that is, that such misfortunes 
‘whether present or future, in this world or another, are a disciplinary mean wisely and powerfully adapted 
to promote the good of  the patients themselves’ (1784: 366). Far from being a disproof  or contradiction 
with God’s nature as infinitely benevolent, they ‘coincide with, wise and reasonable benevolence’ (ibid., 
p.367). This is an old theological argument (Cfr. Augustine) and a pervasive theme in our author’s work, 
and usually referred to as the divine pedagogy, and according to which earthly sufferings are instruments in 
our moral development.17 In the words of  a contemporary theologian, we are to regard misery and 
misfortune, and all other calamities that befell upon us, as an opportunity for spiritual growth, for ‘God 
exercises sovereignty over evil by bringing good out of  what by itself  is only negative and destructive’ 
(Migliore 2004: 124, 122). 
6. Original Sin                      
In accord with what has been mentioned so far and with what will be illustrated in the subsequent chapter, 
Chauncy’s take on the DOS endorses a view of  mediate imputation of  guilt, in the sense that we could 
only be guilty of  our own misdeeds; it is true, we inherit a corruption that makes us invariably liable to 
future sinning, but we are not guilty of  the original lapse that is the origin of  our own sinful proclivity.
 Sin is in its nature fundamentally personal― ‘the sin of  one man cannot be the sin of  another’, says 
Chauncy (1785: 151). Moral wrongdoing presupposes, as has been mentioned previously, moral agency, 
and how could it be possible for Adam’s posterity, thousands of  years before coming into existence to be 
regarded as moral agents capable of  sinning and of  being guilty? (id.). We may, his posterity that is, be 
afflicted with grief, but it would be a great ‘moral contradiction’ to suppose that any of  us actually 
consider his original transgression as a fault of  our own (id.). Fault and its concomitant feeling of  guilt 
could only be the outcome of  personal sinning, and this precisely Chauncy considers to be undisputable 
proof  that God does not look on Adam’s posterity as having sinned when their first father did18 (id.). A 
 
17 For instance, Augustine writes: ‘by the ineffable mercy of  God even the penalty of  man’s offense is 
turned into an instrument of  virtue’ (City of  God, 13.4; cited in Migliore). 
18 Beyond our powers of  perception (sensation), which are instrumental for our intellectual faculties, 
Chauncy believed that we were also endowed with what he called ‘moral powers’, ‘fitting us for moral 
happiness, the highest any being can be made capable of ’ (1784b: 120). The moral abilities are the already 
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contention that our author considers to be validated by certain Scripture passages such as ‘through the 
offence of  one, the many are dead’ (Rom. 5:15), or ‘the judgment was by one to condemnation’ (Rom. 
5:16); or even more so ‘by the offence of  one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation’ (Rom. 5:18) 
(ibid., p.153). Sin then for Chauncy is always personal. One might be a ‘sufferer, in consequence of  the sin 
of  another, but one man cannot be guilty of  another man’s sin’ (ibid., p.131). Sins, therefore, as moral 
agency itself, are untransferable things.        
 Our author’s position finds a significant historical counterpart in Peter Abelard (1079-1142). This 
illustrious medieval philosopher contributed two important distinctions that bear a clear similarity to 
Chauncy’s ideas on the matter: (1) a differentiation between sin, which for the Breton philosopher was 
essentially tied to the concept of  personal consent,19 and the defect or weakness of  human nature that is a 
consequence of  the Fall, and which ought not to be considered sinful per se; and (2) a distinction between 
guilt and punishment. Abelard claimed that Adam’s posterity does not inherit his guilt, though they are 
‘liable to the punishment incurred by the first act of  disobedience’ (Curtis 1950: 67). But given Chauncy’s 
theological convictions and the fact that he was at least nominally in the Reformed tradition, there are 
other possible sources of  inspiration for our author on this topic; such as the already mentioned ideas 
regarding the moral condition of  the first couple by his contemporary John Taylor, or owing to its 
importance for the Reformed churches in America, the Belgic Confession and its treatment of  this issue in 
its fifteenth article.20           
 Moreover in the parallel Paul traces in verses 15, 16, and 17 of  the fifth chapter of  Romans 
between Adam and Christ, Chauncy finds further evidence in support of  his position. Just as through 
Christ’s sacrifice and selfless act of  love and obedience we gain, through a divine establishment or 
constitution, the benefit of  justification, so too due to one man’s transgression, and not any fault of  our 
own, we were subjected to death and its accompanying miseries (Chauncy 1785: 153-154). In both cases 
then, our moral agency plays no part whatsoever in the resulting dispensations.   
 Additionally, our author points to the absence of  Scriptural references that would countenance 
those that portray Adam as a thoroughly corrupted creature. Furthermore, it would be hard to conceive 
 
mentioned moral sense; self-determination, by which we exert control over our volitions and impulses (Griffin, 
1981: 116); and conscience, which Chauncy conceives as an unerring internal witness or ‘testifier for, or 
against us, as we have done that which we know to be right, or wrong’ (1784b: 144). 
19‘We are, that is, inclined to consent to what we ought not to do, or to leave undone what we ought to do. 
Consent of  this kind we rightly call sin’ (McCallum 1935: 18; cited in Curtis, 1950). 
20 The article states, 
We believe that by the disobedience of  Adam original sin has been spread through the whole hu-
man race […] Nevertheless, it is not imputed to God’s children for their condemnation but is for-
given by his grace and mercy… (Various, 2020). 
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how such a single instance of  disobedience could have had such an effect on his whole nature by either 
‘natural operation or divine infliction’ (ibid., p.169).       
 Having thus far described the cause and way in which Adam’s posterity weren’t subjected to a state 
of  lifelong suffering culminating in death, it is time to explain in exactly what manner our author considers 
that this was eventuated. It is by virtue of  Adam being, together with Eve, the instrument or medium, 
through which God established that the rest of  mankind forever should come into being, that the judicial 
sentence upon the first couple was ‘consequentially extended to their children’ (ibid., pp.159-160). Since 
Adam was the head or root from where all of  humanity was to be created, the conditions or circumstances 
in which this act of  propagation took place would inevitably be communicated to all his descendants.
 Chauncy’s view on the lawfulness of  the judicial sentence seems very similar to the one worded by 
Anselm of  Canterbury (1033-1109) several centuries before. An argument that pretty bluntly states that 
this divine judicial sentence ‘is not unlike the verdicts of  human beings’ (Anselm 1969: 209-10; cited in 
Rea). Anselm’s argument goes something like this: suppose a couple were made the subjects of  some 
dignity and state, without merit of  their own, but as a complete favour or gift. Then, due to a grave crime 
on their part, they render themselves liable to the loss of  this favour and also to a life of  misery and 
sorrow. Who, given this context, could claim that their children, born long after their condemnation, 
should be reinstated to the favourable situation that their parents enjoyed before their transgression? 
‘having been justly condemned to be cast from happiness to misery for their fault, they bring forth their 
offspring in the same banishment’ (id.). Anselm’s position here, as well as his rather grim notion of  sin 
itself,21 are interpreted by some scholars as the undue influence that feudal assumptions of  his time had 
upon his thinking. In this line of  interpretation, God would be conceived as the ‘equivalent of  the lord of  
the manor’ (McGrath 2011: 327).          
 At one point our author also ponders, for the sake of  his argument, a federalist theory of  original 
guilt, which is commonly one of  the principal responses given to the question of  the justice of  divinity 
imposing guilt on us for something in which we had no participation whatsoever (for alien guilt theories 
of  immediate imputation that is), just to dismiss it along the same lines; that is, even if  Adam acted as the 
‘constituted representative of  his posterity, it would not follow therefrom that they were guilty of  his sin; 
but only that they might have been sufferers in consequence of  it’ (Chauncy 1785: 131).  
 Chauncy flatly denies that one is to read Paul in the sense of  mankind coming into existence as 
 
21 Anselm believed that any sin was of  infinite seriousness since it was an offense committed against a 
‘being of  infinite worth and honour’ (Crisp 2009b: 442-443). His position seemed to be that the greatness 
of  the one against the transgression is committed, and not the degree of  harm done (or even potential or 
intended harm), is what determines the gravity of  the sin (Talbott 2014: 141). 
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morally corrupt beings, ‘as having derived from their first father a positively sinful nature’ (ibid., p.132). 
Adam was, in Chauncy’s thought, ‘no more than the medium or instrument’ through which God 
‘communicated to men the nature they have’, that is, ‘without the intervention of  any agency’ of  their own 
(id.). He concedes that we come into the world with animal tendencies, that if  unchecked could become 
what he calls sinful principles of  action; he therefore speaks of  our nature as being imperfect, of  being in 
a disadvantageous state as a result of  the original lapse, though not sinful or corrupted since it was the 
nature ‘God was pleased to give us, previous to any agency of  our own’ (id.).    
 As stated before, Chauncy denies that through Adam’s sin we were made sinners ourselves, and 
therefore ‘included in the judicial sentence of  God’ (Realism) (ibid., p.149). To affirm that through any sort 
of  alleged relation or metaphysical union between Adam and ourselves, we were somehow involved with 
Adam in the commission of  the original lapse is completely false and the invention of  man according to 
our theologian. He therefore denies any theory of  immediate imputation of  Adam’s sin to his posterity. 
He claims that such reading is completely absent from Scripture and that the few phrases one might 
encounter in the New Testament that could be taken in such sense―‘death hath passed upon all men, for 
that all have sinned’ (Rom. 5:12), or, ‘by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners’ (Rom. 
5:19)―ought not be interpreted in the way of  supposing that the apostle meant to convey that ‘Adam’s 
posterity sinned when he sinned’ and that this is the reason why we are all subject to death (id.). To do so 
would be as absurd, he claims, as to believe in Transubstantiation or to endorse anthropomorphist 
readings of  Scripture. Chauncy’s opposition to Realism in the DOS, and to Jonathan Edward’s ideas in 
particular, will be discussed in greater detail a few lines below in the final section of  this chapter. 
 Chauncy then gives response to a series of  arguments that purport to explain why we supposedly 
come into the world with a morally depraved or sinful nature. First, he answers that it is virtually 
impossible to perceive, as some claim, a supposed original corruption or a ‘corruption communicated with 
existence itself ’ within ourselves (ibid., p.171). At most, we are capable of  recognizing our current 
wickedness in our condition of  moral agents, but to speak of  anyone being able to perceive their original 
corruption is wholly implausible.         
 Next he tackles one of  the best known arguments wielded in favour of  the theory of  Original Sin, 
viz. the prevalence of  sin among the majority of  mankind since the beginnings of  our race. Despite the 
scarcity of  pious men, this is not a valid contention in support of  the argument of  an innate corrupt 
nature for our theologian. Our first parents were created sinless, and yet they transgressed by disobeying 
the commands of  their maker; and according to our writer, this is a valid criterion for the claim that sin 
can take place in the absence of  an alleged original sinful nature (ibid., pp.172-173). Furthermore, when 
our author brings up the issue of  the fall from grace of  other beings that were allegedly created sinless 
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(e.g. fallen angels as described in Scripture), he concludes that neither angels or Adam, nor ourselves as his 
descendants for that matter, were created as ‘impeccable creatures’ (ibid., p.174). The possibility, therefore, 
of  their making themselves sinners is essentially founded in their original constitution as ‘fallible mutable 
creatures’ (id.).            
 Finally, in response to those that affirm that the supposed immoral behaviour we encounter in 
children is sure evidence of  the innate depravity here talked about, Chauncy affirms that the peevishness, 
wilful or unrestrained behaviour displayed by small children cannot be considered properly sinful for, as 
mentioned repeatedly before, sin entails or presupposes moral agency.   
 Additionally, and during his counterclaim of  the biblical passages that the advocates of  the view of  
an innate depraved or sinful nature seem to rely on, we come across a couple of  themes that reiterate what 
was mentioned previously: (1) moral uncleanness ‘cannot proceed naturally from parents to children’ (ibid., 
p.179) [Job, XIV.4]; (2) various other passages are to be read in an allegorical sense or, as Chauncy calls it, 
as ‘hyperbolical modes of  diction’, as in Psalm, LI. 5 (a key passage for advocates of  the view of  an 
inherent original corruption)―‘Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me’ 
(sic). Here, the intention of  David was to express his youthful penchant for sinning, for otherwise it would 
be absurd to suppose that David was referring to his mother as a ‘filthy woman’, but even more ludicrous 
to represent God in the former part of  this quote as the one who ‘shaped him in iniquity’ according to our 
author (ibid., p.180).           
  
7. Against Edwards and Realism in the DOS         
After mentioning his opposition to the doctrine of  a total incapacity in our nature for performing that 
which is morally good, i.e., of  a universal native and total corruption of  heart, he brackets it with what he 
calls the more refined and consistent Calvinists of  his time, among whom he has particularly in mind 
Jonathan Edwards and his position as he expounds it in his writing on Original Sin (The Great Christian 
Doctrine of  Original Sin Defended [1758]).       
 Chauncy goes on to give a lengthy quote of  Edwards’ book on this issue, only to attack it point by 
point in the following manner: (1) by stating that original corruption is not to be thought of  as the 
outcome of  any infusion or implantation of  an evil quality or any kind of  positive cause or influence, 
either from God or man, he not only fails to provide an intelligible reason as to how this original 
corruption took place, but also contradicts the sense in which this innate depravity is understood by most 
Calvinists (Chauncy 1785: 191); (2) the peculiarity of  Edwards, as he terms it, lies in his supposition that 
although God never infused nor provoked by positive influence our native corruption, He nonetheless 
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withdrew from Adam what he calls supernatural principles:22 divine principles enabling man to love and 
obey his maker. Without the influence of  these supernatural principles, the natural principles that compel 
man to gratify his own pleasure, that is, the ones to be associated with man’s appetites and passions, were 
left unbridled and hence became the origin of  man’s original corruption; and since Adam was dealt with 
by God as the head of  all mankind, his posterity came into existence with this same unfavorable trait (ibid., 
pp.192-193            
 Firstly, Chauncy clearly dismisses as unscriptural the idea that the principles by which we love and 
obey our maker are in any way supernatural. He concedes that God created us with principles that differ 
from each other; that some might be termed superior to others even, but this in no way denies the evident 
fact that they are all equally natural in the sense of  belonging to him as a creature of  a certain ‘order in the 
scale of  beings’ (ibid., p.195). But even more important for our author is to refute Edwards’ claim of  a 
purported withdrawal by God of  our capacity for honoring and obeying divinity that was a consequence 
of  the original lapse. To do so would not only go against reason―it would be ‘a contradiction to all the 
ideas we have of  that which is right and fit’―, but it would be a dishonor to divinity to suppose Him 
capable of  deciding in such a morally unjust manner (ibid., p.196); for if  we commit ourselves to 
orthodoxy in the way of  thinking of  God as requiring of  man ‘love, gratitude and constant obedience’, it 
is necessary He should have endowed us with the principles that would render this service possible in us 
(Kant) (id.). This explains Chauncy’s framing of  this issue in terms not so much of  grace but of  justice.
 Likewise, he also states that such a withdrawal by divinity is nowhere found in Scripture (ibid., 
p.197); in fact, the new covenant of  grace through Christ, the new state of  trial man was placed under, is 
indissoluble of  the exercise of  such principles or faculties as our author elsewhere remarks (ibid., 
pp.99,202). The truth of  the matter is that in practical terms to suppose, as Edwards does, that our 
corruption is due to privative principles is the same thing as to imagine it as the effect of  a positive 
imputation or ‘infusion of  principles that are corrupt’ (ibid., p.200).    
 Chauncy finally takes on what he regards as the most common interpretation in this matter, and 
that would have Paul as intending to affirm that we all indeed sinned in Adam; that we are deservedly 
punished for it because his sin was as truly ours as it was his. He unsurprisingly chooses to expose at 
length, as an example of  this interpretation, the view of  Jonathan Edwards, particularly his device of  
considering a sort of  metaphysical identity or oneness between Adam and his posterity (based on a 
sovereign constitution by God) that would explain both the manner in which this took place as well as the 
 
22 These supernatural principles are for Edwards ‘concreated supernatural endowments of  God’, and the 
ones that allow man to obey His commands and lead a righteous and holy life (Crisp 2005: 29). The natu-
ral principles by contrast include ‘such things as self-love, natural appetites, and [our] passions…’ (id.). 
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alleged justice of  divinity in acting this way. Even though Edwards’ account of  Original Sin is well known, 
we think it will render Chauncy’s rebut clearer if  we offer a brief  summary of  his interpretation here, and 
particularly those aspects that Chauncy finds more problematic.     
 The traditional (Augustinian) account of  the DOS was becoming increasingly criticized during the 
eighteenth century for issues related mainly to its transmission (from Adam to us) (Crisp 2015:111). This is 
because on the orthodox account of  the doctrine God ascribes to us both the crime and guilt associated to 
someone else’s wrongdoing: namely, Adam’s original lapse (id.). It is fair to state that our moral intuitions 
go against the idea of  punishing a descendant for the crime(s) committed by his or her forebear. Applied 
to the DOS, this would generate what Crisp labels as an injustice problem. This then would be an 
objection against the transmission of  such lapse. As for its guilt, the obvious criticism would be directed at 
the immorality of  being ascribed with responsibility, and hence guilt, for Adam’s lapse: what Crisp called a 
morality problem (ibid., p.112).        
 Edwards’ answer to these moral concerns was to construct a metaphysical story designed to 
explain the transmission of  original sin by means of  which you, me, and everyone else together with 
Adam constitute ‘one metaphysical whole’ existing through time (ibid., p.113). In order to better 
understand Edwards’ intricate version of  the doctrine, however, we will have to indulge in a brief  
digression covering other aspects of  his theology; aspects concerned mainly to his take on the creation of  
the world (panentheism and continuous creation), his ideas on causality (occasionalism), and his views on 
persistence through time (perdurantism). Since it is beyond the scope of  this work to provide a 
comprehensive account of  each of  these concepts, we will attempt to provide a succinct definition for 
them, to then lay out Edwards’ realist account of  the transmission of  original sin.   
 We begin with Edwards’ version of  panentheism. The first thing that should be mentioned here is 
that Edwards was in many ways a product of  his philosophical time, and thus that his entire theology is 
heavily influenced by Idealism (ibid., p.12). To put it shortly, he holds that ‘the world is contained in God’ 
(id.); that the world is a sort of  shadow or emanation of  the deity (ibid., p.74). As with other ‘idealisms’, 
there is here a denial of  the reality of  matter and a corresponding belief  that what is truly real are minds 
and ideas (ibid., p.12), and in his case obviously, a divine mind and divine ideas essentially.  
 Occasionalism is the doctrine that states that God is the ‘sole causal agent in the world’ and that 
creatures are ‘merely the occasions of  God’s actions’ (ibid., p.170). To use one of  Crisp’s examples, when I 
raise my hand, I intend to raise it, this much is uncontroversial, but the original or real cause of  it being 
raised is God Himself  (ibid., pp.170-171). My intention, on this picture of  radical divine causality, ‘was 
merely the occasion of  a divine action that brought about the raising of  my arm’ (ibid., p.172). 
 Edwards also subscribed to a peculiar version of  the doctrine of  continuous creation, according to 
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which after God creates everything that exists (a world), it would thereafter immediately cease to exist 
(ibid., p.12). Then God would create again, out of  nothing (ex-nihilo), a successive world-stage that would 
be, qualitatively speaking, near identical to the previous and already vanished world-stage; a world-stage 
that although practically identical with the previous one, is numerically distinct from it (ibid., p.13). This 
new world-stage however with the difference of  ‘incremental changes’ added to it (id.). God segues this 
series of  successive world-stages together giving the impression of  ‘action across time’, and as we have 
seen, projects them outside Himself  ‘like a series of  momentary photographic stills run together into a 
motion picture’ (id.). This in turn leads us into Edwards’ theory of  persistence through time. 
 Since nothing, on Edwards’ account, persists across time; that is, by being numerically identical one 
moment to the next (endurantism), objects and beings persist by virtue of  having temporal parts that exist 
at different times of  those beings’ and objects’ lifetimes and durations (perdurantism) (ibid., p.8 ; Rea 2007: 
335). In the same way that objects are extended in space by virtue of  having spatial parts that occupy 
different (sub) areas  of  the entire area or region of  those entire objects at any given time, so they have 
temporal parts that are extended through time (Rea 2007: 335). An object or being persists through time 
then only in case it has multiple temporal parts existing at different times; a numerically different temporal 
part for each successive moment of  that object’s duration or career (id.). This explains why on such a 
theory of  persistence through time objects and beings that do perdure are called spacetime worms. A 
more detailed account of  perdurantism will be taken in the following chapter.   
 Let us now see how all these theological concepts play a role in Edwards’ realist understanding of  
the transmission of  original sin. So, as mentioned a few lines above, Edwards maintains that God decided 
to create a union or oneness between Adam and his posterity. Similarly to Aquinas, he relies on the 
metaphor of  a body, but even more so on that of  a tree, leading our thoughts to imagine that through a 
law of  nature established by God we are united to Adam just as the members of  a body are related to the 
head or the branches of  a tree to its root or stock. His version could then be classified under what Michael 
Rea calls an Organic Whole Theory of  original guilt, where the non-adamic parts of  this ‘single, 
spatiotemporally extended object’ called mankind, despite not taking part in the original transgression, still 
can be said to bear responsibility for it (Rea 2007: 334). Edwards states that owing to this law of  union 
Adam and his descendants are to be regarded as one moral whole or one complex person; and just as sin, 
guilt, and depravity of  heart all descended upon the head, root or stock of  this complex being, so too it 
must have been with its other organs, branches or parts (Edwards 1758: 327; cited in Chauncy 1785). This 
is a theory of  ‘communion and co-existence in acts and affections’ that as well decidedly rejects 
Presentism, viz., the idea that only presently existing things could be said to constitute a union―‘And if  he 
might, by his sovereign constitution, have established such an union of  the various branches of  mankind, 
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when existing in different places, I do not see why he might not also do the same, though they exist in different 
times’ argues Edwards; and continues: ‘I know not why succession, or diversity of  time, should make any such 
constituted union more unreasonable than diversity of  place’ (id.). An object persists through time, we had 
mentioned, by virtue of  having distinct temporal parts at each moment of  such an object’s lifetime or 
duration, and it is divine constitution, what God desires to be the case, that grounds this ‘sameness at 
different times’ (Crisp 2015: 116).         
 Since no created thing exists numerically the same one moment to the next, they cannot be 
considered as the causal agents of  things that happen afterwards, and this since what is created 
immediately ceases to exist at the next moment for, let us remember, God always creates things out of  
nothing (ibid., p.117). God treats all these different things as one, binding them according to His purposes, 
‘communicating to them like properties, relations and circumstances’ (id.). Now in relation to our matter at 
hand, God deals with Adam and his descendants as one entity for the purposes of  the transmission of  
original sin. What constitutes reality for this union as in all others, according to Edwards, is the outcome 
of  divine fiat (id.).           
 This temporal parts doctrine by Crisp is but one of  two possible metaphysical interpretations of  
the transmission of  original sin; that is, that try to make sense of  Edwards’ ontological realism. The other 
is called stage theory and it is the work of  Michael Rea, but we will go over the latter in our following 
chapter. For now, let us go over Chauncy response to Edward’s rather quixotic account for the 
transmission of  sin from Adam to us.         
 Chauncy’s dissent follows his by now familiar argument where responsibility is unavoidably linked 
to moral agency; but before going over the points where our author considers Edwards’ account to go 
against reason or against ‘that moral discernment mankind are naturally endowed with’ (Chauncy 1785: 
264), lets us first recapitulate what he considers to be the scriptural grounds for disproving Edwards’ 
exegesis in this matter.           
 For our author, Paul, in the fifth chapter of  Romans, is unquestionably not in favor of  considering 
any sort of  metaphysical union between Adam and his posterity, for he clearly and repeatedly 
‘distinguishes between him and them’ (id.)―ver.12: ‘The ‘one man’, Adam, by whose sin death[…]entered 
into the world, is directly pointed out as a person distinct from the ‘all men’, upon whom death, by this sin of  
his, has passed’ (id.); ver.15: ‘where the ‘offence of  one’, and ‘death to many’ is spoken of, the one and many 
are represented as severally distinct from each other’ (ibid., p.265). It would likewise contradict Scripture, 
specifically in the assertion that it was by the offence of  one man that death entered into the world, ‘if  his 
eating of  the forbidden fruit was the sin of  all his posterity together with himself, made ONE COMPLEX 
PERSON’ (id.).           
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 And finally the 14th verse of  the same epistle constitutes irrefutable proof  for Chauncy that an 
alleged metaphysical unity is not at all warranted on scriptural grounds―‘death reigned from Adam to 
Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of  Adam’s transgression’ (ibid., p.266). This 
could not be true if  Adam, Chauncy argues, together with the rest of  mankind, indeed constituted one 
moral whole (ibid., p.266). To believe this to be so would be tantamount to accepting that all of  Adam’s 
posterity, thousands of  years before having an actual being, were sinners with him, an idea that our author 
dismisses as a shocking absurdity.         
 It is likewise evident to our understandings, says Chauncy, that we exist personally and not as part 
of  a single complex entity shared with Adam. We are conscious that it was he, and not us, who ate of  the 
forbidden tree, and hence we are assured that it would be impossible for the original transgression to be an 
act for which we could be accountable for in a moral and, even more so, in a natural sense. For if  
conscience is indeed that perfect interpreter of  life Karl Barth spoke of, then in the absence of  guilt we 
must rest confident that this was not our fault (Barth 1958: 451). We may surely feel grief  as this was ‘the 
occasion of  the introduction of  so much evil in the world’, but a remorseful conscience is only to be 
found in the commission or concurrence with a sin, according to Chauncy (Abelard) (1785: 267). To think 
that such a grave offence (the original lapse) could be chargeable on us, who are naturally deprived of  any 
feeling of  remorse or guilt within our consciences, would be a ‘downright inconsistency with the whole 
system of  moral government; a mere metaphysical invention, contrived for no other purpose than to serve 
a previously imbibed hypothesis’ (ibid., p.268).      
 Besides, if  consciousness in intelligent creatures is, as Edwards acknowledges, constitutive to 
personal identity, ‘How then could Adam and his posterity be the same complex one, to the purposes of  
sin and wrath, without the same principle of  consciousness?’ (ibid., p.269).    
 We are not branches of  a single tree, concurring in actions and volitions, but many distinct and 
different trees, ‘the branches of  which grow out of  their own root, […] not with the root of  Adam’ (id.). 
As moral agents that we are, our affections, actions, and volitions emanate from ourselves, not from a 
supposed common root or stock, Chauncy would argue. The truth is that we don’t share any more of  the 
guilt for any of  the crimes committed by our immediate ancestors than we do for those of  our common 
father in the one instance where he was tried.        
 And so as to leave no room for doubt on this issue, our author rejects the idea that it is ultimately 
up to God to establish such a metaphysical unity if  He desired it to be so. He unequivocally states that this 
is not a faculty that would lie within the powers of  divinity―‘No establishment by God or man, can make 
the volitions and acts of  any moral agent what they are not’; and then again: ‘No pretended law of  union 
could make them so’ (ibid., p.271). As in other of  his works, and unlike Edwards’ position on this matter, 
50 
 
Chauncy clearly conveys the idea of  the existence of  a moral order that is independent of  any will 
whatsoever, even that of  God Himself.        
 As a sort of  conclusion to this part of  our work, we think Chauncy’s definition of  sin might be 
appropriate at this point: our character, says the Bostonian, is but the result of  the use we make of  the 
naked capacities that we come into the world with; ‘if  our natural powers are neglected, misimproved, and 
turned aside from their proper use, we become morally corrupt or sinful’ (ibid., p.186). Again, it all comes 
down to our activity as rational moral agents. 
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Chapter 3. A Philosophical Reconstruction of  Chauncy’s Theology of  Original Sin 
 
Introduction 
In the following chapter I will: (1) outline the doctrine of  original sin; (2) state the main philosophical 
problem that the doctrine gives rise to; (3) describe the solutions available in the literature for dealing with 
this problem; and (4) present the solution that I believe Chauncy advocates, so that later in the thesis I can 
give a rigorous treatment of  Chauncy’s philosophical theology, comprising the interconnected doctrines of  
original sin, redemption, and salvation. 
 
1.The Doctrine of  Original Sin 
Most succinctly stated, the doctrine of  original sin is the claim that: 
 
(OS1) All human beings are the victims of  a sort of  corruption that makes it inevitable that they 
will fall into sin (Rea 2007: 319).23 
 
This claim is then supported by two further claims, the first we may term ‘original corruption’ and the 
second typically termed ‘original guilt’: 
 
(OS2) All human beings are the victims of  a sort of  corruption that makes it inevitable that they 
will fall into sin, a corrupted condition that is a direct consequence of  the original lapse of  the first 
man (Adam); and 
 
(OS3) All human beings are guilty from birth in the eyes of  God; a guilty condition that is a direct 
consequence of  the first sin of  the first man (Rea 2007: 319). 
 
The claim at issue in this chapter will be (OS2), and so I turn now to articulating the philosophical problem 
it gives rise to. 
 
2. The Philosophical Problem with the Doctrine of  Original Sin24 
Following from Harry Frankfurt’s (1969) principle of  alternative possibilities, 
 
23 There are some exceptions though to this statement, and these would include: Adam, Eve, Jesus of  
Nazareth, and Mary the mother of  Jesus for those that believe in the immaculate conception of  Christ’s 
mother. 
24 My presentation of  this problem is drawn from Rea 2007. 
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(PAP) A person is morally responsible for her act only if  she could have done otherwise than she 
does. 
  
Michael Rea states a principle he terms ‘the principle of  possible prevention’: 
 
(MR) A person P is morally responsible for the obtaining of  a state of  affairs S only if  S obtains (or 
obtained) and P could have prevented S from obtaining (Rea 2007: 320). 
 
This principle, he takes it, forms part of  our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility. But, given what 
seems to be obvious: 
 
(A1) No human being who was born after Adam’s first sin could have done anything to prevent 
Adam’s first sin; and no human being who is born corrupt could have done anything to prevent her 
own corruption. 
 
It follows that (OS2) is false. So, if  (OS2) is true, i.e. that the doctrine of  original corruption is true, either 
(MR) or (A1) is false. The philosophical problem with the doctrine of  Original Sin then is to determine 
which of  (MR) or (A1) to deny and how best to do that. 
 
3. Solutions to this Problem 
 
Theoretical Background 
Since (MR) is a principle about moral responsibility and (A1) is a principle about metaphysics, there are 
then two families of  solutions to this philosophical problem: ethical and metaphysical. Corresponding to 
each of  these families is a group of  theological positions pertaining to the sense in which Adam’s sin is to 
be imputed to his posterity: corresponding to the metaphysical family of  solutions, Adam’s guilt is 
immediately imputed to us since we were, in a sense, Adam; corresponding to the ethical family of  solutions, 
Adam’s guilt is mediately imputed to us since, in no sense, we were Adam yet we are nevertheless guilty for his 
sin, guilt mediated by Adam. For theories of  immediate imputation the most pressing question is in the 
way of  asking how we could be guilty for Adam’s sin given that none of  us existed at the time of  Adam’s 
lapse, nor are ourselves Adam or identical with him in any straightforward or commonsensical kind of  way. 
For this case of  imputation we encounter two options: what Rea, adapting terminology by G. C. Berkower, 
calls ‘Personal Guilt’ (PG) theories, that stipulate that in some sense we committed or participated in 
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Adam’s sin; and ‘Alien Guilt’ (AG) theories that advance the thought that despite our nonparticipation or 
concurrence with Adam in his disobedience, guilt is justly imposed on us by God on account of  it (Rea 
2007: 325). 
 
Positions on the Original Sin 
The different positions will be organized around a set of  three questions; questions pertaining to categories 
of  moral responsibility that are now fairly well known within the literature, and whose pertinence will 
become clearer in the pages that will follow. The questions are: (1) Was I in control of  the originating sin?; 
(2) Is the originating sin attributable to me; and (3) Am I accountable for the originating sin? For a chart of  
the positions, see the Annex at the end of  this work, where there are seven positions which affirm the 
doctrine, (1)-(7), and one that denies it (8). Because position (8) denies the doctrine, I will address only 
positions (1)-(7). 
But before proceeding to outline these positions, it is important to say a few words about the 
relation between moral responsibility, as used in Rea’s principle (MR), and the concepts of  attributability 
and accountability, as used in the questions we have formulated to differentiate the various positions on the 
original sin. In a seminal essay, ‘Two Faces of  Responsibility’, Gary Watson (1996) speaks of  different 
(though overlapping) perspectives for matters of  moral responsibility: 
 
• The aretaic face of  responsibility, where what is at issue are questions of  practical identity: 
of  the agent as an adopter of  ends; of  what the agent stands for. On this perspective 
behaviour is supposed to be governed or controlled by one’s deepest principles or values 
(what Susan Wolf  calls ‘real-self  views’), and our actions, as well as the thoughts and 
attitudes manifested in them, are imputable (attributable) to us as exercises of  our moral 
capacity; they are, in other words, an expression of  who we are, and what we stand for or 
believe in. 
 
• The other perspective, that of  accountability, places a prime on our character as social 
beings, and as such on the moral demands or requirements that we impose on one another; 
i.e., since our responsibility as moral agents cannot end in our mere compliance to our own 
self-adopted ends or values (aretaic or attributability face of  responsibility), but must take 
into account our capacity to conform to the (implicit) moral demands imposed by life in 
society, the accountability face of  responsibility concerns itself  with this normative domain 
or competence to which one most naturally gravitates when thinking of  issues of  moral 
responsibility. 
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Hence, while attributability evaluations or appraisals revolve around the agent as an adopter of  ends, 
accountability ones have more to do, to borrow a phrase from T.M. Scanlon (1998), with what we owe to 
each other. This said, I turn now to the solutions to the philosophical problem of  the original sin. 
 
Metaphysical Solutions (1-4) 
 
Solution 1 
The first alternative in this series would give a positive response to all three questions, that is, I was not 
only in control of  the original lapse, but also it is attributable to me and I am accountable for it. 
Consequently, on this solution (MR) is true but (A1) is false. It then follows that Adam’s guilt is 
immediately imputed to us since we were, in a sense, Adam, and so this solution is a Personal Guilt 
solution. There are four ways this solution has been explained: 
 
1.1 Humans have two modes of  existence: as individuals and as a single nature (Augustine and 
 Anselm).25 
1.2 Humanity is an organic whole such that (a) it is a moral agent; (b) every individual human being is a 
 part or instance of  it; and (c) it committed the sin of  Adam by virtue of  having a part or instance
 —namely, Adam— that committed that sin (Aquinas).26 
 
25 Augustine writes, ‘By the evil will of  that one man all sinned in him, since all were that one man, from 
whom, therefore, they individually derived original sin’ (On Marriage and Concupiscence, Bk. 2, Ch.15; in Au-
gustine, 1999: 288). In addition, he writes, 
  
All good qualities, no doubt, which [human nature] still possesses in its make, life, senses, intellect, 
it has of  the Most High God, its Creator and Maker. But the flaw, which darkens and weakens all 
those natural goods, so that it has need of  illumination and healing, it has not contracted from its 
blameless Creator —but from that original sin, which it committed by free will. (On Nature and 
Grace, Ch. 3; in Augustine 1999: 122; cited in Rea 2007) 
 
In a similar way, Anselm maintains, 
 
Each and every descendant of  Adam is at once a human being by creation and Adam by 
generation, and a person by the individuality which distinguishes him from others . . . But there is 
no doubt from what source each and every individual is bound by that debt which we are 
discussing. It certainly does not arise from his being human or from his being a person . . . [for] 
then Adam, before he sinned, would have to have been bound by this debt, because he was a 
human being and a person. But this is most absurd. The only reason left, then, for the individual 
being under obligation is that he is Adam, yet not simply that he is Adam, but that he is Adam the 
sinner. (The Virgin Conception and Original Sin, Ch. 10; in Anselm 1969: 183-184; cited in Rea 2007) 
26 Aquinas writes, 
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1.3 All human beings share Adam as a temporal part. When Adam sinned, there was a great fission 
 which resulted in a plurality of  human beings (Edwards).27 
1.4. All human beings timelessly sinned (Kant).28 
 
 
[A]ll men born of  Adam may be considered as one man inasmuch as they have one common 
nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of  
one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed, Porphyry 
says that by sharing the same species, many men are one man. Accordingly, the multitude of  men, 
born of  Adam, are as so many members of  one body. (Summa Theologica, Part II, Sect. 1, Q. 81, Art. 
1; in Aquinas 1945: 666; cited in Rea 2007) 
27 Edwards writes, 
 
 I think it would go far towards directing us to the more clear conception and right statement of  
this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind: That God, in every step of  his proceeding with 
Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as 
being one with him. And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the head of  
the whole body, and the root of  the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all 
the branches, as if  they had been then existing in their root. From which it will follow, that both 
guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of  heart, came upon Adam’s posterity just 
as they came upon him, as much as if  he and they had all co-existed, like a tree with many 
branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as 
head or root of  the whole. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of  proceeding, every alteration in the 
root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same alterations throughout the whole tree, in 
each individual branch. I think, this will naturally follow on the supposition of  there being a 
constituted oneness or identity of  Adam and his posterity in this affair . . ..My meaning, in the 
whole of  what has been said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose that Adam and all his posterity 
had co-existed, and that his posterity had been, through a law of  nature established by the Creator, 
united to him, something as the branches of  a tree are united to the root, or the members of  the 
body to the head, so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one moral whole: so that by 
the law of  union there should have been a communion and co-existence in acts and affections; all 
jointly participating, and all concurring, as one whole in the disposition and action of  the head: as 
we see in the body natural, the whole body is affected as the head is affected; and the whole body 
concurs when the head acts. Now, in this case, all the branches of  mankind, by the constitution of  
nature and law of  union, would have been affected just as Adam, their common root, was affected. 
When the heart of  a root, by a full disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts of  all the 
branches would have concurred; and when the root, in consequence of  this, became guilty, so 
would all the branches; and when the root, in consequence of  this, became guilty, so would all the 
branches; and when the root, as a punishment of  the sin committed, was forsaken of  God, in like 
manner would it have fared with all the branches; and when the root, in consequence of  this, was 
confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been the same with all the branches; and as 
new guilt on the soul of  Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been 
with his moral branches. And thus all things, with relation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution, and 
depravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root. (The Great 
Christian Doctrine of  Original Sin Defended, in The Works of  Jonathan Edwards, vol. I 1992: 220-
221; cited in Rea 2007) 
28 In distinguishing between maxims and dispositions, Kant writes, ‘Moreover, to have the one or the other 
disposition by nature as an innate characteristic does not mean here that the disposition has not been 
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We can take solutions 1.1 and 1.2 together. While the view affirms (MR), and so accords with this aspect of  
our ordinary moral thinking, it also affirms that natures or organic wholes of  humanity can be agents, 
which does not accord with our ordinary moral thinking since natures and organic wholes of  humanity are 
not the kinds of  things that can have beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. One should take into account, 
though, that there is a manner of  speaking in everyday life, particularly employed in literature, that does 
present groups of  people―from small collectives to humanity itself―as moral agents in their own right; 
and as such, desiring, acting, and ultimately as praise or blameworthy for certain states of  affairs. Anyhow, 
not only does the solution require a complex metaphysics, it also requires a complex ethics, which seems 
the worst possible option. 
 Position 1.3, though perhaps metaphysically more extravagant, allows for a truly simple ethics, 
affirming (MR) and requiring nothing more than typical human agency. To explain Edwards’ position (or 
his position as Michael Rea (2007) has interpreted it), we need to consider the problem of  change, a 
problem we can illustrate by considering how a candle, which was straight at 9am is now bent at 12noon. 
Here is how such a situation poses a problem:29 
 
1. The candle persists through the change. 
2. The candle which persists through the change is numerically identical with the candle which persists 
after the change. 
3. The candle’s change involves the incompatible properties of  being straight and being bent. 
4. The candle is the proper subject of  being straight and of  being bent. 
5. The candle is straight and the candle is bent. 
6. Nothing can be both straight and bent. 
7. Contradiction 
 
To solve this problem, David Lewis (1986: 202-203) denies the second claim. To do so, he develops a 
metaphysics of  persistence he termed ‘perdurance’. On this metaphysics, just as material objects are 
extended in space, so are they extended in time: just as material objects have spatial parts, so do they have 
temporal parts, which are momentary objects. Thus, no material objects are wholly present at different 
times. Consequently, material objects are spacetime worms, having temporal parts which are extended in 
 
earned by the human being who harbors it, i.e. that he is not its author, but means rather that it has not 
been earned in time’ (2001, 6: 25). 
29 For further explanation of  this problem, see Haslanger 2003 and Kurtz 2006. My statement of  the 
problem is indebted to their work. 
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time. Change is thus explained by an object having a temporal part at one time, instantiating a certain 
property at that time, and a temporal part at a later time, instantiating another property incompatible with 
the former property at that later time. Using this metaphysics, we can understand Edwards’ solution to the 
problem of  original guilt thusly: Adam, and I (and you, and everyone else) share a temporal part. Therefore 
in a sense, I was Adam and so committed the original sin along with you and everyone else. But then a 
great fission happened, which is why I am not morally responsible or blameworthy for Adam’s subsequent 
sins. But what is it that unifies me with Adam? In virtue of  what do we make up the same spacetime 
worm? Normally, it is psychological connectedness and continuity that unifies human spacetime worms. 
But there is no such connectedness and continuity with Adam. I do not remember being in the Garden of  
Eden, for instance. There are two responses, neither of  which are satisfying. The first is: divine decree. 
God says it is so. The second is: there’s no answer; it is just a primitive fact that Adam and I share a 
temporal part. 
 Position 1.4 is Kant’s (2001), according to which we somehow timelessly sinned. Firstly, it is 
somewhat puzzling that Kant had taken an interest in the topic, as he was deeply committed to a 
conception of  moral responsibility as entirely dependent on the free actions emanating from a person’s 
own will; i.e. he had an essentially voluntaristic take on questions of  moral responsibility. His attempt to 
work out a version of  the doctrine of  original sin that was consistent with his voluntarism is what mainly 
pushed him in this metaphysical direction (Adams 1999: 230). 
 The basis of  Kant’s interest in the doctrine of  original sin is his principle that nothing is good 
without qualification, but a good will (Kant 1949). To have a good will is not to be inferred from actions in 
particular nor is it to act in accordance with the law or our duty conceived simply as such; rather, it is to act 
out of  principle, to act out of  duty, and it should take into account all the deeds performed by any agent 
over a protracted period of  time. It is, in a few words, a motivational state or a disposition more generally 
(Adams 1999: 230-231). 
  
Solution 2  
The next position is a slight variation from the previous one with the proviso of  Adam being considered as 
essentially young or immature (and it should be remembered, I was Adam, that is, the young or immature 
Adam for this alternative). The result is that the first two questions receive a positive answer: I was both in 
control of  the original sin, and it should also be considered as being attributable to me; but since we 
presuppose Adam young or immature, question number 3, having to do with accountability, is given a 
negative response―we are not to be held accountable for the original transgression, and this insofar as our 
natural notions of  justice do not regard young children as truly responsible moral agents. 
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 There are some considerations to bear in mind when thinking about the moral responsibility of  
immature agents, as with children for example, and that should warn us about the implications of  this 
position or solution to the DOS. Indeed, one might consider that in the case of  children their actions do 
sometimes reflect or are expressive of  who they are, but the fact that they behave in a certain way does not 
signify that either (1) this is their fault, for it might well be the case that due to bad parenting they behave 
the way they do, or, as it usually happens, (2) that they have acquired a certain unfavourable character trait 
in a definitive manner, for there are many cases at hand when we can think of  persons who, for example, 
as children were rather abusive towards others, but that left such adverse behaviour once they reached 
maturity. There is certainly a kind of  cruelty that one can see in children that is more the outcome of  
unconsciousness associated to immaturity rather than plain and deliberate evil, as one can encounter it in 
adults. So, to consider that a young or immature Adam is rightfully considered as a paradigmatic case of  
who we are morally, and from there to consider that divinity does not wrong us in some way by extending 
the guilt ascribed to him to the rest of  us, seems a rather unconvincing solution to say the least. 
 Furthermore, there are cases where even though one could claim that a culpable individual is 
indeed immature, as in the case of  a juvenile delinquent, most of  us would refrain from not holding such 
an individual to account based on a certain crime. Indeed, his criminal behaviour is expressive of  who he 
is, but it would be strange to find people that would think that such a young criminal is not responsible or 
accountable due to his young age or to the fact that one could, and rightfully so, consider him as immature. 
It might ultimately hinge on the gravity of  the crime whether one decides to hold someone, regarded as 
immature, to account for their offense. So that based on all of  what has been said, the claim that due to the 
fact that an agent is immature we could regard him as attributable, though not accountable for a certain 
offense, becomes more dubious. 
 And just like the preceding alternative, this solution is attended with the same costs or metaphysical 
commitments (perdurantism, Kantian metaphysics, and the conception of  humanity as a moral agent), but 
as well carries with it similar benefits in the sense of  promoting a simple theory of  the relations of  the 
three key elements in our classification of  alternatives: control, attributability, and accountability. 
 
Solution 3 
Position number three is indeed difficult to endorse since it argues that I was indeed in control of  the 
originating sin, and consequently assumes that we are accountable for it, but at the same time pretends that 
the lapse is not to be attributed to us. 
 It is undoubtedly troublesome to conceive how we could be both in control of  a certain act, and 
therefore rightly accountable for it, while abjuring attributability for it. Even for cases when someone acts 
out of  character let’s say, and therefore that the questionable action or attitude is not truly revealing of  who 
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that person is (in normal circumstances), most of  us would hesitate to not regard that particular action or 
attitude as attributable to her, for at least in that one instance, the act or behaviour does shed light on the 
kind of  person she is if  placed in particular circumstances. It might well turn out that someone is known 
for her patience, for example, but when confronted with a truly stubborn case of  unruly behaviour, she 
loses her composure and behaves inappropriately, to the surprise of  everyone that knows her. True, her 
behaviour in that instance is not truly revealing of  who she is, but most of  us would, and rightfully so I 
believe, consider that the questionable attitude or action in that occasion does say something of  who she is, 
and therefore being rightly attributable to her. 
 As formerly stated, the want of  noted theologians or philosophers to back this position serves as 
evidence of  its implausibility, and as if  this wasn’t detrimental enough for this alternative, it carries with it 
the same metaphysical baggage of  the first option analysed, though it also benefits from the same simple 
theoretical analysis of  the elements of  control, attributability, and accountability. 
 
Solution 4 
The fourth viewpoint on this doctrine is very similar to position number two, in the sense of  considering 
ourselves (in the place that is) as the immature Adam, and bears with it the exact same costs and benefits 
declared there. The only difference lies in our consideration of  ourselves as in control of  the original 
offense, but notwithstanding the original transgression, we are to think of  ourselves as neither attributable 
nor accountable for it. Again, its flimsiness lies in the difficulty of  accepting someone as in control of  a 
certain event or act, while at the same time denying both attributability and accountability for it. There 
could be no extenuating circumstances (as with the examples given above pertaining either to an immature 
agent, or in the case of  someone that acts out of  character), as regarding both attributability and 
accountability, for a case in which someone is indeed in control of  a given situation. Moreover, to be in 
control of  a situation implies the ability to do otherwise, and that for matters of  moral responsibility―in 
both the sense of  being an action or behaviour expressive of  the agent’s true self, but, what is more, of  
being open to certain reactive entitlements on account of  it―is indisputable proof  that such an act or 
behaviour is rightfully to be attributed to that agent and he is also lawfully accountable for it. As with the 
previous solution, the lack of  significant theological support in history is testament to its weakness. 
  
Ethical Solutions (5-7) 
The idea behind the ethical solutions is that, in some way, (MR) is false. So far, all the alternatives described 
purport that we were in control of  the originating sin, but from hereon (from positions 5 to 7), the 
assumption is that there was no such control. 
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Solution 5 
On this solution, though I was not in control of  the original sin, it is attributable to me and I am 
accountable for it. There are three ways this solution has been defended: 
 
5.1.  Adam’s sin brought about condemnation and corruption which all human beings subsequent to 
him inherit (Federalism). 
5.2.  Adam’s sin is attributable to us because it reveals our character, that is, our true self, and we are 
accountable for that sin because we think poorly of  people who have this character, who do this 
kind of  thing (extrapolated from Robert Adams’ work on involuntary sins). 
5.3.  Adam’s sin is attributable to us and we are accountable for it because, even though we did not 
actually commit this original sin, we would have done so (Keith Wyma). 
 
Beginning with Federalism (5.1), an Alien Guilt theory, we may say that it seems to have two problems: it is 
unclear how we inherit the guilt associated with Adam’s condemnation, an ethical question, and how our 
nature then becomes corrupted, a metaphysical question. Concerning the ethical question, it just seems 
impossible for us to inherit Adam’s guilt, owing to a modification of  an objection Mark Murphy (2009) 
raises against the penal substitution theory of  the atonement. On this theory of  the atonement, our guilt is 
transferred to Christ, who then takes our punishment for our sins. Murphy argues that, though Christ can 
take our hard treatment, he cannot take our guilt, for that can be only ours since we still stand condemned 
and Christ stands uncondemned. For example, if  I win a marathon, I can give my winnings to you, but I 
can’t thereby make you the winner, for I’m still the winner. Similarly, Christ cannot take our condemnation 
for we are the ones who sinned, and if  that is correct, that means that we cannot, in any way, take Adam’s 
guilt for the original sin. We will review in a subsequent chapter when dealing with theories of  
Redemption, Murphy’s objection to theories that involve the transfer of  condemnation as it is in penal 
substitutionary theories of  the atonement. 
 On position 5.2, we do not inherit Adam’s guilt, but rather, we are guilty of  Adam’s sin because it 
reveals our character, our true selves. This position is an extrapolation of  Robert Adams’ (1985) view that 
we can sin involuntarily. He takes as an example having angry or lustful thoughts about another. According 
to Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount, we are just as guilty of  murder or adultery if  we think angry or 
lustful thoughts. This then poses a problem since it seems we are not in control of  our thoughts; they are 
involuntary. And it seems we sin only when we commit an act voluntarily. What Adams does is modify this 
account of  sin: we can sin involuntarily when what we do reveals our character, our true selves, that is, 
when the act is attributable to us, to use Watson’s term. We are then blameworthy for this sin or, to use 
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Watson’s term, we are accountable for it because it is appropriate to think poorly of  people who have such 
characters. Adapting this view to a position on the original sin,  
• we are not in control of  Adam’s sin, and in that sense it is involuntary for us, but 
• it does reveal our characters, our true (fallen) selves, and so it is attributable to us, and 
• we are accountable for it because it is appropriate to think poorly of  people with such 
characters. 
In essence, Adam’s original sin is something we would have done, which leads then to Keith Wyma’s 
molinist position. 
 Keith Wyma’s (2004) position, position 5.3, asserts that it is just for God to hold us guilty of  
Adam’s sin because, even though we did not commit this sin, we would have done so. God knows that we 
would have done this through His middle knowledge. God’s middle knowledge consists in His knowledge 
of  counterfactuals of  creaturely freedom, which are contingent truths not under his control.30 These 
counterfactuals have the form: If  subject S were in circumstances C, she would freely perform action A. 
On this view, before creation God chooses which world to actualize based on His intentions for what He 
creates and His middle knowledge of  what free creatures would do in each of  the worlds He could create. 
Based on this knowledge, God creates only creatures who, in worlds in which they are the first human 
beings, commit the original sin in that world. So, even though I, not being Adam, did not commit the 
original sin, I would have done so. The obvious problem with this position is one of  justice: how is it just 
to condemn me for something I did not do? 
 
Solution 7 
Before addressing position number six, I want to address position number seven. This position is 
altogether unconvincing for it tries to reconcile our alleged accountability for the originating sin, while 
simultaneously affirming that we were not in control of  it nor are we supposed to regard it as attributable 
to us. It therefore would require a rather implausible theory of  the relations between attributability, 
accountability, and control.  
 Just as Robert Adams does, one could bring up cases of  ungratefulness or of  self-righteousness as 
paradigmatic instances of  objectionable attitudes that, though perhaps not within our direct voluntary 
control, could be regarded as something for which we are rightly held accountable. It is however extremely 
 
30 For a simple explanation of  the history of  the concept, see Adams, R. (1977) ‘Middle Knowledge and 
The Problem of  Evil’, and for an example of  the type of  objections the concept has raised, see Lane Craig, 
W. (2001) ‘Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection’’. 
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difficult to conceive how self-righteousness or ungratefulness are not to be attributed to us, in the sense of  
being expressive of  who we are. This solution is therefore far from being an acceptable one. 
 
Solution 6 
In my view, Chauncy’s treatment of  original sin situates him in this category; i.e., one where despite not 
being in control of  the originating sin, the transgression is attributable to us, but we are, however, not 
accountable for it. In the remainder of  this chapter, I want to develop this position, something that has not 
been done before, so that I can give a rigorous presentation of  Chauncy’s account of  original sin. To do 
this, I will present some relevant philosophical work on moral responsibility due to Adams, Watson, but 
mainly from Angela Smith. Thus, before proceeding to Chauncy’s own treatment of  the DOS, I will 
present a Scanlonian account of  moral responsibility offered in recent years by Angela Smith. 
 
Smith’s Rational Relations View of  Moral Responsibility 
Angela Smith terms her view of  moral responsibility, drawn from Scanlon’s work,31 a ‘rational relations 
view’ (from here on RRV). Smith’s original intention, as found in her 2005 essay ‘Responsibility for 
Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life’, was to present an alternative narrative to what she calls the 
volitional take on moral responsibility; an account that would explain how we could be morally responsible 
not only for our deliberate or intentional acts, but as well for most of  the unintentional features of  our 
selfhood, such as our emotions, desires, convictions or beliefs, our unreflective patterns of  awareness, and 
other unintentional mental states (Smith 2005: 237; Smith 2012: 578). 
 As for volitional accounts of  moral responsibility, there is no single or unified conception of  the 
term, but they all subscribe to the conviction that in order to count as morally responsible for something 
(whether an act or attitude) this something needs to be connected in some way to a choice or decision on 
our part or, at the very least, be susceptible to our voluntary control (Smith 2005: 238). On this traditional 
version of  moral responsibility, an agent could be considered responsible for an attitude or other 
unintentional mental state and hence open to moral appraisal on account of  it, just in case such a mental 
state is somehow connected to the agent’s choices or decisions: whether (1) if  it was owing to the previous 
decisions taken by the agent that the (objectionable) attitude or mental state took rise from (what Smith 
calls the ‘prior choice view’); or if  (2) the agent decided to identify with or endorse with the attitude or 
mental state in question (the ‘endorsement view’); or if  (3) the agent has the capacity to alter the 
 
31 Although Smith acknowledges this influence, particularly from T.M. Scanlon’s treatment of  moral 
responsibility in What We Owe to Each Other (1998), she nonetheless distances herself  from Scanlon’s more 
recent views as encountered in Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (2008). 
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objectionable mental state through the decisions he takes in the future (the ‘voluntary control view’) (ibid., 
pp.238-9). 
 On the RRV by contrast, moral responsibility is essentially dependent on ‘judgment sensitivity’: one 
is morally responsible for those things that bear a relation (Smith talks of  a rational relation) or that 
somehow reflect our evaluative judgments or commitments (Smith 2005: 237; Smith 2012: 577). More 
generally though, on Smith’s view of  the matter, the basic condition of  an agent’s responsibility is rational 
judgment, as opposed to choice or voluntary control as most volitional versions would have it. Therefore, it 
is not the activity of  choice, but that of  evaluative judgment, the one inherent to our moral practices 
(Smith 2005: 237). For Smith then, responsibility is an issue not so much about accountability, but of  
attributability, that is, of  the requirements that must be met in order for something to be imputed (or 
attributed) to an individual so as to serve as a ‘basis of  moral appraisal of  that agent’ (ibid., p.238). 
 Fundamentally though, moral responsibility on Smith’s theory is to be identified with 
answerability―moral criticism of  an agent would be contingent on whether an action or attitude is 
‘normatively connected’ to an agent’s evaluative judgments or commitments, so that such an agent could 
intelligibly and, at least in principle, be demanded to provide his (justificatory) reasons for his conduct; and 
even to reassess or modify them if  his response was unconvincing or unsatisfactory (Smith 2008: 370). I 
say in principle for as Smith correctly points out, it might well be the case that there is no one in a position 
to legitimately make such demand for justifications on the questioned agent; and intelligibly since the 
failing in question just needs to be of  a kind where this demand for reasons would make sense (Smith 
2015: 103). 
 Furthermore, these evaluative judgments or commitments need not be ‘consciously held 
propositional beliefs, but rather tendencies to regard certain things as having evaluative significance’ (Smith 
2005: 251), which is why it is proper to speak of  ‘evaluative discoveries’ in ourselves, as in some instances 
when we are responding to certain circumstances we might be surprised at our own reactions. Here, as 
mentioned previously, it is up to oneself  to determine if  one has sufficient justification to support the 
mental state or action in question, and ultimately to ‘modify it or give it up if  such a justification cannot be 
provided’ (ibid p.52). But being morally responsible also involves being eligible―in principle here as well for 
reasons I will later explain―to certain moral responses based or depending on the quality of  the reasons 
(justifications) provided. Although mostly these responses are based on assumptions of  how we think the 
agent might respond given our knowledge of  the context or situation (Smith 2015: 103). 
 What exactly does get ruled in under the RRV then? Just as Robert Adams does, Smith believes that 
the mental states for which we would bear no responsibility whatsoever, and hence that would be excluded 
from the RRV would be physical pains (v.gr. headaches), physical traits (height, weight, intelligence), 
appetitive desires (hunger, thirst), and this insofar as it would be preposterous to expect such states ‘to be 
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rationally sensitive to our evaluative judgments or our wider cognitive or evaluative commitments’ (Smith 
2005: 257). Nor would it make any sense to ask an agent to justify his thirst or his height; such demands, at 
most, could be for explanatory reasons, not justificatory ones (Smith 2012: 578). Her claim is that we are 
essentially passive regarding such states (Smith 2005: 257). 
 It would likewise rule out mental states arising in non-rational agents such as children or the 
mentally impaired, or in animals since we do not in general consider such beings (despite conceding to 
their obvious capacity for experiencing emotions) as responsible for their actions or mental states (Smith 
2007: 474). But as well, not all of  the thoughts that occur to us unreflectively could be regarded as 
revealing much of  what we value or care for, as the appearance of  certain advertising slogans or of  
random song lyrics within our heads, as Smith points out, have no direct rational connection to what we 
consider as significant (2005: 248). On this account of  moral responsibility then, and this is a key idea, 
particularly for the next pages of this chapter, ‘moral criticism addresses a person qua rational agent’; i.e., it 
imposes a demand for both acknowledgment and justification on the implicit judgements in the agent’s 
attitudes, emotions, unreflective patterns of  thought, and other (unintentional) mental states for which we 
would consider him accountable (ibid., p. 256). It is judgment then, which divides the things for which we 
are passive and active for on the RRV: I would be both active and responsible for anything that is 
responsive to, or is supposed to be controlled by, my evaluative judgments or commitments (judgment 
sensitivity) (ibid., pp. 256, 263). On the RRV by consequence, one is active and responsible for many things 
that in the traditional view of  moral responsibility would be considered as (volitionally) passive. 
 Underpinning what has been said so far is the presupposition that a rational agent is the depositary 
of  a ‘coherent psychology of  a certain sort, such that there are systematic rational connections between the 
things that happen in her psychological life, and the underlying judgments and values she accepts’ (ibid., p. 
256). A racist demeanour or attitude, for example, implies the fact that one judges certain segments of  the 
population as inferior in some way due to a rather arbitrary concept such as skin colour or physical 
appearance more generally; or if  I fail to notice that someone might need my chair in public transportation 
(an elderly woman for example), this again says something about what I value or judge to be important. 
Such failings are not voluntary, though we do not forbear from attributing them to their agents for 
purposes of  moral appraisal. 
 
Attributability/Accountability Divide 
It could be affirmed that up until two decades ago most philosophers pretty much shared the same 
concept of  moral responsibility, and their discussions revolved around the issue of  the interpretation of  
‘the basic conditions that must be met in order for an agent to count as morally responsible’ for something 
(Smith 2015: 99). Nowadays and following the path begun by Gary Watson, most philosophers believe that 
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there are at least two different senses of  moral responsibility―responsibility as attributability and 
responsibility as accountability,32 and therefore also at least two different ways of  understanding the 
conditions to be met in order for someone to count as morally responsible for something (ibid., p. 100). 
 Smith believes though that this distinction between attributability and accountability actually ‘rests 
on an ambiguity in the notion of  accountability’ and that there is but a single concept of  moral 
responsibility: responsibility as answerability (Smith 2008: 377). So far, what has been reflected in the 
literature is how different types of  moral responses allegedly ‘presuppose different agency conditions’; i.e., 
these responses as being dependent on whether the conditions of  moral responsibility are weak 
(attributability) or stringent (accountability) (Smith 2015: 104). What she brings to our attention is the 
difference, on the one hand, between someone being both responsible for something (and open to moral 
appraisal on account of  it), and also maybe even culpable for it (in the sense of  liable to moral criticism), 
and, on the other, in actively adopting blaming responses or stances (Smith 2007: 470; Smith 2008: 377).
 In determining if  a person is in a legitimate position to adopt blaming attitudes towards a culprit 
agent, considerations having to do with the type of  failing in question―if  whether the objectionable act or 
mental state belongs to aretaic or accountability blame―play but a secondary role. The main considerations 
on which this blaming activity is predicated go beyond or work ‘in addition to the agent’s responsibility and 
culpability for the thing in question’ (Smith 2007: 477). These considerations are: (1) the standing the 
person might have with regard to the agent, that is, on the relationship he might have with the agent, but 
additionally if  the person has some significant stake or interest in the matter (ibid., p. 478). Moreover, the 
relationship one might have with an agent is important not only in determining if  we are in a position to 
express moral criticism, but also if  the adoption of  particular blaming attitudes is warranted as well (such 
as resentment, disappointment or anger for example) (ibid., p. 479). We would likewise lack standing to 
express moral criticism to someone for a fault or character flaw that we shared with him, as charges of  
hypocrisy would then be rightly directed towards us (id.). (2) The agent’s own responses to his or her moral 
failings also usually play a role in determining how to react to a moral fault, for if  the agent is deemed as 
already reproaching himself  (and perhaps also even ‘making efforts to change’) for the aforementioned 
lapse, then surely our expression or adoption of  blaming attitudes towards him might seem out of  place. 
And finally, (3) the significance itself  of  the failing, as everyone surely agrees with the fact that different 
types of  moral faults warrant different sorts of  moral responses (ibid., p.480): the idea being that in some 
instances the fault might be so trivial that the expression of  moral criticism, and even more so the adoption 
 
32 David Shoemaker, for example, claims that there are three different understandings of  moral 
responsibility: responsibility as accountability, responsibility as attributability, but also, responsibility as 
answerability. Cfr. (2011) ‘Attibutability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of  
Moral Responsibility’. 
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of  blaming attitudes, could make us liable to charges of  uncharitable behaviour (id.). In dismissing minor 
offenses or frailties though, one need not to consider that the agents in question are not responsible for 
them.  
 When going over the reasons Watson puts forward for his distinction of  responsibility as 
attributability and as accountability though, Smith agrees with him in the need to distinguish ethical failures 
(as in Watson’s examples of  the person who betrays her ideals in choosing a dull but secure career in favour 
of  a riskier but more meaningful one, and the one where the agent endangers significant things in her life 
by engaging in irresponsible behaviour [Watson 2004: 266]) from violations of  moral obligations to others, 
as well as from the sorts of  moral responses it would be appropriate to direct to each; or the fact that there 
are moral responses that are more appropriate for ethical failures, while others are more fitting for 
violations of  moral norms. These considerations, however, do not in her opinion warrant this distinction in 
our basic notion of  moral responsibility (Smith 2015: 111).  
 Besides, even for cases where what is at issue is an ethical failing of  some sort―as with Watson’s 
second example of  the self-indulgent behaviour―the claim put forward by Watson that only aretaic forms 
of  appraisal would be justified becomes rather equivocal, and this since a person close to the self-indulgent 
agent might be licensed to hold the agent to account for his behaviour, and this in turn since close friends 
or family, according to Smith, ‘have a kind of  license to ‘hold their friends to account’ even for ostensibly 
self-regarding behaviour’ (ibid., p.113). The truth is that it is probably only in cases of  ethical failings of  
people one does not know personally (as with celebrities) that this ‘detached, quasi-aesthetic perspective of  
aretaic evaluation’ comes into play (ibid., p.114). This however does not mean that we don’t think such 
agents are not accountable for their behaviour, and that the people who are close to them would be 
justified in holding them to account for it (id.).  
 Smith has also some remarks for Watson’s other example of  the victim criminal, a criminal who 
was himself  a victim of  a terrible childhood. In the case of  such a criminal, Watson avers that we would 
consider him responsible in an aretaic, but not in an accountability, way for we would consider that the 
control/avoidability condition was in his case violated (ibid., p. 115). Smith believes that if  we do as Watson 
does in the way of  thinking that the victim criminal is not properly accountable for his moral violations, 
then we would be ‘treating him as if  he was less than fully rational’ (id.). Exempting the criminal from 
accountability blame in this manner, according to Smith, comes at a ‘high cost’ (id.). 
 All of  what has been said, however, is not to be taken in the sense of  believing that there is nothing 
special or particular about moral transgressions as opposed from breaches in other normative domains. 
Like Scanlon, Watson considers that the special value that moral standards have in comparison with other 
non-moral standards has to do with what we owe to each other as moral creatures; viz., in the 
‘interpersonal significance’ that moral standards have (id.). Since moral failures posit a ‘direct challenge to 
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the moral standing and value of  those to whom they are directed’, it is easy to understand why non-moral 
failings ‘normally do not support reactive attitudes on the part of  others such as hurt feelings, resentment, 
or indignation’, and this since they do not concern our relations with others in a direct manner (id). 
 
4. Applying Smith’s RRV to Charles Chauncy’s take on Original Sin 
In these last pages I will provide the main features of  Chauncy’s theology on original sin―and of  sinning 
in general―and the connection they have with an account of  moral responsibility (moral agency) that in 
some ways mirrors the moral philosophy of  Angela Smith as described in the previous pages of  this 
chapter. By way of  introduction and in order to prepare the stage for Chauncy’s treatment of  original sin, I 
will say a few words concerning his ideas of  human beings as created in God’s image, and on the type of  
nature we derive from Adam, and from there move on to the main topics of  this section. 
 As previously described, Chauncy denies the claim that the first couple were endowed with the 
preternatural gift of  original righteousness (justitia originalis). For him, being made in God’s image is to be 
taken in the way of  divinity endowing man with a ‘constitution of  nature such that his intellectual and 
moral faculties could be developed gradually’―under God’s guidance and due use of  them―towards 
perfection (Chauncy 1785: 17). It should accordingly not be understood as if  the first couple were created 
already perfect (in both moral [holy or moral perfection] and intellectual faculties [intellectual perfection]) 
for despite their grownup exterior (their adult-type corporeal form that is), they were completely deprived 
of  experiential or practical knowledge and could be regarded as infants in this respect. 
 It is precisely this misconception, this belief  in an alleged original justice, that is connected for 
Chauncy with the assumption that the covenant under which innocent man was placed was a covenant of  
works. Such a covenant, says Chauncy, would have been too harsh on an otherwise intellectually and 
morally infant creature like Adam was in his prelapsarian condition. The law of  trial they were placed under 
was a positive law given in a single instance through immediate divine revelation (Gen. 2II: 16, 17). This 
rejection of  both the concept of  original justice and of  the covenant of  works is directly connected with 
Chauncy’s conviction, in a very similar manner to how Angela Smith does, that moral responsibility is 
unavoidably connected with rational moral agency, something that cannot come about till after a 
considerable period of  experience and learning has taken place, something that the first couple were 
completely deprived of  in their innocent condition (Chauncy 1785: 54). 
 As for our inherited nature, the flawed or corrupted nature of  postlapsarian Adam is to be 
considered as a super-induced quality, not essential to his character as instrument or medium that based on the 
law of  propagation, mediated the creation of  the rest of  mankind. What we derived from our first father 
was our quality as human beings, but in no way this entails that we inherited his moral condition or state, 
for as Chauncy mentions it elsewhere: ‘neither virtuous or vicious character is transmitted by propagation’ 
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(ibid., p.170). He concedes that we come into the world with what he calls animal tendencies that, if  
unchecked, could become ‘sinful principles of  action’ (ibid., p.132). He therefore writes of  our nature as 
being imperfect―of  being in a disadvantageous state as a consequence of  the original lapse―though not 
sinful or corrupted since it was the nature ‘God was pleased to give us, previous to any agency of  our own’, 
and without the concurrence of  our moral agency as Smith’s RRV would have it, there could be no talk of  
moral criticism as to this nature we inherit and certainly no guilt could be ascribed to it (id.). But it is 
disadvantageous as well since we are incapable of  being either justified or sanctified upon the foot of  mere 
law33(ibid., p.208). And now, let us turn to the centrality that moral agency plays in Chauncy’s theology of  
Original Sin. 
 We had mentioned that our powers and faculties when we arrive into the world are but mere 
‘implanted powers, absolutely incapable of  moral exertion’ (ibid., p.162). Thus, the only manner in which 
we could be deemed blameworthy for our nature depends entirely on the use, ‘good culture, and proper 
exercise’ of  these implanted powers (ibid., p.163). To illustrate this point he makes use of  his empiricist 
epistemology34by rhetorically asking who could blame infants for their want of  understanding —‘is it now 
 
33 The orthodox Christian solution for the recovery of  men’s souls are the paired processes of  justification 
and sanctification. Since it is beyond the scope of  this paper to provide a comprehensive account of  this 
complex theory, it will suffice for our purposes to merely say that: 
(1) on Augustine’s account at least, our propensity to selfish or evil willing is not a function of  the 
weakness of  our will, but of  our failure to seek help in God (this is our real fault), for it is open to 
anyone, even if  internally fragmented, to form the first-order desire to ask God to strengthen his 
will (based on a higher-order desire): ‘this is cooperative grace, because in giving it, God is 
cooperating with a person’s higher-order desire’ to have a will that wills the good (Stump 2010: 
160). This process of  cooperative grace is the process of  sanctification; as one in which God does 
not undermine or ultimately infringes on the agent’s free will (with efficient causality and therefore 
in a way substituting the agent’s own will with His own), but rather only cooperates with the 
person’s own will (with formal causality) to have the will he himself  desires or aspires to (id.). It 
should only be noted that this process of  sanctification is ordinarily a lengthy one, that is 
completed (if  at all) only in the afterlife, and this is due to the fact that the human will is very liable 
to internal division, wavering, and is in general rather inconsistent (ibid.., p.161). 
 
(2) As Stump points out, sanctification ‘not only involves this higher-order desire for a will that 
wills some particular good thing, but it also presupposes a more general higher-order desire as well’ 
(ibid., p.163); viz., a general or global ‘higher-order desire for a will that wills to will the good’ (id.). 
And where is such a global higher-order will to be found? The answer lies in the solfidianism 
characteristic of  much of  protestant theology since Luther: that is, the sufficiency of  faith for 
justification. Faith as an essentially free-willed ‘global second-order desire to have, through God’s 
help, a will that wills the good’ (id.). 
34  There are various instances where Chauncy clearly exhibits a knowledge and endorsement of  some of  
John Locke’s empiricist ideas, as for example in his description of  the cognitive faculties of  Adam: like the 
rest of  us, Adam was brought into the world completely deprived of  the ‘objects of  knowledge’ (tabula 
rasa). Other than immediate communication by God, the only manner he had for attaining such goods was 
by the mediate agency of  our bodily organs (the senses more precisely), that receive the impressions from 
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any fault of  ours, that we come into existence thus destitute of  actual knowledge’ (id.). Once again, it could 
be only due to misuse or neglect on our part, with respect to our understanding, and hence only after 
becoming moral agents, that an attribution of  blame, sin or vice could be ascribed to us. 
 To talk of  neglect or misuse of  our faculties entails the judgment on the RRV, that either our 
faculties are not something to be cared for and hence developed, or the deliberate decision to become a 
vicious individual, and in both cases the questionable behaviour or attitude bears, as Smith would have it, a 
rational connection to our evaluative judgments or commitments. And what has been said of  our power of  
understanding extends, on Chauncy’s thought, to the rest of  our faculties: ‘They are all, at first, mere 
capacities only, neither fitted nor designed for present moral exertion’ (ibid., p.164); to speak of  moral 
perversion in them necessarily presupposes wrongdoing as to their use or exertion. 
 One could rightfully claim then, that for Chauncy just as for Smith, the basic condition of  an 
agent’s responsibility is moral agency, understood as the rational faculty by which we appraise certain 
situations, and act accordingly; that is, very close to what we now call practical reason. We stumble at this 
point with a recurrent idea in Chauncy’s theology: his rather optimistic (and Thomistic) view of  human 
nature in the sense of  an objective moral standard being accessible to any normally functioning human 
intellect (Stump 2010: 126, 139). For Chauncy believes that divinity created us in such a way that we are 
unable―unless due to some perversion or corruption in our understandings that would ultimately be 
chargeable to ourselves―, to not recognize, through our ‘natural power of  discernment’, right from wrong 
(Chauncy 1785: 204). Those who become the servants of  sin do so not because of  an inability to discern 
moral good from evil— any rational and fully functioning moral agent, according to the RRV, would be 
able to morally appraise any given situation after all—or from an incapacity to dislike the latter, and love 
the former, but because they are ‘drawn aside’ by their lusts; because, in other words, ‘their fleshly part gets 
the better of  their mental’ one (ibid., p.206), which is why on his account those that choose evil over good 
do so at the expense of  acting against their consciences. 
 Moreover, this emphasis and understanding of  moral agency serves as a basis for his treatment of  
the differences between the disadvantages inherited through Adam’s lapse, viz., death and sin, and the 
advantages ‘gained’ or made available through Christ’s perfect obedience on the cross: life and 
righteousness. It is doubtless for him that the real cause of  the entrance of  sin and death in the world was 
indeed Adam’s original transgression; but as we’ve mentioned, since death and sin are different sorts of  evil 
—the former a natural, while the latter a moral one—, it is impossible, says Chauncy, that Adam should be 
the source of  both equally or in the same manner. Death came to be, or to pass upon all men, owing to the 
 
the material world, and transmit them to our minds. These sensorial impressions and the reflections that 
the mind makes of  them are the real ‘inlets to our knowledge, and the original source of  all our 
attainments in it’ (1785: 25). 
70 
(divine) judicial sentence as expressed in Genesis, though not sin, since no judicial sentence either from 
God or man could ascribe or impute sin on anyone without the intervention or exercise of  moral agency 
on their part; no one can be made a sinner, to put the argument more forcibly, ‘without their own wicked 
choice’ (ibid., p.274). And in the same way that death, being a natural evil, could come upon mankind by 
virtue of  a divine constitution, and without the intervention of  a misused moral agency, so too ‘deliverance 
from death may, by a like constitution of  God, be secured to the same mankind without any regard had to 
their own well-used agency’ (ibid., p.307). Righteousness, however, being of  a moral nature (just as sin), is 
contingent on the (good) use we make of  our faculties. 
 At this point though, the reader might rightfully ask how it is that Christ’s obedience became the 
source for our own righteousness? Chauncy’s words are to the point that ‘as in consequence of  this 
obedience […], and the constitution of  God grounded thereon, they are rendered capable, in a moral way 
(such an one [sic] as is adjusted to [rational] moral agents) of  becoming righteous persons’ (ibid., p.308-309). 
To think otherwise would be a moral impossibility for ‘we can no more be made personally righteous by 
the righteousness of  another transferred to us, than we can be made sinners by the sin of  another 
transferred in like manner’ (ibid., p.309). 
 As for the description of  the process by which rational human beings will be eventually (‘sooner or 
later’[id.]) turned into righteous persons, this is more properly the subject matter for the last chapters of  
this work and will be dealt with in detail there (Chapters 6 and 7). We could add at this point though that 
this will be a process that will be agreeable to our natures, viz., supposing the use of  means suitable to be 
employed with rational moral agents (Chauncy 1784: 85). Since, as previously explained, an attribution of  
blameworthiness can only come about after personal wrongdoing, sin is to be regarded as essentially 
personal and, just like moral agency itself, as a non-transferable thing (Chauncy 1785: 151). True, one might 
be a sort of  victim (a sufferer Chauncy says) ‘in consequence of  the sin of  another, but one man cannot be 
guilty of  another man’s sin’ (ibid., p.131). We could only then be properly considered sinners after we have 
sinned ourselves (ibid., p.307), that is, ‘in our own persons’, as it is necessary that we do if  we are to be 
justly and even intelligibly ‘chargeable with being sinners at all’ (Chauncy, 1784: 45). Again, in a way that 
conforms to Smith’s RRV, it is impossible to think of  sinning without the intervention of  our moral agency 
taken as equivalent to rational judgment, something which in its nature is fundamentally personal and 
untransferable. 
 At one point, Chauncy goes over to ponder, for the sake of  his argument, a federalist theory of  
original guilt (for AG theories of  immediate imputation), just to dismiss it along the same lines; that is, 
even if  Adam acted as the ‘constituted representative of  his posterity, it would not follow here from, that 
they were guilty of  his sin; but only that they might have been sufferers in consequence of  it’ (id.). 
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 Having thus far described how an attribution of  blame, vice or sin is not to be imputed on us, it is 
time to explain how Chauncy conceives that sin in ourselves does take place. It has as its provenance the 
original lapse, but Adam’s transgression became the spring for our own sinning in an indirect manner for it 
was owing to the divine judicial sentence, subjecting us to a mortal and frail bodily condition, that our 
proclivities towards sin take their rise from (ibid., p.85). This implies a ‘complex’ understanding of  
death―as Chauncy suggests we should, and in a way similar to how Moses employs the term in Genesis―in 
Paul’s epistles, as accompanied by its appendages of  ‘vanity, toil, sorrow, and suffering’; and not just death 
itself, simply taken as the termination of  our physical life (Chauncy 1785: 274). It is this understanding of  
death connected with ‘the whole disadvantage under which we hold life since the [F]all’, that explains how 
we ‘all become sinners upon, or in consequence of ’ our subjection to it (death) (ibid., p.275); and this because 
our temptations to sin are essentially connected to our mortal bodies, to their situation and circumstances 
(id.). The fear of  losing one’s life, the desire to acquire the good things in life, and avoid the evil ones, all 
circumstances pertaining our mortal and frail condition provide the occasion for sinning in all its forms. A 
mortal condition that likewise explains our inability to reign in our sinful proclivities and hence go against 
our better judgement —‘in consequence of  our present suffering mortal state, we are often induced to do that, 
which upon sober reflection, we cannot but condemn ourselves for’ (ibid., p.276). 
 Chauncy relies as well on the absence of  guilt as further proof  of  our unaccountability when it 
comes to the original sin. Again, since moral wrongdoing presupposes rational moral agency, how could it 
be possible, asks our writer, for Adam’s posterity, thousands of  years before coming into existence, to be 
regarded as moral agents, fit for being ascribed with guilt? (ibid., p.151). We may, his posterity that is, be 
afflicted with grief, but it would be a downright ‘moral contradiction’ to suppose that any of  us actually 
consider the original lapse as a fault of  our own (id.). As mentioned previously, fault, and its concomitant 
feeling of  guilt, could only be the outcome of  personal sinning, and this precisely Chauncy considers to be 
indisputable proof  that God does not look on Adam’s posterity as having sinned when their first father did 
(id.). In this respect it seems important to bring to the reader’s attention that conscience is one of  the three 
elements or abilities of  what Chauncy calls our moral powers or abilities (Chauncy 1784b). 
 The centrality of  this notion of  moral agency―understood broadly as equivalent to rational activity 
(RRV)―predisposes Chauncy to consider, again in a similar vein to Angela Smith, those beings that could 
not be regarded as proper moral agents, and thus ultimately not morally responsible for their actions or 
involuntary states of  mind: children, animals, the mentally handicapped, etc. And this since, it should be 
remembered, on the RRV, actions or mental states arising in non-rational agents such as the ones just 
mentioned would be ruled out since it would be preposterous to expect such individuals or creatures to be 
eligible candidates for demands of  justification. 
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 When replying to those that claim that the supposed immoral behaviour encountered in children is 
sure evidence of  an alleged innate depravity, Chauncy asserts that the peevishness or unrestrained 
behaviour displayed by infants cannot be regarded as properly sinful for, as mentioned repeatedly before, 
sin entails or presupposes rational moral agency, which is simply something children cannot have ascribed 
to them (Chauncy 1785: 171). Or, when confuting those who insist on the idea of  the perennial torments 
of  hell as contained in the death threatened to Adam (and by extension on his posterity) in Genesis, he 
expresses his disbelief  in the fact that a good God would, for no other reason than that their first father ate 
of  a fruit he was forbidden, for having disobeyed a positive command that is, condemn to eternal misery 
all of  the beings that sadly die before arriving at a state or condition of  moral agency. To think so would be 
both an ‘injurious reflection’ on God, but would as well be a contradiction to ‘all the natural notions we 
have both of  justice and benevolence’ (ibid., p.142). 
 During his treatment of  the differences between men and the rest of  created beings, and this 
within the (Thomist) framework of  the interactions between intellect and will, he excludes animals from 
moral responsibility altogether for even though he doesn’t seem to deny that animals are completely 
deprived of  thought―for Aquinas believed that the beasts were capable of  forming mental images anyway 
(Curtis, 1950)―but since they do so in so low a degree, it is impossible for them to properly distinguish 
moral good from evil (Chauncy 1785: 38). So that, in line with the RRV take on moral criticism―in the 
sense of  addressing the culprit qua rational agent―, mentally inferior creatures such as animals would be 
precluded from moral blame in the strict sense. Before moving to a summary of  Chauncy’s position on this 
topic, I think it necessary to say a few more words regarding his take on moral agency and the connection 
it bears to questions of  moral evil. And since it carries certain relevance for our later argumentation, I will 
also devote a few paragraphs on his position on God’s middle knowledge and the possibility of  
counterfactuals of  creaturely freedom. 
 When contravening those who claim that God, in confining Himself  to bestowing existence on the 
posterity of  Adam, not through a direct exertion of  His power (as with Adam), but according to an 
established course of  nature―such that owing to ‘the fatality of  settled connections in nature’, they might 
suffer under the disadvantages they inherit from their first father (ibid., p.225)―might speak unfavourably 
of  the divine wisdom and benevolence, Chauncy makes the following remarks, particularly to those that 
think that the absence of  provisions or, as Chauncy calls them, ‘interpositions’, in order to prevent the 
undesired suffering here talked about, likewise reflects unflatteringly on the deity. In this respect, Chauncy 
replies that it is impossible to know if  the only effect of  such interpositions would be the prevention of  
moral and natural evil. He states that perhaps the only possible interpositions would be those that imply 
the loss of  moral agency itself, which he terms the foundation of  the ‘greatest and most valuable 
happiness’ God has communicated to us (ibid., p.227). As previously stated, from this assertion one could 
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conceive of  Chauncy as aligning himself  with a philosophical and theological tradition that finds a use and 
place for our proclivity to moral wrongdoing, in the sense of  making serious moral decisions and hence 
genuine virtuous moral choices possible. Accordingly, without a tendency or ‘propensity to what is not 
morally good, [we] would lack significant free choice and, with it, the ability to do good acts’ (Stump 2012: 
154). 
 So far then, we have a theologian that espouses a view of  mediate imputation of  guilt; i.e., that we 
could be guilty only for our own corruption; a corruption that makes us invariably liable to future sinning, 
but not at all guilty for the original lapse that is the source for our own sinful proclivities. 
 And as described in the second chapter of  this work, he ponders the possibility of  a metaphysical 
unity with Adam―during his rather lengthy treatment of  Edwards’ ideas on the matter, particularly what 
could be classified as Edwards’ organic whole theoretical account―as a way of  explaining our purported 
concurrence with our first father in his lapse, that is, for PG theories of  immediate imputation, but 
disposes of  it by calling it a mere metaphysical invention, ‘contrived for no other purpose than to serve a 
previously imbibed hypothesis’ (Chauncy 1785: 149, 269). Moreover such a reading, he considers, is entirely 
absent from Scripture and points to Rom. 5:14 as further evidence that Paul never considered any such 
metaphysical unity or identity between Adam and his posterity —‘death reigned from Adam to Moses, 
even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of  Adam’s transgression’. This could not be true if  
Adam, Chauncy argues, together with the rest of  mankind, indeed constituted one moral whole (ibid., 
p.226). To believe such a claim would tantamount to accepting that all of  Adam’s posterity, thousands of  
years before having an actual being, were sinners with him; an idea that we mentioned, our author 
dismisses completely. And in order to settle the matter once and for all, he denies that it is within the 
power of  divinity to establish such a metaphysical unity between Adam and his posterity―‘No 
establishment by God or man, can make the volitions and acts of  any moral agent what they are not’; and 
then again: ‘[n]o pretended law of  union could make them so’ (ibid., p.271). Volitions and acts that cannot 
be imputed on anyone from the outside, even by God, but must emanate or have as their source a 
connection to a person’s evaluative commitments and judgments (RRV). In short, accountability 
presupposes judgment sensitivity or rational activity more generally, something which would be impossible 
to consider in the case of  original sin. 
 Finally, though more evidently present in other of  his works, Chauncy hints on several occasions at 
the possibility of  God making use, through His middle knowledge, of  counterfactuals of  creaturely 
freedom. Since this will be the topic of  another chapter of  this work, I only mention it to help with my last 
claim in this part of  my work; viz., the position, among the list of  alternatives available for original sin, with 
which Chauncy more clearly aligns himself. 
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 Since we have seen that Chauncy’s ideas on the importance of  moral agency are very much in tune 
with Angela Smith’s narrative on moral responsibility, we could conclude that in the case of  Chauncy’s 
account of  original sin, we would be considered as not accountable for the original lapse, and this since the 
control condition was flouted―we were not, after all, as there was no exercise of  our moral agency in the 
first place, in control of  the situation. But if  we add to this the idea of  God making use of  counterfactuals 
of  creaturely freedom in order to know who among the beings He decides to create would act in a way 
similar to Adam (we would here be considered as some sort of  subset of  would-be Adams), then we could 
argue that original sin is rightfully attributed to us in the way of  being expressive of  who we are, of  how 
we would have acted if  placed in similar circumstances as Adam. So, this is what we have arrived at, a case 
where we were not in control of  the original lapse and therefore unaccountable for it, but nonetheless it is 
lawfully attributed to us.          
 This is a rather uncommon stance in the DOS, and as the third section of  this dissertation will 
make clear (Chapters 6 and 7), Chauncy has also an interesting proposal for the manner in which obstinate 
evildoers will voluntarily come to God. Now as mentioned in the introduction of  this work, linking these 
two major dimensions of  Chauncy’s theology is the redemptive work of  Christ, and this in turn explains 
our interest, and ultimately the inclusion in this work (Chapters 4 and 5), of  Chauncy’s ideas on 
redemption, to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 4. Chauncy’s Theology of  Redemption 
 
1. An Overview of  the History of  Atonement Theories 
Despite its centrality in Christian theology, the atonement presents something of  an odd case among the 
core doctrines of  this religion. The reasons for this are historical for unlike other central Christian 
doctrines (v.gr. the Trinity or the Incarnation) that found their definitive or at least official formulation in 
creeds such as the Nicean or Chalcedonian, nothing of  the sort took place for the doctrine of  the 
atonement, with the result that ideas on the topic vary significantly (Quinn 1993: 349). Furthermore and as 
the present chapter will illustrate, the Bible makes use of  various images in trying to convey the meaning 
of  Christ’s passion and death. 
 Briefly stated, the doctrine holds that Jesus Christ’s suffering and death on the cross frees sinners 
from both their sinful condition and from eternal death, and brings them ‘into a state of  righteousness and 
eternal life’ (Pearson 1659: 348; cited in McGrath 2011); so that more generally, it somehow solves, ‘in 
some unexplained mystical way’, the problem of  human evil (Talbott 2014: 101; Stump 2003: 427). When it 
comes to clarity though, as to how such a redemptive process is carried out, one encounters an unhelpful 
popular understanding or account of  the doctrine which only serves to generate further confusion.35 
 Since what the doctrine aims to provide is an account of  the manner in which God deals with the 
problem of  human sin, we will develop during the first half  of  this chapter a typology of  the different 
versions of  the doctrine according to a couple of  considerations: (1) to the type of  sin that the different 
doctrines tend to belong to―that is, whether their conception of  sin is either deontic, ontological, or 
relational36―, and (2) what is it that the different models of  the atonement are meant to resolve: a strife 
between God and humanity, between God and the Devil, or a conflict in our moral characters (Bayne & 
Restall 2009: 2). As for the second half  of  the present chapter and with the intention of  better 
contextualizing Chauncy’s ideas on the atonement process, we will provide a brief  historical survey of  
positions that resemble in various ways those of  our theologian―from those early and more philosophical 
Greek non-apostolic fathers such as Irenaeus of  Lyon (130 – 202), Clement of  Alexandria (150 – 215), and 
Origen (184 – 253) to a medieval luminary in Peter Abelard (1079 – 1142). And we will conclude the 
 
35A definition of  such popular account as well as some of  the main philosophical and theological problems 
it generates are explained in Eleonore Stump’s Aquinas (2003). 
36 There are, one could argue, three different conceptualizations of  sin: (1) ontological, also thought of  as a 
pathological understanding of  sin, and which conceives of  it as an inherent feature of  human nature; 
(2) deontic, where the idea is that sin constitutes a failure to meet our moral obligations, and it is 
therefore seen as immoral behaviour by which we incur in a moral debt; and (3) relational, to mean that 
sin is to be thought of  ‘in terms of  a broken or alienated relationships’ (Bayne & Restall 2009: 2). On 
such an account, sin’s ultimate and most devastating consequence is our alienation from both God and 
our fellow humans (id.). 
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present chapter by paying attention to some of  Chauncy’s thoughts more directly related to the topic of  
this chapter and to some intra-trinitarian concerns―concerns related to the ‘relations’ between the different 
‘persons’ of  the Trinity―that some of  the traditional theories give rise to, and we will suggest a way for 
rethinking some aspects of  the divine nature as they were advanced in the work of  Karl Barth. 
 We thus commence with those models of  the doctrine of  atonement that could be grouped under 
a deontic conception of  sin, that is, those doctrines that conceive of  sin as essentially a breach in our moral 
obligations towards God; i.e., where sin is thought of  in terms of  moral debt. Satisfaction, penal, sacrificial, 
and merit models of  the doctrine all imply this deontic conception of  sin and therefore advance different 
narratives as to how God handles such a debt (ibid., pp.2-3). 
 
2. Atonement Models 
2.1 Satisfaction Models  
The quintessential version of  satisfaction models is that provided by Anselm of  Canterbury. Satisfaction 
theories take their biblical inspiration from passages (e.g. Gal. 3:13) that suggest the idea that Christ 
vicariously underwent hardships on our behalf  (Migliore, 2004: 183). Anselm’s position concisely expressed 
is that: (1) original righteousness with which humanity was created, was aimed at leading us into a state of  
eternal blessedness; (2) with the Fall nonetheless such a state becomes an impossibility since it was 
contingent on our obedience to God’s will; (3) since it is logically impossible for an omnipotent and 
omniscient being to have His purposes defeated, some sort of  means (a satisfaction of  some kind) had to 
be provided by which this state of  affairs could be overcome; (4) if  we recall from our previous discussion 
of  Anselm’s ideas concerning sin, that he conceived of  it (of  every sin in fact) as being infinite in character, 
then it is a logical conclusion that humanity by itself, that is, unaided, is precluded from providing the 
required satisfaction; and (5) therefore, only a ‘God-man would possess both the ability (as God), and the 
obligation (as a human being), to pay the required satisfaction’ (McGrath 2011: 327). Moreover, the 
supererogatory merit that was necessary to redeem mankind was funded on Christ’s active and passive 
obedience, a distinction to which we will devote some attention lines below.37 
 Thus, for Anselm the moral debt we speak of  is dealt with by God in the manner of  payment: by 
sacrificing himself  for us, Christ pays back the honour that we as humans owe to God (Bayne & Restall 
 
37 By supererogatory good acts one is to understand those actions that go beyond what would anyone 
consider to be obligatory for someone; that is, while there are certainly good acts that most of  us would 
consider as being of  a compulsory or mandatory nature (e.g. keeping one’s promises or the education of  
one’s children), a supererogatory good act entails going over and above what is demanded as mandatory 
from us (Swinburne 2009: 354-355). 
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2007: 3). On this account, salvation is then made available through Christ’s own restitution and reparation 
on our behalf  (id.). 
A noteworthy contemporary supporter of  this model is Richard Swinburne, for whom Christ’s 
atonement comprises reparation (payment) and penance (sorrow for sin) for the failure to comply with the 
(moral) debt we have been speaking of  (Bayne & Restall 2009: 3 ; Davis 2014: 408). Whereas for Anselm 
our obligation was directed at honouring God, Swinburne thinks of  it in terms of  a duty to live good lives. 
By sinning we commit to living what he calls second-rate lives, and this, he claims, despite having been 
granted with sufficient opportunities to do otherwise (Swinburne 1989). We will provide a more detailed 
account of  Swinburne’s take on redemption in the following chapter. 
A couple of  objections to Swinburne’ account ought to be mentioned at this point though. Firstly, 
to claim that we have an obligation to live good or first-rate lives would no doubt find many sympathetic 
listeners, but to claim that such an obligation is due to God, and not merely to ourselves or our loved ones, 
seems contentious to say the least. Swinburne bases such an obligation on a principle of  gratitude; on the 
fact that we owe our very existences to God, but surely this, in and of  itself, cannot be the sole basis for 
such an obligation. To claim that ‘ontological dependence alone’ is sufficient ground for establishing a 
‘deontological conception of  sin’ appears to be questionable (Bayne & Restall 2009: 4). Secondly, a brief  
survey of  individuals committed to prison time will suffice to convince us that a significant number of  
them grew up in highly dysfunctional environments―subjected to abuse at many levels―, so that it turns 
out to be clear that for at least a considerable number of  people living second-rate lives, God indeed fell 
short of  the so-called obligation that Swinburne speaks of, in the sense of  granting them with the 
sufficient opportunities for flourishing as morally sound individuals (ibid., p.5). 
But there are also some contentious points with satisfaction accounts in general, as with Anselm’s 
claim that our main obligation is towards honouring God. There is an evident tension with such a claim 
and the biblically ubiquitous conception of  God as essentially loving and merciful; for if  we conceive of  
rendering honour to God as the quid or centre of  our moral obligations, then this recasts our relationship 
to Him more in terms of  those had with respect to a ‘petty bureaucrat, whose relations with his inferiors 
are controlled by whether or not those inferiors show respect’ (ibid., p.4). Rather than love and 
benevolence, this would entail that divinity’s hopes for His creatures should be couched in terms more of  
‘compliance and deference’ (id.). 
 Furthermore and from a Trinitarian perspective, to talk of  Christ paying back God the honour 
owed to Him by sinful humanity is not without its problems. For either Christ ‘honours God the Father 
and not God as such’ (that is, Father, Son and Holy Spirit) and in which case one might lawfully wonder 
why God the Father but not ‘God as such ought to be honoured’ (ibid., p.12), or else Christ is rendering 
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God as such the honour owed to Him; but such a view is likewise puzzling, since Christ is an integral part 
of  God, we would be committed to asserting that Christ is in fact honouring himself  (id.). 
 Another objection arises from the suspicion that Christ’s surrender of  His life was not really 
supererogatory, for following Anselm’s argument and owing to divine omniscience, God (the Father) knew 
that Christ rendering his life to pay the debt owed to God by humanity was necessary. So, if  God desired 
this end and knew that the means to achieve this end was Christ’s sacrifice, then one could claim that God, 
in some way, willed the crucifixion of  Jesus; and this since if  one desires a certain end, and knows that this 
end logically requires a certain means, then one wills that means as well. So that if  Christ is really doing the 
will of  the Father by surrendering His life, then to claim that Christ’s atonement is a supererogatory good 
act becomes more dubious. 
 A further caveat against satisfaction models is that they fail to distinguish between a substitute and 
a representative. The idea is that while usually the language of  substitution is that of  mere replaceable 
things (as when a machine’s part needs replacing in order to resume functioning), that of  representation 
belongs in the world of  interpersonal relationships (Migliore 2004: 184). On such an understanding, a 
representative, by standing in for us, by speaking and acting on our behalf, and therefore not merely 
displacing us, ‘does not divest us of  responsibility’ (ibid., p.185). Accordingly, we should envisage Christ’s 
atoning work as that of  sinful humanity’s representative and less so on that of  a mechanical substitute who 
would seem to exempt us from personal liability (Sölle 1967, cited in ibid.). 
 Another damaging critique to be raised against satisfaction models is that they tend to obscure 
divine mercy. Denny Weaver brings our attention to Jesus’ famous Parable of  the Prodigal Son (Luke 15: 
11-32) and how in that story the father of  a son who squanders his inheritance welcomes him back with 
open arms. Weaver asks us to compare this merciful father― an earthly father who Jesus relies on to 
advance an image of  our heavenly father―with the God portrayed in Anselmian satisfaction (Weaver 2001; 
cited in Peterson 2016). The God ‘envisioned in satisfaction atonement’, says Weaver, ‘is not actually a 
merciful God. This God forgives only after receiving his ‘pound of  flesh’’, that is, only after compensation 
has been provided (Weaver 2001: 96; cited in Peterson 2016). Such contingent mercy could rightfully be 
considered as unworthy of  a being who is thought to be perfect in love (Peterson 2016). 
 Others have cogently advanced this same point―if  we as imperfect moral agents are nonetheless 
capable at times of  forgiving without demanding the suffering of  those who wronged us, why are we to 
think that God is incapable of  doing so? Even if  I am resentful, my negative reactive attitudes need not be 
vengeful or punitive (Davis 2014: 408). So again, why should we think that God cannot forgive without 
demanding satisfaction or some form of  compensation? As will be shown in the following chapter when 
we will go over Swinburne’s ideas on atonement, the usual response given to such questions is what Ryan 
Davis called ‘the argument from moral seriousness’ (ibid., p.410): an argument that states that it is somehow 
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morally wrong to forgive without exacting some loss or suffering on the wrongdoer (id.). To forgive too 
easily would entail, so the argument goes, that we are not considering with due seriousness either the one 
who has been wronged or the wrongdoer himself; or a failure to appreciate the educational or expressive 
value that punishment could have (ibid., p.411). There is evidently some truth in this line of  reasoning, but 
it also overlooks the fact that there are alternatives to punishment or suffering that, while granting due 
seriousness to everyone involved, can bring about reconciliation (ibid., pp.410-411). If  it is possible to 
encounter instances of  this in our ordinary human exchanges, then we can surely side with Davis in 
claiming that theories ‘requiring that God insist on punishment or suffering of  someone seem […] unduly 
sceptical about God’s moral creativity’ (ibid., p.411). 
 
2.2 Sacrificial Models 
We continue with the image of  Christ’s Passion and death as representing a sacrifice on our behalf. The 
idea, roughly speaking, is that the only (or perhaps the best or more adequate) manner for humanity to be 
restored in its relationship to God was for our mediator or representative (Christ as a second Adam) to 
become Himself  the sacrificial offering; a perfect sacrifice that unlike those oblations performed under the 
old law managed to overcome in a permanent way the guilt associated with our sinful condition (McGrath 
2011: 320).  
This is an outlook on Christ’s death that proved to be specially compelling during the early history 
of  the Church, but that like many other aspects of  traditional theology, seemed to lose ground with the 
advent of  the Enlightenment38 (id.). It was an important understanding of  Christ’s redemptive work owing 
mainly to historical and contextual circumstances because for both Jewish and Gentile ancient culture, 
sacrifice was a rather common institution (Rashdall 1919: 69). The idea of  religion in those days was very 
much connected to this institution of  sacrifice. In such a context it was, one could claim, inevitable that the 
understanding of  Jesus’ death as somehow redemptive for our sins came to be expressed in sacrificial 
terms. Although it is important to mention that sacrifice in ancient Judaism was mostly connected with 
breaches of  ritual laws; with ritual irregularities that had to be atoned for with other ritual endeavours or 
observances (ibid., p.67); and that its purpose was not so much to be propitiatory, but to favour 
communion with the tribal god (id.). It was not until the idea of  god became loftier and more ethical, and 
particularly so after Jahve came to be regarded as the one true God (that is, after Jewish transition into 
definite monotheism) that the concept of  ‘sacrifice became more ethical too…[and] the idea of  satisfaction 
for moral transgressions became more prominent’ (ibid., p.68).  
 
38 Both Athanasius in some of  his Festal Letters (particularly the seventh) and Augustine, most notably in 
The City of  God, spoke of  Christ’s suffering and death in sacrificial terms (McGrath 2011: 320). 
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 Hugh of  St. Victor (1096 - 1141) for instance provides an account of  the efficacy of  Christ’s 
sacrifice in comparison to those effected under the old law―it is because, unlike animal sacrifices of  old he 
avers, Christ was able to ‘bring our fallen sinful nature before God’ (McGrath 2011: 320-321); it rested, i.e., 
on his humanity coupled with his divinity (id.).  
  
2.3 Substitution Models             
On the penal substitution model the central claim is that Christ saves us by taking in our punishment. On 
this deontic model the moral debt is dealt with by God with the punishment of  Christ (Bayne & Restall 
2009: 3). By accepting to go to the cross in our place and thereby ‘taking in our guilt upon himself ’, Christ 
makes available to us His righteousness, a righteousness of  which we could avail ourselves through faith 
(McGrath 2011: 329). 
 Absent from much of  early Christian history, it began to gain ground mainly through the writings 
of  Calvin during the sixteenth century and finds its main source of  contemporary support in conservative 
protestant circles with theologians such as J. I. Packer, John Stott, and even Karl Barth endorsing such a 
view (ibid., p.329; Bayne & Restall 2009: 9). Contemporary philosophical support for such a theory can be 
found in the writings of  William Lane Craig and Steven Porter, as the following chapter will show. 
 As with other models, the penal substitution version posits some unsavory intra-Trinitarian 
connections or relations, for under such a model it is inevitable to think that God is being punished by 
God originating in a debt owed to God (Bayne & Restall 2009: 11). So how is one to make sense of  such a 
statement? Are we to think that God the Father is punishing the Son? That is, that for retributive reasons, 
the second person of  the Trinity is undergoing hard treatment at the hands of  the first. This is an idea that 
seems to entail enmity between Father and Son, something which is unheard of  in Christian dogma; or 
perhaps even more puzzling, that God is somehow punishing Himself ? (ibid., pp.11-12). This model 
therefore fails to take into account an integral element of  Christian dogma, viz., ‘that Christ is one with 
God―one in character and purpose and disposition towards the children of  men’ (Smith 1918: 106; cited 
in Brümmer). 
 Moreover, the very idea of  Christ undergoing punishment seems problematic for it seems to imply 
wrongdoing on His part, and this since punishment is generally understood as hard treatment for a failure 
which expresses condemnation of  the wrongdoer. While Christ can take authoritative hard treatment for 
the moral failure of  humanity, to claim that he is being condemned seems out of  place. This is likewise an 
issue with which we will concern ourselves at length in the next chapter, where we will go about the 
implications of  an expressivist theory of  punishment for substitutionary accounts of  the doctrine of  
atonement. 
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 Given the importance that such models afford to the value of  retributive punishment, there is 
likewise a problem with this model of  the doctrine as concerns the issue of  retribution (Davis 2014: 408). 
The concern arises from the fact that, unlike liberal theories of  punishment (e.g. utilitarianism) that see 
some value in, and therefore ‘justify’, the infliction of  punishment on the innocent, a retributivist theory of  
punishment disallows this (id.). And this because the very value of  retribution is predicated on the fact of  
exacting some loss or inflicting some suffering on those who deserve it; and clearly those innocent, by 
definition, do not deserve this (id.). This is likewise a topic that we will concern ourselves at length in the 
following chapter. 
 Moreover, there are logical problems for this model of  the doctrine (as it is for satisfaction 
accounts) in connection with the orthodox conception of  divine impassibility. For under this model the 
punishment (and for satisfaction accounts the compensation) is intended to be propitiatory, not expiatory; 
that is, it is meant to bring about a change in God (propitiation) and not so much in ourselves (expiation) 
(O’ Collins 2007: 15-18; cited in Peterson); a change from divine anger to divine mercy that would 
supposedly enable God to forgive sinners. As Karl Rahner puts it, this theory ‘almost of  necessity 
introduces the metaphysically impossible idea of  a transformation of  God’, but it also obscures the fact 
that the real cause of  the crucifixion ‘is the mercy and love of  God’ (Rahner 1979: 119-224, 208 ; cited in 
Peterson 2016). But even talk of  divine forgiveness runs into problems with the concept of  divine 
impassibility as well, and this because if  I condone someone there is an implicit denial that the wrong 
committed actually affected my interests, but if  I forgive someone there is an assumption that the misdeed 
did upset or negatively influenced me somehow (Brümmer 1992: 440). As others have put it, forgiveness is 
‘not to be obtained for nothing, it must be bought at a price’: the suffering of  the one who was wronged 
(Quick 1916: 92-93; cited in Brümmer). 
 Lastly, the very fittingness of  the idea of  penal substitution seems to depend on the gravity of  the 
offense itself. Truth be told, as David Lewis suggests, most of  us are of  two minds when it comes to penal 
substitution. Outside a theological context most of  us seem to accept it as it in fact takes place―if  for no 
other reason that it is impractical to oppose it, as for example in cases when the punishment consists in  
some monetary disbursement, that is then covered by a surrogate (a friend or benefactor of  some sort). 
But most of  us no doubt would balk at the idea of  a substitute covering or doing the prison time of  some 
wrongdoer, or suffering the physical hardship that was meant for the offender, or worse yet, in giving up 
his or her life for that of  the culprit individual. And indeed, our criminal systems corroborate such moral 
intuitions (Lewis 1997). 
 So far all of  the models covered, being of  a deontic nature, presuppose that what needs fixing is 
the relationship between humanity and its maker, that is the product of  our failure to comply with our 
moral obligations towards God. The subsequent models, however (Christus Victor and the Ransom 
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model), assume that what the atonement achieves is a resolution of  a conflict between God and the forces 
of  evil, personified in the Devil. 
 
2.4 Christus Victor Model 
The belief  that the main achievement of  Christ’s life, ministry, death, and resurrection was the destruction 
of  the Devil and his cohorts dominated Christian thought on the atonement for more than a millennium 
(Boyd 2006: 21-11). It was not until Anselm’s doctrinal proposal in the eleventh century that this 
understanding of  Chris’s work and death began to lose ground (Beilby & Eddy 2006: 10). In order to 
explain this development and better describe this model for the doctrine of  atonement, we will briefly 
allude to the historical context of  first century Judaism. 
 For obvious reasons the worldview of  first century (Palestinian) Judaism was very different from 
ours. As it was not altogether uncommon in the near-eastern mythological context of  the time, they tended 
to embody or personify evil in either marine monsters, hostile waters, or rebel spiritual beings (demons) 
that waged war on God and His creation, including mankind naturally (Boyd 2006: 25). But by the time of  
what is called the apocalyptic period (beginning roughly two centuries before the advent of  Jesus Christ), 
the locus of  this evil had shifted to Satan, whom it was believed had enthralled mankind under his sinful 
spell (ibid., pp.25-26). There is therefore what Gregory Boyd calls a pervasive warfare motif  throughout 
Scripture, an example of  which is to be found in the tendency observed in Israelites of  the time to 
conceive of  the world as a type of  ‘cosmic warzone’ (ibid., p.25). Satan and his hosts, they were convinced, 
had so enslaved the creation and its inhabitants that what was required was nothing less that the ‘radical in-
breaking of  God’ in history (id.). Such messianic longings were not however a distant hope, but something 
they expected for the near future (id.). This is an important aspect of  the religious context to which Jesus 
arrived at, and it appears that His movement contributed to this apocalyptic mindset (e.g. John 12:31; 
14:30; 16:11) (id.). 
 By the time of  the New Testament writers, however, evil had also acquired a more corporate 
character, being associated with everything that they regarded as incompatible with God’s kingdom (Boyd 
2006: 27). This broad characterization of  evil included elements such as the excessive religious legalism of  
ancient Judaism or its propensity to social and racial injustice; but as well the judicial cruelty of  both Jewish 
and Roman cultures; and even death itself  (ibid., p.28; Beilby & Eddy 2006: 9). It had more to do with the 
‘destructive spiritual force of  social structures and people groups’ embodied not only in ancient Judaism as 
has been mentioned, but more generally in social classes, governments, and other power structures (Boyd 
2006: 28): hence its various appellations in Scripture as the ‘principalities’, ‘authorities’, ‘dominions’, or 
more generally as ‘the powers’ (ibid., p.28). 
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 The entrance of  God into history, the advent of  Jesus as God incarnate, and His conquering of  
these evil cosmic forces in order to set mankind free from their bondage are what constitute the centre of  
this model of  the atonement (ibid., p.29). On this Christus Victor account, the cosmic precedes the 
anthropological or soteriological (ibid., p.34); it is only because the creation has been set free that we are 
liberated; i.e., ‘we are reconciled because the cosmos has been reconciled’ (id.). The forgiveness of  our sins 
is predicated on the cosmic victory of  Christ over the Devil, and this since such victory assures our release 
from such demonic subjection (ibid., pp.35-37). Salvation on this model is a ‘cosmic reality before it is an 
anthropological reality, and it is the latter because it is the former’ (ibid., p.37). The manner in which this 
cosmic victory took place leads us into our next model for the doctrine: ransom theory. 
Its main drawback is that it seems to encourage a dualism between good and evil that some 
consider might threaten God’s sovereignty (Beilby & Eddy 2006: 11). It likewise seems to ‘undermine 
awareness of  human responsibility for its sinful condition’, for to think of  the atonement as a cosmic battle 
between good and evil forces would somehow seem to make sinful humanity a mere spectator in such a 
struggle (Migliore 2004: 183). 
 
2.5 Ransom Model 
The Christus Victor model previously described ‘crystallized’ in certain Christian provinces into what is 
known as the ransom model for the doctrine of  atonement (Beilby & Eddy 2006:10). Drawing on some 
biblical references that speak of  Christ’s death as a ransom paid for fallen humanity (Mark 10:45; 1 
Timothy 2:6), Irenaeus (130-202), and subsequently Origen (185-254), and Gregory the Great (540-604), 
advanced the rather startling idea that if  Christ’s death was indeed a ransom on behalf  of  sinners, then this 
had to be paid to the Devil, who had somehow managed to acquire rights over sinful mankind (McGrath 
2011: 322-323).  
 As with the other models in this section, there is ample scriptural support for this theory (e.g., Matt. 
20:28; Mark 10:45), support that provides us with clues as to how such ransom took place (Boyd 2006: 38). 
To begin with, it appears that during Jesus’ ministry demons were aware of  His presence and ministry but 
were unable to fathom the reasons for this (Mark 1:23; Luke 8:28) (id.); the reasons or logic that led to or 
precipitated Jesus’ death―the wisdom of  God that is―,were kept secret till after the crucifixion (Rom. 
16:25; 1Cor. 2:7) (id.); Satan and his earthly cohorts played an active role in effecting this outcome (John 
13:27) (ibid., pp.38-39); and finally, that it was by the cross that Christ defeated the evil powers and brought 
about the reconciliation of  the entire creation (including mankind naturally) with its maker (ibid., pp.38-39). 
 Now let us see how these various scriptural clues play a part in what was one of  the most common 
versions for this model of  the doctrine. Ever since the original lapse, we have said, humanity had been 
enslaved by the Devil, who retained such control over humanity ‘through the powers of  the kingdom of  
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darkness (sin, fear, death, etc.)’ (Beilby & Eddy 2006:10). In order to overcome this dreadful situation, Jesus 
would become a ransom meant to liberate mankind from this demonic hold. But since Jesus’ life was 
entirely blameless, that is, perfectly innocent, in taking His life as ransom, the Devil had gone too far, and 
was therefore required to liberate not only Christ, but mankind itself  (id.). In this manner the Devil had 
been outwitted by God, who knew that the evil powers would be incapable of  imagining ‘action that is 
motivated by this kind of  self-sacrificial love’ (Boyd 2006: 39). Jesus had become a divine ‘bait’; a bait too 
tempting for the Devil and his human cohorts to overlook, and in acting this way, in following their 
nefarious proclivities, they would all ‘play into God’s secret plan all along (Acts 2:22-23; 4:28)’ (id.). 
Nevertheless, the idea of  God availing Himself  of  means rather questionable, i.e., of  God being 
perhaps guilty of  deception together with the problematic claim that the Devil had somehow acquired 
rights over fallen humanity, rights that God was in some way obligated to uphold, contributed to the loss 
of  favour that this image of  the atonement suffered at the onset of  the Enlightenment (McGrath 2011: 
324). In response, defenders of  this model sometimes stipulate that God was in no way deceptive; God, 
they argue, merely acted out of  love, knowing all along that the Devil and his hosts would be blinded by 
their very evil to action inspired by such outrageous love (Boyd 2006: 40-41). All participants, therefore, 
were merely acting according to their natures, and God cannot be held responsible for deception in any 
way. 
 
2.6 Exemplarist or Moral Influence Model 
A relational understanding of  human sin is to be found in what is called the exemplarist or moral influence 
theory of  the atonement; a model that some (mistakenly) believe has in Peter Abelard its most eminent 
classical representative39 (Migliore 2004: 185; Kronen & Reitan 2011: 32). 
 Unlike the models previously described, and which would appear to entail that after Christ’s 
(objective) redemptive action―whether a transaction of  some sort or as the outcome of  an epic 
battle―there is little, if  any, participation for those on whose behalf  the action was undertaken, this model 
is centred on the idea that Christ’s redemptive undertaking is completed only till after His example of  
selfless love in both His ministry and death, it brings about repentance and conversion in sinners. It is 
therefore commonly referred to as a subjective theory or model (Migliore 2004: 185; Kronen & Reitan 
 
39 Philip Quinn has made a strong case for the view that although the motif  of  divine love as an example 
for sinful mankind is at the center of  Abelard’s understanding of  the atonement, it should not to be 
taken at the exclusion of  other themes which he also considers as playing an important, though 
secondary role in Abelard’s model, such as the idea of  penal substitution. Based on such clarification, 
Abelard, just like Aquinas, is to be taken as a hierarchical pluralist, that is, athough he assigns pride of  
place to a single motif, others no doubt are brought to bear in his account of  Christ’s redemptive work 
(Quinn 1993). 
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2011: 32). Also, unlike the models mentioned lines above, what this theory purports to fix or amend is not 
a conflict between God and humanity, nor between God and the Devil, but a strife within our moral 
characters.            
 Surely the claim, on itself, that Jesus’ sacrifice is a good example for humanity to follow, ought not 
to be regarded as an unfavourable trait of  any atonement narrative, and in fact, it is difficult to find any 
theologian who would contradict such a statement; but critics of  this model claim that to reduce the 
atonement to essentially this feature or image is to render an incomplete account of  the doctrine (Quinn 
1993: 349; Migliore 2004: 186). 
 Others censure what they consider to be an underestimation of  both the gravity and hold of  sin in 
humanity, and the centrality of  grace in any appropriate account of  the doctrine; as well as an undue 
‘sentimentalization of  God’s love’ (Migliore 2004: 186). Connected to this series of  concerns lies probably 
the biggest problem that a model such as this might entail: its inherent Pelagian tendencies, which we now 
discuss. 
 If  Christ is nothing but a moral example that we are free to disdain or follow, then this would 
suggest that it is entirely within the natural faculties of  man―that is, unaided by divine grace―to attain 
justification in God’s sight (Quinn 1993: 358). The danger thus lies in the fact, as Bernard of  Clairvaux 
suggested, that such a model fails to provide an adequate justification or reason for Christ’s atoning work 
on the cross in the matter of  our salvation; that is, it renders it almost unnecessary (id.). To state this 
concern in more theological terms, it would appear that exemplarist accounts of  the atonement fail to 
make sense of  Christ’s passive obedience.        
 One place to look then, if  one were to question the possible Pelagian proclivities of  any writer 
subscribing to an exemplarist model, would be to analyse his take on the role played by divine grace in such 
a process. Later in the chapter we will concern ourselves with Chauncy’s ideas on divine grace and the 
soteriological role he assigns to it. 
 It is now time for us to move to the second segment of  the present chapter where, as mentioned 
before, we will provide a short historical review of  theories that bear a kind of  family resemblance with 
Chauncy’s ideas on the matter and that could all be classified as being exemplary models of  the doctrine of  
atonement. We will advance chronologically starting with those non-apostolic ‘Greek’ fathers of  the early 
church, and in particular with the ideas of  Clement of  Alexandria. We will devote significant attention to 
these ancient exemplarist models, and we will provide as well a couple of  more contemporary accounts at 
the end of  the following chapter (by Hastings Rashdall and John Hick) in the conviction that all of  them 
provide narratives that help us better understand the position advocated by Chauncy. So, without further 
ado, let us go over the ideas of  those Greek fathers of  the church. 
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3. Ancient Exemplarist Models of  the Doctrine of  Atonement 
3.1 Greek Fathers 
Although the extent to which Chauncy’s overall theology could be described as Greek or patristic in 
character will be developed in the final section of  this work, it seems not amiss at this point to say a few 
words concerning the presence in most of  the early church’s history of  exemplarist understandings or 
readings of  Christ’s redemptive work on the cross. As Hastings Rashdall in his classical work on the history 
of  the idea of  atonement40 (1919) expresses repeatedly, with the qualified exception of  Paul, it was not 
until Irenaeus of  Lyon in the late second century that a substitutionary or propitiatory dimension is 
reintroduced into Christian reflection on the topic (1919: 233). Though, as will become evident in the 
following lines, even in the ancient bishop of  Lyon the old exemplarist and ‘more philosophical [and 
ethical] modes of  presentation’ linger in his writings (id.). 
 The first of  these patristic theologians with decidedly exemplarist leanings that we will survey (in a 
cursory manner) is Clement of  Alexandria. And despite the fact that at times one might stumble in his 
writings with the familiar quotations from the passage of  the suffering servant of  God in Isaiah LIII, and 
which convey images of  sacrifice, propitiation or even ransom, when ‘the sufferings of  Christ are dwelt 
upon, it is always either for the purpose of  increasing our sense of  Christ’s goodness, or by way of  
example’ (ibid., p.222). Again, if  Clement speaks of  Christ surrendering His life on our behalf, this is to be 
interpreted in the sense of  requiring from us a corresponding sacrifice on behalf  of  each other.41 
 Clement’s logos theology and its identification of  salvation with knowledge further contribute to 
the position we are advancing here. The word of  God incarnate in Jesus is the greatest source of  
knowledge about God and the world He created; the culmination of  a long process of  divine self-
revelation that has, for instance, in the most eminent of  the classical philosophers of  Greek antiquity, or in 
the Old Testament prophets of  Israel, significant precedents (ibid., p.224). Clement is thus fond of  
portraying Christ as both saviour and teacher, for they are to him overlapping functions, and this since ‘it is 
mainly by His teaching and influence’ that redemption is effected (ibid., p.225). This idea of  a progressive 
(historical) divine self-revelation, is endorsed by Chauncy, and we will return to it in the concluding chapter 
of  this work. 
 Contemporary with Clement, Irenaeus of  Lyon (c.120, /140, c.200, /203) (less of  a philosopher and 
a moralist than him) is brought into our account owing to his ethical interpretation of  theosis, or salvation as 
divinization (Trocmé 1993: 323). An idea shared by Clement and in general common to ancient Greek 
 
40 The Idea of  Atonement in Christian Theology (1919) 
41 Clement. Strom.VII, ii.6 
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theology,42 it advances the conviction that deification is reached through the progressive moral progress or 
perfection of  the believer, and with it the attainment of  immortality (Rashdall 1919: 228, 241). At this 
point it is imperative to bring our attention to an aspect of  Irenaeus theology with important implications 
for Chauncy’s overall theodicy―Irenaeus distinction between the image and the likeness of  God in man 
(Hick 2010: 211). For Irenaeus the image of  God in man resides fundamentally in his character as a free and 
rational creature capable of  achieving union with his maker, whilst the likeness consists in the progressive 
attainment of  a moral character that resembles (finitely) that of  Christ (id.). It is thus with this latter 
dimension that both Irenaeus’ and Clement’s conceptions of  theosis are to be associated with. But let us 
now move from Clement to who some have termed the first dogmatic theologian in Christian thought: 
Origen (Trocmé 1993: 325). 
 Despite having followed some of  Clement’s courses, Origen considered himself  more the disciple 
of  Panteno and Amonio Saccas, a fact which sheds light on the strong Neoplatonic character of  his 
writings (ibid., pp.325-26). Origen does however clearly embrace Clement’s ideas on the Incarnation 
concerning the progressive unfolding of  divine knowledge in other persons prior to the historical Jesus, 
and, as Clement does, he proposes that the union of  the divine word with Christ had been naturally more 
complete and perfect than ever before (Rashdall 1919: 257); an idea that, according to Norman B. Gibbs, is 
also shared by Chauncy. 
 As with his ideas on the Incarnation, Origen’s concept of  salvation is in essence ethical and 
rational―greater emphasis is given to Christ’s teaching and example (active obedience) than to His death (ibid., 
p.258); the logos saves us mainly through the teaching and revelation of  the Father it conveys as well as 
through the example it lays down for our lives. And notwithstanding his use of  conventional formulas to 
describe the death of  Christ, the explanations he provides tend to be pre-Irenaean: the death of  Christ is 
not isolated in his writings from His whole life and ministry,43 but represent its completion, the culminating 
evidence of  both perfect obedience to the will of  the Father and of  divine love towards His creatures (id.). 
Christ redeems us through the moral influence it exerts upon the believer, that is, by generating within the 
sinner a real change of  heart; by making the sinner actually better. 
 One could claim that it was out of  deference for the authority already enjoyed by Paul in his time, 
that Origen repeats some of  the common formulas to speak of  the death of  Christ, and despite his 
admitted incapacity to describe how exactly the death of  Christ ‘redounds to the spiritual benefit of  men’, 
this death operates for Origen by making men better (ibid., p.264). We are to understand such life and death 
 
42 Although later Greek theology tended to conceive of  this process as consisting in a sort of  mystical or 
metaphysical acquisition of  incorruptibility (Rashdall 1919: 228). 
43 Rashdall makes a convincing case to the point that all early Greek patristic theologians merge the 
concept of  atonement in that of  the Incarnation. 
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prospectively: it was not intended to satisfy a divine demand for retribution or a ‘retrospective cancelling of  
the past’ (id.); and rather than point to any objective effect or transaction of  any sort, its effects are to be 
explained by their ‘subjective or ethical influence upon the believer’ (ibid., p.266). 
 
3.2. The Irenaean Theodicy                 
The orthodox Christian narrative concerning the first members of  our race provides us with an idyllic 
setting (Eden) in which the first couple enjoyed, among other benefits or blessings, unmediated 
communication with divinity. A noteworthy benefit they enjoyed, so the traditional account goes, was their 
capacity to both perfectly discern good from wrong and hence to always know what was expected of  them 
by every instance of  God’s law (intellectual perfection), and to actually comply with those demands (holly 
or moral perfection); a concept alluded to before as original righteousness or original justice (Vid. Ch.2). 
Despite this favourable situation, and rather inexplicably we might add,44 the first couple disobeyed a single 
positive command issued by their maker and thereby gained for themselves expulsion from Eden and a 
host of  other drawbacks that explain the current condition of  mankind. This adamic myth as encountered 
in Gen. II and III, but most damagingly in its elaborated version first in Paul (Rom. 5:12-21; Cor. 15:21-22) 
and even more so in Augustine has been the conventional Christian explanation for the existence of  evil 
and sin since the formation of  the New Testament cannon in the second half  of  the second century (Hick 
2010: 203-207, 210; Trocmé 1993: 313-317). 
 Within this mythological scheme, however, an alternative account that goes back to the earliest of  
the Eastern Greek fathers (e.g. Tatian and Theophilus), and which finds its ultimate expositor in Irenaeus 
of  Lyon, provides us with a very different picture of  the first humans. Instead of  thinking of  them as 
morally perfect (original justice), it portrays them as essentially immature and therefore unfit for the 
reception of  God’s highest bestowals (Hick 2010: 212). If  we recall from above the Irenaean distinction 
between the image and the likeness of  God in man, we can think of  Adam and Eve at this early stage of  
their lives as sharing in the divine image in the sense of  being rational creatures endowed with free will. 
These are the materials that ground the Imago Dei position of  Irenaeus; an unfinished stage in our personal 
development which depends in its entirety on the divine creative decrees (ibid., p.254). Whilst the likeness of  
God in man requires our uncompelled engagement with the world in which He has placed us, so as to 
progressively acquire the moral features that were eminently exemplified in the life (and death) of  the 
 
44 Referred to as the traditional theological problem of  the Fall, the unintelligibility of  the idea of  morally 
perfect creatures (whether human or angelic in kind it does not matter) falling into sin amounts to, as 
John Hick, Schleiermacher and others have pointed to, the ‘absurdity of  the self-creation of  evil ex 
nihilo’; and it inavoidably places ultimate responsibility for the existence of  evil in God Himself  (Hick 
2010: 63, 249-50; Crisp 2005: 25). 
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historical Jesus (id.). A process that, so as to fend off  possible charges of  Pelagianism, is always guided 
according to Irenaeus by the Holy Spirit. Thus, while it is straightforward to regard the first stage of  this 
creative process as the outcome of  divine fiat, the second one lies beyond divine omnipotence in that it 
requires the willing cooperation of  creatures who are by definition free to act as they please (ibid., p.255). 
 The philosophical (and Christian) argument that underpins this last point has to do with the 
unavoidable presence of  freedom, and with it moral freedom, in creatures whose life is to be described as 
personal, i.e., as endowed with personality. Thus, the idea of  creating persons who are unable to act freely is 
incoherent; and since the accepted view of  divine omnipotence precludes logical absurdities such as this 
one, we could conclude that not even omnipotent power could have achieved the creation of  unfree, moral 
personal beings (Talbott 2014: 156-157; Hick 2010: 265). Part of  the traditional free-will explanation for 
the existence of  evil, this argument lends support to the Christian conviction that in creating men, the 
divine purpose was not only that they would freely act righteously towards each other, but also to bring 
them into fellowship with Himself  (Hick 2010: 266, 272). And since experience teaches us that this was in 
fact God’s resolution on the matter (for we are no mere automata) and since the establishment of  a loving 
or even an amicable relationship requires the willing participation of  those involved, then man ‘must be a 
morally responsible agent with a real power of  moral choice’ (id.). 
 There is something inherently ethical in this account, as Hick is prompt to remark, in the way of  
regarding a goodness arrived through the free engagement with the world and with it with the temptations 
that characterize it, over the sort of  untried innocence that could be ascribed to beings created ab initio as 
(finitely) perfect in this regard (ibid., p.255). Indeed, it could be lawfully questioned whether such innocent 
creatures could even be morally commended in the way in which our terms have been generally employed 
in ethical discussion. Ninian Smart for example (1961) provided a cogent validation of  our moral intuitions 
in this respect by showing how the decoupling of  moral praise from concepts such as temptation, lust, 
greed, envy, and other proclivities simply renders moral utterances unintelligible (Smart 1961: 190-191; 
cited in ibid.). As with John Hick, Richard Swinburne, Kant, Schleiermacher, Eleonore Stump, and a host 
of  other theologians and philosophers, there lies in Smart’s argument an instrumental conception of  evil; a 
view which, furthermore, is supported by Chauncy as we will later describe. Again, this is a topic to which 
we shall return in our concluding section of  our work as we will then try to provide a comprehensive 
outlook on our subject’s theology. 
 
3.3. Peter Abelard and the Power of  a Story of  Love 
Abelard’s theory of  atonement grew out of  his dissatisfaction with the then prevailing interpretations of  
the death of  Christ―the ransom model which probably reached its most philosophically defensible 
exposition in the work of  Gregory of  Nyssa (335-395) and the Anselmian substitutionary model (Rashdall 
90 
1919: 304-5; Fiddes 1989: 142). Both accounts seemed to Abelard to ‘impose a necessity upon God from 
outside himself, as if  God had to find some way of  solving a problem that faced him’45 (Fiddes 1989: 142). 
Furthermore, as part of  a generation of  theologians in the second half  of  the twelfth century who were 
keenly interested in the human life of  Jesus, Abelard was baffled by the particular mode chosen by Christ 
to carry out His redemptive work; that is, one characterized by ‘insults, scourgings, and spittings, and finally 
that most bitter and disgraceful death’ (Buytaert 1969: 116; cited in Quinn 1993). For Abelard the only 
catalyst to be found for the Son of  God to voluntarily abase Himself  in this form was the ‘sheer love of  
God’ (Fiddes 1989: 143). The atonement, and the incarnation more generally, took their inspiration not 
from the demands imposed by either the so-called rights of  the Devil (ransom theory), nor from a 
conception of  divine justice that somehow required a substitute culprit on whom to discharge retribution 
for the sins of  men; rather they both obeyed what one Abelard scholar aptly called the logic of  divine love 
(Weingart 1970; cited in Fiddes). If  the divine nature is essentially loving, an argument we will develop on a 
subsequent chapter (Ch.7), then in both the incarnation and atonement God was merely pleasing His own 
loving nature (Fiddes 1989: 143). 
 Having established the motive for the path of  redemption chosen by divinity, and knowing 
beforehand its ultimate intention according to Christian dogma―the reconciliation of  fallen man to his 
maker―, it still lays open the difficult and all-important question of  how exactly the love manifested and 
present in Christ redeems us from our sins. And in this respect, it is helpful to pay notice to the language 
employed by Abelard, especially in those passages taken as representative of  his position on this topic.46 
Before diving in earnest into Abelard’s choice of  words though, we believe it is important to draw attention 
to a distinction within the subfield of  subjective models of  the atonement: exemplarist, and infusionist 
 
45 To borrow a phrase from Rashdall, both these older models would seem to make the atonement a sort 
of  divine afterthought by which God overcomes a situation that (per impossible) somehow took Him by 
surprise (Rashdall 1919: 224). 
46 Abelard writes, 
Now it seems to us that we have been justified by the blood of  Christ and reconciled to God in this 
way: through this unique act of  grace manifested to us[...] he has more fully bound us to himself  by 
love; with the result that our hearts should be enkindled by such a gift of  divine grace; and true 
charity should not now shrink from enduring anything for him. And we do not doubt that the 
ancient Fathers, waiting in faith for this same gift, were aroused to very great love of  God in the 
same way as men of  this dispensation of  grace, since it is written: ‘[a]nd they that went before and 
they that followed cried, saying: ‘Hosanna to the Son of  David,’ etc. Yet everyone becomes more 
righteous―by which we mean a greater lover of  the Lord―after the Passion of  Christ than before, 
since a realized gift inspires greater love than one which is only hoped for. Wherefore, our 
redemption through Christ’s suffering is that deeper affection [dilection] in us which not only frees us 
from slavery to sin, but also wins for us the true liberty of  sons of  God, so that we do all things 
out of  love rather than fear―love to him who has shown us such grace that no greater can be 
found, as he himself  asserts, saying, ‘Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his 
life for his friends’ (Abelard 1956: 283-284; cited in Quinn 1993). 
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models. Under such distinction, an exemplarist model would stipulate that ‘Christ’s soteriological 
significance lies merely in the example it provides to believers’ and the ensuing life changes it could foster 
in them (Hill 2018: 195); whilst an infusionist model sees the ‘change in believer’s lives as deriving not 
(merely) from their own efforts but from God working directly on their hearts in some way’ (id.). It is our 
contention that Abelard’s doctrine escapes the former mere exemplarist label so defined and attempts to 
express, though not necessarily in a completely successful manner, that divine love is capable of  creating or 
generating love within us; i.e., that it somehow manages to infuse love within ourselves (although Abelard 
prefers to speak about the pouring in of  divine love into ourselves) and that he is therefore attempting to 
express something more objective when he claims that divine love has the capacity to ‘move human hearts 
and minds to a similar love’ (Fiddes 1989: 141). To this effect, Abelard’s identification of  the Holy Spirit 
with divine love further contributes to our infusionist characterization of  his doctrine. Far from being the 
product of  our own efforts or good deeds alone, it is the Spirit ‘who reactivates the love of  human beings 
for their Creator’ (ibid., pp.153-154). In one of  his sermons for example, he refers to the Holy Spirit as 
pouring out ‘his pure love into us by which we love him sincerely for his own sake’ (Abelard, Sermons, 5. 
PL 423c; cited in ibid.). 
 But returning to our analysis of  Abelard’s language, it is important to notice that by his use of  
expressions as enkindled, made righteous, incites, or acquire for us, Abelard is trying to express the thought that 
divine love has a ‘redemptive impact on its own account’, that is, independently of  the disposition it might 
encounter in its receptor (ibid., p.144). To speak of  a love that enkindles love entails or presupposes a 
generation within and seems to go beyond a mere imitation of  the aforementioned affective state in the 
one who beholds or receives it (id.). For Abelard it would seem that the demonstration of  divine love, its 
revelation, is at the same time an infusion of  it. A case in point― ‘Dispelling our shadows with light, he 
showed us, both by his words and example, the fullness of  all virtue, and repaired our nature’(id.). As with 
another quotation where Abelard moves from the idea of  Christ teaching us by word and example to that of  
our hearts being enkindled, here also lays a noteworthy transition between showing us, and repairing our natures 
(Fiddes 1989: 145). And the device employed by Abelard to explain how this process is carried out is 
understandably close to his own life experience: the power of  a story of  love (id.). 
 As is well known, the name of  Abelard is usually considered in relation to that of  Heloise 
d’Argenteuil as representing one of  the most famous, albeit tragic, love stories of  the Middle Ages. One of  
the main features of  their intermittent relationship was their prolonged epistolary exchange, and it seems 
fair to state that Abelard draws upon this experience in his dealings with the matter at hand; viz., that of  
the ‘human experience of  telling a story, and the human gift of  memory, and applies it to the narrative of  
the cross’ (ibid., p.146). In the course of  their letters, he exhorts Heloise to enter into the story of  Christ’s 
death and Passion with the same imaginative force she does when reliving the story of  their love (id.). 
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 It appears that Abelard has, as Paul Fiddes remarks, an intuitive perception of  an interior 
psychological transformation that is dependent upon an objective event (id.), and that therefore those 
atonement models that make use of  psychological insights could be said to belong in spirit to Abelard’s 
outlook on the topic (ibid., p.147). If, as Robert Taylor remarks, Abelard conceives of  love as a ‘spiritual 
force exerted by the lover on the beloved, and, in a responsive heart, setting up a reflex which tends to 
become permanent’, Abelard’s model, ingenious and insightful as it is, is not altogether clear as to the 
manner in which Christ’s love gets implanted or infused in us (Taylor 1935: 212; cited in Quinn 1993). But 
it is now well due for us to provide some of  Chauncy’s main ideas concerning the redemption process. 
 
4. Chauncy’s Redemption Thoughts 
4.1 Righteousness 
Sin, to be sure, was the main foe that God came to destroy, but the only way to do this is by bringing about 
a change in mankind that shall transform them from rebels against God into their ‘willing and obedient 
people’ (Chauncy 1784: 179). And despite Chauncy’s talk of  two senses of  reconciliation between God and 
mankind―one effected immediately through Christ’s passive obedience, while the other is that ‘change of  
state connected with an actual meetness for, and present interest in eternal life’ (id.)―it is clear from his 
work that his emphasis lies in this latter sense of  the term. Accordingly, we are redeemed, that is, made 
righteous, in a manner that is agreeable to our natures as intelligent and indeterministically free moral 
agents. This for Chauncy, constitutes the reason for ‘the erection of  the gospel kingdom, with all its means, 
privileges, blessings, and motives’, and yet of  still ‘other dispensations […], that so mankind universally 
may, at length, be wrought upon, and in a rational way, to become righteous persons’ (ibid., p.86). Like 
Origen centuries before him, our author clearly spurns the idea of  imputed righteousness and believes that 
this making righteous could only come about in a manner or through a process that does not undermine 
our character as personal moral agents. A case in point: when going over the demerits of  the traditional or 
classical doctrine of  hell as being allegedly everlasting (something our author dismisses as it will be shown 
in the following chapters), Chauncy argues that God is not obliged, and it certainly would not comport 
with divine wisdom, to make the ‘discouragements to vicious practice the greatest, it is possible his power 
should make them’ (ibid., p.344); such a method, he says, would not suit with God’s consideration of  them 
as personal moral agents, for then ‘no room in this case would be left for the trial of  their virtue’; these 
discouragements being so great as to ‘overpower the mind and give no opportunity for choice’ (ibid., 
p.345). 
 This, moreover, we should remember, is connected to our author’s take on the issue of  being born 
again, of  the so-called second birth. This second birth consists for our author, in a moral sense and 
figuratively speaking, in the acquirement of  a condition or state where our moral traits resemble, through a 
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new superinduced nature as he likes to put it, those exhibited by the historical Jesus (Chauncy 1785: 186). 
Chauncy’s ideas on this topic are similar to those Greek patristic theologians mentioned above (e.g. 
Irenaeus of  Lyon) and their distinction between the Image of  God in man, which essentially consists in our 
condition as rational and free moral agents, and the likeness of  God in man, as that progressive development 
of  our moral faculties by which we hopefully imitate or resemble those exhibited by Christ in his earthly 
sojourn. 
 What God seeks, says Chauncy repeatedly, is the free consent of  the will (ibid., pp.181, 190-191); 
that is, a repentant attitude in the contrite sinner. Elsewhere he touches upon the idea of  forced or 
involuntary submission as morally worthless, and it is telling in this respect his reliance on Samuel Clark’s 
distinction between God’s kingdom of  power and God’s moral government, the latter as that rule over 
rational personal beings who can’t, and moreover shouldn’t, be morally compelled to act in any given way. 
For Christ will, Chauncy holds, ‘influence them universally, sooner or later, in a rational moral way, and as is 
befitting free and intelligent agents, to bow down before him, practically confessing him to be Lord’ (ibid., 
p.190). Now a philosophically minded putative objector might reasonably question the plausibility of  the 
idea of  universal voluntary subjection in the case of  indeterministically free personal beings, but suffice it 
to say for the moment that our author finds a way out of  such a logical quagmire by the expedient of  
making use of  Molinism for Universalism. Since we will concern ourselves at length with this important 
issue in a subsequent chapter, we leave it at rest for the moment. 
 To repent and change one’s ways are thus the main conditions for admission into heaven according 
to our author. Examples of  this are numerous in his work, but we consider the following to be especially 
illustrative of  this belief. When discussing the new gospel-dispensation opened up through Christ and 
again in the context of  his disquisitions on the Pauline texts of  Scripture, he emphasizes that despite the 
offenses being many, the possibility of  avoiding the second death is open to anyone who repents and 
comes to Christ; for ‘God is not willing that anyone should perish’ (2 Peter 3:8-10) (ibid., pp.137-138). 
Wherefore if  anyone misses out on salvation, the fault will lie entirely with them. The other instance we 
advance comes during Chauncy’s discussion of  the different covenants that have framed the divine-human 
relationship through the ages. When comparing this gospel-dispensation made available through Christ, to 
the one in which our first fathers found themselves in (which Chauncy believes it not to be a covenant of  
works let us remember), this rule of  trial we are dependent upon, he says, is less severe than that which 
Adam was subjected to. For ‘there was no room for repentance’ and a sure doom was to follow in case he 
would transgress or disobey. We, however, can ‘be admitted to mercy’ if  we sincerely repent, no matter 
how severe or numerous our offenses could be (ibid., p.240). 
 This idea therefore of  the voluntary subjection of  sinners to God’s moral government is a rather 
pervasive theme in Chauncy’s theological works, and he moreover explicitly connects it to the idea of  
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redemption by claiming that rational and eternal happiness can only come about through such willing or 
voluntary submission (ibid., p.191); and so as to leave no room for doubt, moral depravity, says our author, 
is to be regarded as ‘inconsistent with rational happiness’ (Chauncy 1784: 343). In another of  his works 
and dealing with the issue of  divine benevolence, Chauncy mentions that communications of  goodness 
from the deity vary significantly; that some manifest goodness in one degree, while others in a different 
one, and that no such ‘communications of  goodness may reasonably be looked for from the deity, though 
infinitely benevolent, but such as fall in with what wisdom directs to as fit and proper’ (1784b: 41-42); lest 
in ‘the final result of  its operations, [it could] do more hurt than good’ (id.). Divine love thus could take on 
the shape or form of  unfortunate consequences that are a direct result of  leading selfish and unloving lives, 
certainly clear marks of  a sinful existence. 
 
4.2 Against Divine Impassibility 
Since God willed the creation of  personal moral agents that would actively participate in the process of  
their own redemption; and if  an integral part of  such redemption is the achievement of  fellowship 
between such creatures and the deity, then we must suppose God as desiring, and as concerning Himself  
for the welfare of  such creatures. We provide below our author’s ideas around the concept of  divine 
passibility. 
In arguing against those who claim that benevolence, ‘as a disposition, inclination, or propension’, 
ought not to be ascribed to the deity―for unlike us imperfect and frail creatures, God is not in want of  
such help to spur His benign endeavours―, Chauncy lays down his position on the issue of  divine 
impassibility (1784b: 22). Such writers, according to Chauncy, believe that because of  His infinite 
understanding, God bestows ‘existence and happiness to his creatures solely from the fitness and 
reasonableness, of  the thing as an object of  intelligence’ (id.). 
 Chauncy answers that in order to determine if  an inclination or disposition is proper to a certain 
being, we must look to its nature or constitution. In the case of  man for example, he avers that it is by 
knowing his constitution that we understand ‘that he is formed with a capacity to receive pleasure; with a 
state of  mind inclining him to pursue it, both for his own privative good, and the good of  others’ (ibid., 
p.23). Additionally, such a being was formed with the ‘powers of  intelligence and volition, qualifying him to 
discern what will conduce to these ends, and to will the exertion of  his endeavours for the accomplishment 
of  them’ (id.). But take away such capacity or inclination for both private and social happiness, ‘of  what use 
would intelligence or volition have been to him?’ our author asks (ibid., p.24). Such a being would have no 
incentive to action, and ‘would eternally exist indifferent to everything’ (ibid., p.27). Now such reasoning, 
says Chauncy, is to be extended to ‘all created beings whatsoever; and... it equally takes place with respect 
to the supreme being himself ’ (ibid. p.25). We must suppose God, Chauncy continues, as 
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existing with some constitution or other: which constitution, as to him, being self-existent, must be 
looked upon as necessary, in the same sense that we call his existence necessary. And what 
constitution can be imagined more worthy of  the Deity, or consentaneous to all the ideas we have of  
perfection, than that which supposes him to exist not only with the powers of  intelligence and 
volition, heightened in degree of  perfection beyond all bounds; but with the principles also of  self-
love, and benevolence, heightened in like manner; disposing him to seek his own, and the happiness 
of  others? Upon the previous supposition of  such a constitution of  nature, the conduct of  the 
Deity, in creating the world, and giving being and happiness to so many creatures is intelligible. 
Otherwise, not very easily accounted for (id.). 
We must therefore suppose the deity as existing ‘with sentiments of  happiness, and a capacity for it, 
in addition to the powers of  intelligence and volition, together with a natural state of  mind inclining Him 
to pursue it; either with respect of  himself  or others, or both’ (ibid., p.27). This understanding of  divinity, 
one in some respects in opposition to medieval conceptions, conceives of  God as responsive and in some 
way as affected by His creation. In essence, it would appear to present God in more modern terms, one 
where he would appear to be, for lack of  a better word, more human. We will retake this topic of  divine 
passibility in the following chapter. 
 
4.3 Divine Grace 
Owing to the importance of  the topic itself, but also perhaps as a response to the inherent Pelagian 
tendencies of  any exemplarist understanding of  the atonement, Chauncy devotes some considerable 
attention to the role of  divine grace in the matter of  human salvation. We provide below some examples 
of  this, particularly in connection with the Fall and its consequences, for it is there that our author mainly 
brings this issue to the fore. 
 The universal mortality that we are subjected to after the Fall together with the anti-Pelagian claim 
of  an impossibility of  earning justification through our own efforts alone―without the aid of  divine grace 
that is―are things that in his consideration should appear obvious to an unprejudiced reader of  the 
Scriptures. Hence despite his rather unconventional interpretation of  the DOS as we saw in the previous 
chapters, he advances a rather orthodox account of  God’s grace through Jesus Christ as indispensable for 
salvation. He in fact considers this as another unfortunate consequence of  the original lapse, but at the 
same time portrays it as its remedy. It is this dispensation of  grace, this new establishment as he calls it, the 
grand promise and remedy for ‘the disadvantages Adam had brought upon himself  and his posterity’ 
(Chauncy 1785: 135). Had this not been the case, he (Adam) would have surely immediately died, and the 
history of  mankind would have been stopped in its tracks there and then. Therefore this ‘deliverance from 
the power of  the grave’ is, for the Bostonian, ‘absolutely and unconditionally the grant of  grace to 
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mankind’ (ibid., p.136). And just as the sin of  Adam, it came to be without any fault or merit on our part, 
i.e., without the concurrence of  our own agency. 
 Another drawback of  the Fall, and to which we alluded to in a previous chapter (Ch.2), was this 
Pauline emphasis in an internal warring condition in all men, and again here the remedy for such a situation 
is to be found in divine grace. Our author does this when discussing Romans, particularly its seventh 
chapter (verse 24th) and where Paul complains of  his fleshly proclivities as inducing him to sin―‘O 
wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of  this death’; Chauncy interprets such 
passage as signifying: ‘O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from THIS MORTAL BODY’, that 
is, from its accompanying cravings and proclivities that make it virtually impossible in this world to refrain 
from sinning (ibid., p.279). Now as we mentioned, deliverance from this internal warring condition is to be 
found a few pages on, in ver. 25, where it is specified that redemption ‘may be obtained upon the plan of  
grace, through Jesus Christ’ (ibid., pp.282-283). 
 Our subjection to the nature we derived from Adam would bespeak unfavourably of  both God’s 
moral government of  creation and His divine attributes as well if  we were judged solely on our observance 
of  the law, but since divine grace is essential in determining our ultimate destiny, critics that hurl such 
recriminations lack a firm footing in their complaints according to our writer. And he ends up the 
treatment of  this topic with a very Augustinian declaration―no matter how early contracted or pervasive 
sinfulness could be within a person, it will always be their fault if  they don’t achieve deliverance from it 
since it is always open to anyone ‘upon the foot of  grace through Jesus Christ’ to extricate themselves from 
the power of  the devil (ibid., p.237). We say ‘Augustinian’ owing to the North-African father’s belief  that no 
matter how internally fragmented a person could be, it is always open to anyone to ask God for a will that 
wills the good and in this way to begin the path to moral regeneration (Stump 2006). 
 
4.4 A Developmental Approach to Redemption 
It should be clear to the reader by now that our theologian places a great deal of  interpretative weight in 
our condition as personal moral beings, endowed with liberty to will and act (the precise sense of  which it 
would be difficult to express in contemporary terms, but suffice it to say that it approximates to what is 
now termed a libertarian understanding of  free will), and that his outlook on the redemption process is 
likewise influenced by it. 
 Just as during his lengthy work on original sin he brings our attention to the happiness or pleasure 
that is the outcome of  a due use of  our intellectual and moral faculties (and this in the context of  rebutting 
those who would claim that it would have evinced greater benevolence in the deity if  He had granted us 
with the gift of  original righteousness), he in another of  his works actually connects it to the matter of  our 
attaining a state of  moral righteousness in which redemption essentially consists for him. He begins by 
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stating that in fact ‘there could be no such thing as any moral attainment, if  nothing could be acquired by 
the due exercise of  our natural faculties’ (1784b: 119). He continues, ‘The capacity of  making acquisitions, 
by our own endeavours, suitably employed, is the true and only basis of  all our moral perfection’ (id.). And 
again the issue of  moral agency reappears a few lines after when he states that ‘it is in consequence of  
this... that we become capable of  virtue, and worthy of  praise...And had we not this power, we should be 
nothing more than mere perceptive beings, who do not act, but are acted upon’ (id.). 
 
4.5 The Destruction of  Sin 
Chauncy’s interpretation of  Genesis 3:15 is worthy of  attention at this point. The passage in question has 
God declaring that He ‘will put enmity between thee [Devil] and the woman [Eve], and between thy seed 
and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel’. Chauncy naturally denies a literal sense 
in the interpretation of  these words and favours a spiritual sense, particularly an anagogical one we could 
say that we now explain. 
 These words, says Chauncy, were uttered by God to the Devil then present in the body of  the 
serpent, and really have to do with the promise of  his destruction ‘as the tempter and destroyer of  man, by 
one who should be of  the seed of  the woman’ (1785: 97). These words therefore, apart from providing 
comfort to the first couple in their guilty condition―they were pronounced in their presence, and in words 
‘adapted to the appearance of  things, and their conceptions of  them’ (ibid., p.99)―were not really aimed at 
their understanding; and the comfort here spoken of  has to do with the implicit promise that they were to 
have children, which, as Chauncy makes clear, ‘could not have been the case if  the death threatened had 
been […] immediately inflicted on them’ (id.). The correct reading of  this passage for Chauncy is that they 
were ‘a declaration from God, summarily, though obscurely, promising or predicting, the destruction of  the 
devil, that is, his power, interest, and kingdom’, though not necessarily his being as our writer explains 
elsewhere (ibid., p.98). The idea the passage is intending to convey, says Chauncy, is that of  God’s victory 
over sin; for when it is here said that Christ shall destroy evil, it is to be understood as the destruction of  
‘that kingdom of  sin, which, by his means, as a tempter, he had introduced into the world’ (ibid., p.233). 
 Because of  their circumstances both historical and experiential, they had (Adam and Eve) no way 
of  understanding the full meaning of  God’s words within the bigger scheme of  the gospel plan of  
salvation. They couldn’t know that evil men are the seed of  the devil and that Christ was the seed of  the 
woman here spoken of; a God both human and divine, ‘made of  a woman, and born of  her body’ (ibid., 
p.100). 
 It is this passage, for Chauncy, the first enunciation of  the gospel scheme of  providence, ‘the plan 
of  grace’ (ibid., p.101), that in later times became clearer through God’s subsequent promises to the first 
prophets, and particularly through His Son Jesus Christ and the apostles. A scheme that is expected to 
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become even more evident in the future as mankind will gain a stronger grasp of  the ‘grand purpose of  
God’ (ibid., p.102). 
 We are aware of  the limited capacity that a single model or approach to the doctrine of  atonement 
has for making sense of  the work of  Christ on the cross. Current writings on this topic thus piece together 
a ‘synthetic understanding of  the doctrine from elements of  the various extant models…’, a procedure that 
Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders labelled as an ‘egalitarian approach’ to the doctrine of  atonement (Crisp & 
Sanders 2015: 13). The fact that our author, in some isolated instances notwithstanding, avails himself  of  
language that could be described as sacrificial, and in others, as just seen, his language would fit neatly into 
what we previously described as a Christus Victor approach to the doctrine, is perhaps an implicit 
acknowledgement on his part that a single approach or model to this intractable issue is probably ill-
advised. However, it is clear that, to the best of  our knowledge, he could be regarded as an exemplarist.  
 
 . 
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Chapter 5. Philosophical Problems and Solutions to Chauncy’s Account of  Redemption 
 
Introduction 
In the following chapter I will: (1) describe the most relevant philosophical literature in current debates 
about atonement theories; (2) advance Chauncy’s position on the issue; (3) provide an analysis of  the 
nature and purpose of  punishment, particularly for the version of  redemption favoured by our author; and 
(4) state the principal objections raised against exemplarist versions of  the doctrine of  atonement. (5) We 
will likewise provide a couple of  more contemporary accounts of  the atonement―by Hastings Rashdall 
and John Hick―that, like the ones described in the previous chapter, could aid us to better understand 
Chauncy’s position; also, during our discussion of  Rashdall ideas, we will make a brief  parenthesis to 
discuss one of  the main criticisms raised against exemplarist readings of  the atonement, viz., that since it 
lacks an ‘objective transaction’, it is ultimately an unsatisfactory model to understand the doctrine. Finally, 
(6) we will devote some attention to the topic of  divine voluntariness, particularly in its trinitarian 
implications and we will end this chapter by resuming our discussion about divine impassibility. 
 An adequate theory of  the atonement should meet the following desiderata: faithfulness to 
Scripture, consistency with tradition, and coherence with reason. Satisfaction theories of  the atonement 
cannot be adequate because they founder on Mark Murphy’s objection, thus being incoherent with reason. 
In place of  such theories we should have a moral exemplar theory of  the sort given by Chauncy. It doesn't 
founder on Murphy’s objection and is faithful to Scripture―while it is contrary to some passages of  
Scripture, all atonement theories are so, and it is no more so than any other―, as well as is consistent with 
tradition (that is, consistent with the three Catholic creeds―Apostle’s, Nicene, and Athanasian). 
 
1. The state of  the Current Philosophical Debate on Atonement Theories 
It has been maintained that one of  the most philosophically sophisticated and morally intuitive accounts of  
the atonement to appear in recent decades was advanced by Richard Swinburne’s Responsibility and Atonement 
(1989), and in a more condensed form a year before in The Christian Scheme of  Salvation. Most of  the 
allusions to his ideas on the subject to be found in this dissertation were taken from this latter work. Now 
at this early stage it seems warranted to clarify that Swinburne’s theory would be best classified as a 
satisfaction account of  the atonement and as such, it takes compensation―not retribution, as it is in penal 
substitutionary accounts―, as its ‘guiding ideal’ in the removal or cleansing of  the moral debt that sinners 
incur in by way of  their misdeeds (Murphy 2009: 254). And what is it that could compensate or undo the 
consequences of  our sinful actions? To answer such a question Swinburne first constructs a framework of  
reconciliation between persons and then applies it to the divine-human relationship. So, let us first go over 
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those elements that Swinburne takes to be essential in bringing about atonement between persons, and 
then lay out the role he assigns to Christ’s life and death in the divine-human context. 
 Swinburne contends that in instances of  wrongdoing the offender acquires a moral debt towards 
the offended. Through an analysis of  cases of  intentional and unintentional wrongdoing between persons, 
Swinburne lists a series of  elements he considers necessary for reconciliation: repentance, apology, 
reparation, penance, and (hopefully) forgiveness; though, depending on the intentional or unintentional 
character of  the wrong involved, not every one of  such elements is indispensable for true reconciliation as 
we will henceforth describe. The first step towards atonement between individuals consists naturally in a 
change of  heart, disposition, or purposive attitude on the part of  the wrongdoer (Swinburne 2009:357). 
This could take two forms depending on whether the wrong was committed unknowingly or by accident 
(i.e. involuntarily), or if  it was the outcome of  either deliberate malice or through blameworthy negligence 
or reckless behaviour (i.e. intentionally) (id.). By repentance Swinburne describes a rejection of  the 
wrongful act by the culprit that takes place privately (in foro interno); a rejection that consists in both an 
internal acknowledgement of  the wrongness of  the past act, and a resolution not to incur in the same kind 
of  misdeed in the future (id.). In apology I make public this repentant disposition (in foro externo) and make 
clear to the wronged individual that my current ‘purposive attitude’ is not the same as the one entailed in 
my previous offense (id.). Now if  my wrongful act was unintentional then only apology is needed to begin 
the reconciliation process, but if  there was a blameworthy volitional state involved repentance is also 
required (ibid., p.358). Moreover, the connection between these two elements in cases of  intentional 
wrongdoing is clear to see in the fact that sincere or convincing apologies―as are required in instances of  
serious offenses―are very much predicated on a genuine inward repentance beforehand. 
 After repentance and/or apology, reparation is an unavoidable feature for both intentional and 
unintentional wrongdoing. By reparation we are to understand all those actions meant to undo, to the 
extent that this is even possible, the negative consequences or effects of  our wrongful actions (ibid., p.357). 
For cases of  negligence that concern private property for instance, some form of  reparation will usually be 
available; for example, if  you lend me a book and I somehow damage or destroy it, then one 
straightforward way of  making reparation will be for me to buy you a new copy (id.). But as we will 
afterwards describe, in some instances reparation or at least true reparation seems impossible to 
achieve―there is no reparation possible for example for the victims of  murder, and no matter what 
Swinburne thinks, if  I run you over with my car while inebriated and leave you paraplegic, then regardless 
of  how much I spend in wheelchairs, medical care or whatever else to alleviate your suffering, true 
reparation will be elusive until you manage to walk again. 
 The last action open to wrongdoers in their quest for reconciliation with their victims is penance, 
which Swinburne characterizes as a costly gift that goes beyond what is required in reparation and that has 
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for purpose the reiteration by the culprit of  the good intentions exhibited in his previous steps (ibid., 
p.358). It is precisely this costliness that grants seriousness to the repentant’s reparation efforts, for as 
Swinburne rightly holds, to give what we cannot easily afford evinces how sincere our efforts at 
reconciliation really are (id.). It goes without saying that penance is only required in instances of  deliberate, 
negligent or reckless wrongdoing; that is, when there is a blameworthy volitional state involved. 
 After repenting, apologizing, and making significant reparation and probably even penance, the 
wrongdoer, Swinburne argues, has done everything in his power to undo or cancel out his previously bad 
act; towards being at one (at-one-ment) or reconciled to his victim; but the definite remission of  the guilt 
and moral debt he carries will depend on the concession of  forgiveness by his victim (ibid., p.359). 
Forgiveness being an attitudinal or dispositional change in the victim by which he essentially agrees to not 
think of  and treat the culprit as the person who wronged him previously (id.). Now no one is obligated to 
forgive47 and on Swinburne’s account it lies entirely within the wronged party to decide how much 
reparation and penance to demand before granting his forgiveness (ibid., pp.360-361). This furthermore is a 
good thing according to Swinburne, for it allows the wrongdoer to take his offense seriously as well as the 
importance of  both the person and the relationship affected by it48 (ibid., p.360). What we previously 
referred to, following Ryan Davis, as the ‘argument from moral seriousness’.  
 Swinburne then applies this framework for reconciliation between persons to the divine/human 
relationship. Just as we owe it to our benefactors of  early life, and chiefly among those to our parents, to 
make something good out of  our lives, then, a fortiori, we owe it to our heavenly father as our ultimate 
benefactor to lead good lives or what Swinburne calls first-rate lives (ibid., p.364). Alas, this is not the case 
and we all end up squandering the opportunities we were given, and thus stand as guilty sinners in His 
presence and as required to make atonement to Him. The problem here lies in the fact that owing to the 
gravity of  our offenses, the reparation and penance needed lies well beyond our capacities. In Anselmian 
fashion, Swinburne holds that the outside help comes through the life and death of  Christ as the means 
available to repentant sinners to make the reparation and penance required (ibid., pp.364,366). It is hence 
only after ‘sinners combine their repentance and apology with pleading the work of  Christ as a means of  
reparation and penance that God forgives them their sins and their guilt is removed’ (Porter 2004: 231). 
And since Swinburne holds that the best reparation possible is the one that restores the damage caused by 
 
47 Swinburne rightly holds that despite this non-obligatory character of  forgiveness, Christians do have 
such an obligation to forgive based on various sources of  Christian dogma such as the Lord’s Prayer 
(2009: 361). 
48 Swinburne claims that it would be in fact wrong to forgive serious offenses without at least requiring a 
sincere apology from the wrongdoer. Failing to do so he holds, trivializes human relationships for it 
presupposes that good human relationships could exist when we don’t take our actions towards each 
other seriously (2009: 359-360). 
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the wrongful act―instead of  merely giving something else as compensation―, and if  the damage at hand 
consists in our living second-rate lives, then the offering of  a perfect life is indeed fitting reparation for 
such a case (Swinburne 2009: 366). 
 However, let us remember that on Swinburne’s theory it is up to the victim of  wrongdoing (in this 
case God) to determine how much reparation and penance to demand before accepting to forgive the 
sinner. So that, as Steven Porter cogently remarks, on Swinburne’s theory God could have settled for any 
other expedient to provide the required satisfaction (Porter 2004: 232). Far from being necessary, Christ’s 
life and death was only one morally felicitous method for doing so ‘amongst other fitting ways given God’s 
overall intentions for human salvation’ (id.). Why not think that Christ’s perfect human life, Porter asks, 
could be sufficient to constitute the necessary satisfaction? And if  this is so, it would seem unlikely that ‘a 
good God would require such an event for forgiveness’ (id.). In short, Porter’s critique of  the Swinburnian 
atonement process is that while it seems to accommodate or make sense of  Christ’s active obedience, it 
fails to do so for His passive obedience; for ‘unless there is some good purpose that can only or best be 
achieved’ by such death, then such a death would be at best inconsequential and at ‘worst foolish or 
suicidal’ (id.).We will retake this issue in a latter segment of  this chapter. What Porter claims to be needed 
then is a theory of  the atonement that bears a closer relationship with Christ’s suffering and death; one that 
makes sense, or more sense at least, of  His voluntary death (ibid., pp.231-232). And with such an objective 
in mind Porter sets out to provide a renewed defence of  the theory of  penal substitution to which we now 
turn. 
 Porter’s more constructive writing on the atonement―his defence of  penal substitution―starts with 
a defence of  the infliction of  penal consequences on deliberate wrongdoers; with what he labels as the 
utilitarian and intrinsic ends served by retributive punishment. Contrary to Swinburne, Porter believes that 
in intentional wrongdoing (particularly when such acts include mens rea conditions) the culprit has in fact 
acquired a penal debt towards his victim and that even after engaging in the Swinburnian atonement 
process in its entirety, ‘he will likely deserve further loss’ (ibid., p.234). For Porter then, victims of  deliberate 
wrongdoing ‘have a retributive right to punish their wrongdoers’ (ibid., p.233). A retributive right that is 
based on the deliberate misuse of  certain rights and/or privileges by the wrongdoer. Accordingly, 
retributive punishment for Porter is the ‘forcible withdrawal of  certain rights and/or privileges from a 
wrongdoer in response to the intentional misuse of  those rights and/or privileges by the wrongdoer’ (ibid., 
p.234). Ultimately though, despite its permissibility, its justification or what Porter calls its fittingness will lie 
in the moral goods that can be gained through the imposition of  retributive punishment (ibid., pp.234, 
236). 
 Beyond the known utilitarian ends served by retribution such as deterrence or rehabilitation, Porter 
lists what he terms as the intrinsic ends served by it: taking the harm caused with appropriate seriousness; 
103 
treating the wrongdoer as ‘a responsible moral agent’ (id.); and in its more relational aspect, it affords to 
both the victim and the relationship marred by the wrongful act an adequate value judgement by the 
wrongdoer (id.). A deliberate wrongdoer going through retributive punishment would thus be granted with 
the opportunity of  correctly considering the reasons that put him in that situation: of  taking seriously his 
wrongful act, the person(s) affected by it, and the relationships involved. He would then be, in short, 
treated as a responsible moral agent; and in Swinburnian fashion, not doing so according to Porter, runs 
the risk of  trivializing human relationships (id.). 
 Transposed to the divine-human context, we stand as penal debtors with respect to God, for 
everything we have, including our very lives is the consequence of  His gracious and unmerited gift. 
Moreover, if  we take into consideration the fact that we were granted with the opportunity of  attaining the 
highest possible happiness any creature could experience, viz., the unmediated experience and company of  
God Himself  in the afterlife, then to knowingly squander ‘the goods and opportunities of  earthly human 
life... is a clear misuse of  the rights and privileges we have been given by God’ (ibid., p.235). God would 
thus be justified in taking away, forcibly, these same rights and privileges―physical and spiritual death in 
theological terms. 
 It should be clear by now that Porter has a rather reformative and utilitarian conception of  
retributive punishment, and that he bases his transposition from the merely human to the divine-human 
context for these very reasons. For instance, even though Porter does not contend that it was necessary for 
God to follow such a procedure (here talking about what passes for the orthodox account of  the 
atonement) to attain reconciliation between mankind and Himself, he does argue that ‘there is great moral 
worth in him doing so’ (id.). Such a process, again, will permit the wrongdoer to take his action, his victim 
and the relationship affected with due moral seriousness, and he will therefore be treated as a responsible 
moral agent (id.). All of  which will redound, according to Porter, to the moral betterment of  the 
wrongdoer (id.). 
 As for its utilitarian tincture, we are to concern ourselves now with Porter’s arguments for 
defending the moral coherence of  the substitution aspect of  his theory, that is, of  the penalty transfer 
from the guilty party (us) to Christ. At this point we arrive at an important fork in the road in current 
philosophical analyses of  penal substitution theories of  the atonement―the alleged logical and/or 
conceptual impossibility of  punishing an innocent person. It has been argued, following Joel Feinberg’s 
ideas concerning punishment, that since it is part of  the very definition of  punishment that the hard and 
authoritative treatment inflicted is in response to a person’s failure to meet a certain binding standard 
(Craig 2018: 510), that an indispensable aspect of  punishment is that it ‘expresses condemnation of  the 
wrongdoer, of  the wrongdoer as performer of  the wrong’ (Murphy 2009: 256). And if  punishment is 
chiefly condemnatory expressive action of  a guilty individual, then one cannot logically maintain to be able 
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to punish someone one does not consider to be guilty or at fault in the first place (Porter 2004: 236; 
Murphy 2009: 255-257). For the time being let us simply mention that such semantic or logical qualms turn 
out unpersuasive for Porter, and that he believes that the claim that punishment could only be executed on 
blameworthy individuals is not a logical assertion ‘but a moral one’ (Porter 2004: 236). We will retake this 
issue later on when going over Mark Murphy’s and William Lane Craig’s contributions to this debate. 
 But beyond these logical or conceptual disquisitions, Porter grounds the moral coherence of  the 
substitutionary aspect of  his theory in two elements: (1) on the intentional character of  the decision 
involved, and this itself  based on a sound mind to take the culprit’s place in the reception of  hard 
treatment; and (2) on the ultimate justification for the imposition of  retributive punishment: the 
accomplishment of  certain good ends as has been already described (id.). This would permit, Porter 
believes, a relative freedom in the execution of  this retributive right by the victim, and it also helps to 
explain why on this view it is ultimately up to the victim to decide ‘within limits...to what extent and in 
what manner to inflict punishment’ (id.). A freedom, moreover, that Porter naturally believes to include the 
acceptance of  a ‘voluntary penal substitute’ (id.), for, on his view, if  the good ends that warrant the 
punishment of  the wrongdoer are also served through punishment of  the substitute then this lends 
justification to his version of  penal substitution (ibid., p.237). Against Porter here however, one can apply 
the same arguments employed against humanitarian theories of  punishment in the sense that they tend to 
dissociate punishment from desert (Lewis 1954: 225), and perhaps more troubling as we will afterwards 
explain in a more detailed segment devoted to punishment, in opening up the possibility of  tyrannical 
forms of  judicial authority that are predicated on alleged loftier goals. 
 Porter’s endorsement of  penal substitution is not however without qualifications and he provides 
clear instances of  wrongdoing in which his theory would be simply out of  place: a rapist’s mother for 
example, with a willing disposition and sound mind notwithstanding, should not be allowed (as in practice 
it is never allowed) to serve his son’s prison sentence. And the reason we find such a transfer morally 
counterintuitive according to Porter, is that ‘the likely good ends’ that could be attained by the punishment 
of  the culprit (such as deterrence and prevention49) would not be served by the punishment of  the 
substitute (id.). Though in the substitution that concerns us, that of  Christ taking our place to receive our 
punishment, these good ends according to Porter are not an issue of  concern (id.). 
 To recap at this point: we began with Swinburne believing that in order to atone for our sins, to be 
reconciled to God, it was necessary to make satisfaction for our wrongs; but after Porter’s misgivings 
concerning Swinburne’s apparent incapacity to make sense of  Christ’s passive obedience in his scheme of  
 
49 The main good ends that Porter ascribes to criminal punishment are deterrence and prevention (Porter 
2004: 237). 
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atonement, it would appear that we are now in orthodox Reformation quarters, arguing that genuine 
atonement can be achieved only if  Christ Himself  somehow takes the punishment that was our due. Let us 
now look briefly at Mark Murphy’s theory of  the atonement to see what valuable insights can be gained 
through what he labels as a vicarious punishment account; a theory he puts forward as capturing the kernel 
of  the penal substitutionary theory but that avoids, so he says, what he regards as an insuperable 
conceptual or logical incoherence in it. And it is to this latter aspect of  Murphy’s ideas that we move into. 
 It was Murphy’s work that introduced the definition of  punishment―itself  informed by current 
discussions in the philosophy of  law―with which we are working, and since the essence of  his critique 
against the penal substitution theory hinges on it, and it will also be a matter of  concern during our 
revision of  William Lane Craig’s defence of  such a view, we consider it appropriate to list its main 
components or characteristics at this point. Punishment we said is hard treatment, and as such it is 
‘perceived as an evil by the person punished’ (Murphy 2009: 255); it is also authoritative in the sense that it 
is administered by someone legitimized to do so, that is, someone legally authorized; and lastly, 
punishments are for failures to meet binding standards (id.). When an instance of  imposition of  hard 
treatment is portrayed as punishment but fails to meet all these conditions, then we have, says Murphy, a 
case of  defective punishment (id.). As it would be if, for instance, the authority or legitimacy of  the person 
or institution in charge of  inflicting such treatment is rightfully questioned, or if, as well, the wrongdoer for 
whatever reasons sees his punishment as not a completely unwelcomed development (id.). 
 These three conditions moreover, though necessary for an adequate definition of  punishment, are 
not jointly sufficient conditions for it, for Murphy considers that certain cases in which hard treatment is 
authoritatively imposed for a failure to a meet a standard might nonetheless not count as instances of  
punishment. Torts or penalties in sports he believes, are not punishments, and he takes it as validation of  
this point the fact that torts are usually the domain of  civil, not criminal law (id.). Which brings us to his 
fourth and more defining feature of  punishments―that punishment, as already mentioned, is expressive 
action; action that expresses condemnation ‘of  the wrongdoer as performer of  the wrong’50 (ibid., p.256). 
Among the virtues of  such a definition for Murphy are: (1) a better way of  recognizing instances of  
wrongdoing from those that aren’t; and (2) it ‘makes intelligible the fact that crimes have mens rea (guilty 
mind) conditions as essential elements’ (id.). The first of  these would help to explain why in tort awards or 
in infringements of  sports rules there is no expression of  condemnation according to Murphy; and for the 
latter alleged virtue, such definition would assist us in understanding why in criminal law, despite the 
 
50 Punishments on this account are neither directly and solely against the wrongdoer qua wrongdoer, nor is 
it intended to condemn only the wrongful act (Murphy 2009: 256). 
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existence of  a wrongful act (actus reus), if  there is no blameworthy volitional state involved (presupposing 
intentionality, reckless or negligent behaviour) then there is no real crime according to Murphy (id.). 
 Considering Murphy’s adoption of  Feinberg’s definition of  punishment, one can see that in the 
dichotomy previously addressed, he believes there to lie an unresolvable conceptual tension and/or logical 
inconsistency in the idea of  punishing an innocent individual. For if  one adopts an expressivist definition 
of  punishment, then punishment is a non-transferable activity (id.). One would not be able to express 
condemnation, so the argument would go, ‘via hard treatment of  someone who one does not take to be 
worthy of  condemnation’ (id.). Murphy likens this non-transferable quality of  punishment―thought of  as 
an expressive activity and not as a basic action―with the non-transferable character of  an official 
honouring ceremony (ibid., pp.256-257). Just as it would make no sense to punish someone one doesn’t 
consider to be at fault, to praise or honour someone for an achievement or feature they haven’t attained or 
don’t possess is equally absurd. Praising and punishing ‘are expressive actions, and they presuppose that 
their targets are bearers of  certain relevant evaluative properties’ (ibid., p.257). Praise substitution, just as 
penal substitution can only be directed towards those individuals bearing the ‘relevant evaluative properties’ 
and are thus non-transferable activities (id.). 
 Harkening back to Porter’s theory and even after acquiescing in his rather contentious concept of  a 
retributive right (enjoyed by those wronged to punish their wrongdoers), such a right under the definition 
of  punishment we are working with would be unavailable for those wronged to transfer (ibid., p.258). We 
mentioned already that such an issue turned out to be unpersuasive for Porter, and that from the obvious 
fact that innocent people are subjected to hard treatment for crimes they didn’t commit, he concludes that 
the objection at hand mustn’t be logical, but moral (id.). Murphy rejects such a view claiming that even if  
there is no logical inconsistency there could still be conceptual incoherence involved (Cfr. The Moorean 
Paradox as an example of  a logically consistent assertion that is nonetheless ultimately incoherent)51(id.). 
 Murphy likewise believes that this definition provides him with resources to counter David Lewis’ 
qualified endorsement of  penal substitution. Lewis’ defence of  penal substitution (Do We Believe in Penal 
Substitution? [1997]) revolved around the apparent tolerance exhibited (by society in general) when an 
offender, punished through a fine, has that fine paid by someone else. In such instances, says Murphy, the 
only way to characterize them would be either that: (a) there is punishment taking place though of  a 
defective sort; or (b) that no one is really being punished (id.). Now if  we describe the situation under the 
former rubric, this would be because the law only stipulates that the criminal ensures that the amount 
demanded by the fine be paid, and this regardless of  who (such as a wealthy relative) makes the required 
disbursement and hence also regardless of  whether such payment actually creates financial difficulties for 
 
51 ‘I believe that P, but P is false’ (Murphy 2009: 258). 
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the wrongdoer (ibid., p.259). Or we could also describe the situation as one in which no one is being 
punished owing to the simple fact that if  someone else pays the fine, then surely the person fined (the 
wrongdoer) is not being punished, and there would also be no intelligible sense in which it could be 
affirmed that the substitute is in fact being punished for the misdeeds that generated the fine in the first 
place (id.). Faced with such alternatives, it is important as Murphy suggests, to remember that ‘penal 
substitution is not supposed to eliminate punishment, but rather to re-direct it’ (ibid., p.258); and since 
neither a clear imposition of  punishment nor a genuine substitution could be discerned in Lewis’ examples, 
Murphy believes Lewis’ defence, albeit qualified, turns out to be unsatisfactory (ibid., p.259). 
 One could also bring against Lewis an argument only tangentially touched by Murphy but more 
thoroughly developed by Philip Quinn―instances that demonstrate that this alleged general tolerance 
towards offender’s fines (thought of  as punishments) being paid by others is not as widespread as Lewis 
seems to think. Quinn’s text is mostly a recapitulation of  court rulings and legal opinions that evince 
dissatisfaction with penal substitution in cases of  fines (Quinn 2004). Although the legal evidence put 
forward by Quinn is admittedly indirect, for they do not concern examples in which someone else serves as 
a penal substitute in the disbursement of  an offender’s large fine, they do address ‘the underlying ethical 
issue’, which Quinn takes to be ‘whether offenders should be allowed to avoid punishment in the form of  
fines’ (ibid., p.722). Legal reasoning here proves to be significant for our purposes in the distinction it draws 
between compensatory and punitive awards, and on the lawfulness of  insurance coverage against this latter 
punitive or exemplary damages (ibid., pp.722-728). 
 But returning to Murphy, it is due for us to describe in what exactly does his nearby alternative to 
penal substitution consists in. The penal substitution view holds, let us remember, that a person A deserves 
to be punished, but that person B undergoes the punishment that was A’s due, thereby releasing A from the 
punishment he deserved (Murphy 2009: 260). This we said while maybe not logically inconsistent, did 
present, to Murphy at least, a conceptual or semantic incoherence. On the contrary, the vicarious 
punishment account holds that person A deserves to be punished, but that person ‘B undergoes hard 
treatment, which hard treatment constitutes A’s being punished; and so A no longer deserves to be 
punished’ (id.). 
 As in the penal substitution account, in vicarious punishment the hard treatment inflicted on Christ 
is what constitutes the punishment and allows for the ‘requital of  ill-desert’ (id.); but unlike penal 
substitution, in vicarious punishment the wrongdoer himself  is punished through the hard treatment that is 
inflicted in the substitute (id.). This could only come about, it is obvious, through a close personal 
connection between wrongdoer and substitute, such that the harms that befall the latter have a direct 
negative effect on the former. To this effect Murphy lists the many ways in which one could be made worse 
off  through the imposition of  punishment―by being deprived of  one’s liberty, bodily integrity, property or 
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even the loss of  one’s life, and calls all these forms of  hard treatment as punishments exerted or inflicted in 
propia persona in the sense that they are immediately applied in one’s own person (id.). Though Murphy, 
surely taking inspiration from history, states that not all punishments have to be inflicted in this manner, 
and that one way in which we could be punished is through the suffering of  an innocent person who bears 
a special relationship to us; a suffering that is the outcome, and this is important to remember, of  one’s 
inability to meet a certain binding standard; of  ‘one’s wrongful action’ (ibid., p.261). A feature which would 
surely aggravate the (indirect) punishment of  the culprit. 
 Murphy claims that this vicarious punishment account is genuine punishment and through the 
counterfactual strategy of  imagining a legal system based on it―his example involves the case of  a 
murderer whose own spouse is killed (therefore punishing him) owing to the fact that his victim was 
himself  married―he claims to meet all of  the conditions of  punishment previously listed. It would be 
authoritative, for it would be part of  the legal code to punish wrongdoers in such manner; it would also be 
hard treatment imposed for a failure to meet a standard; and it would also be clear that such hard treatment 
would be ‘essentially condemning... and limited by the variety of  negative and affirmative defences that 
block attributions of  blameworthiness and so make condemnation inappropriate’ (id.). 
 Since it is not our aim to analyse in greater depth Murphy’s theoretic proposal, we will only 
mention that despite its avoidance of  the conceptual incoherence he finds in penal substitution accounts, 
this comes at a great moral cost, for on such a view one would have to countenance the justice of  
subjecting innocent persons (what he calls the suffering innocents) to hard treatment for the wrongs 
committed by someone else (id.). To this Murphy responds that if  everyone in society has informedly and 
freely consented to be potential suffering innocents (how such a consent could be achieved he never 
mentions), then such a device would ‘remove a basis for claiming that requiring [such] compliance is itself  
unjust’ (ibid., p.262). Again, as we will afterwards more fully explain, Murphy’s approach could be 
reproached, as some liberal theories of  punishment have been, with opening the door to tyrannical forms 
of  judicial authority in the sense of  justifying cruel and unjust punishment owing to allegedly utilitarian 
goals pursued by such methods. A case in point and in Murphy’s own words: ‘if  an action is purported to 
be cruel (though not unjust), we would have to ask whether the action is justified by the ends the action 
pursues and the circumstances in which it is performed’ (id.). 
 So it seems that vicarious punishment for Murphy is morally warranted on the alleged free and 
informed consent of  the would-be suffering innocents; indeed, it all seems to hang on it. But Murphy 
himself  elsewhere seems to be aware of  just how hard consent to such a scheme would be to 
achieve―consent to such a scheme, he mentions, ‘could probably not be freely and informedly acquired’ 
(ibid., p.263). If  we take its analogical base, that is, it’s possible human context of  application, and deem it 
as inherently unjust and cruel no matter its avowed lofty goals, then we are inclined to regard it as a rather 
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unpalatable theory for the doctrine of  the atonement; specially when applied to a God whose essence is 
presumed to be that of  love. 
 A different strategy by Murphy in defending his theoretical proposal is to argue that in following 
such an expedient the utilitarian ends of  punishment (retribution and deterrence) are better served than 
through other schemes of  retribution (ibid., p.264). It is prima facie possible that the prospect of  having a 
loved one punished for my faults be a stronger deterrent than any sort of  punishment inflicted in propia 
persona, such as imprisonment; and from a retributivist standpoint, serious wrongdoing ‘might be better 
answered by punishing me through harm to a loved one than through unmediated punishing of  me’ (id.). 
Now all this might be true, but the issue of  the glaring injustice of  subjecting an innocent person to hard 
treatment for something someone else did; of  treating such person as a mere means to an end, remains, no 
matter how valuable such ends might appear to be. 
 Lastly, Murphy argues, there might be other ends apart from achieving the aims of  punishment that 
might commend vicarious punishment to ourselves, such as unity. Adapting an example from Porter in 
which a team captain volunteers to undergo the punishment (the running of  extra laps) that was due to 
some members of  such squad for arriving late to practice, Murphy claims that in having the captain solely 
undergoing the hard treatment, as opposed, let’s say, to the whole team running extra laps, a sentiment of  
unity amongst the team could be better elicited than with the alternative. This would be so because, claims 
Murphy, if  everyone is made to run, then ‘the focus is in one’s own discomfort, one’s own pain’ (ibid., 
p.265). When the captain runs ‘there is a common focus, on the suffering of  the one’ (id.). But before 
passing to Craig’s renewed defence of  penal substitution, let us state Murphy’s vicarious punishment 
account in theological terms, that is, as applied to the reconciliation between God and sinful mankind. 
 The theory would go something like this: by sinning, by disobeying the divine law, we merit 
punishment and until such ill-dessert is dealt with (requited that is), union with God is unattainable (id.). 
God then decides to deal with this ill-dessert through the vicarious device of  subjecting Christ to hard 
treatment in our stead; a hard treatment that constitutes our punishment owing to the special relationship 
between ourselves and Christ―that of  Him being our Lord (id.). And since Christ freely and informedly 
decided to undergo such treatment (as it couldn’t have been otherwise), any reproaches of  cruelty or 
injustice towards Christ and the scheme in general could be put to rest. Under this account then we expiate 
our sins through being ‘subjected to the hard treatment of  having [our] Lord made to suffer and die’ (id.). 
 Craig’s defence of  penal substitution takes the form of  a variegated reply to some of  Murphy’s 
criticisms to the theory of  penal substitution as has been described lines above. First, he relies on the 
known device of  providing a definition of  penal substitution that avoids making Jesus the subject of  God’s 
retributive justice (Craig 2018: 511). One such definitional alternative would stipulate that ‘God gave 
himself  in the person of  his Son to suffer instead of  us the death, punishment, and curse due to fallen 
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humanity as the penalty for sin’ (Jeffery et al. 2007: 21; cited in Craig, 2018). Under such wording of  the 
theory says Craig, Christ is not punished, but suffers the treatment that, had it been inflicted on us, would 
have been our just desert and hence punishment (Craig 2018: 511). Now while it might appear that in this 
enunciation of  the theory we avoid the risk of  treating Father and Son as distinct juridical persons―one 
who imposes punishment, and one who endures it―we are still left with the issue of  the provenance of  the 
punishment to be paid for such sinfulness. For divine law within a Christian context is usually never 
thought of  as having its origin in some impersonal or self-evident principles (we are aware that for some 
Christians this is in fact a source, but such understanding of  the divine law has never been universally or 
even widely shared within Christendom), but rather in the will of  an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity 
(and here we should not be understood as necessarily endorsing theological voluntarism). And if  this is so, 
on such an alternative we would have to commit to the claim that God gave Himself  in His Son to pay a 
penalty whose origin was Himself  (sic). 
 A different charge brought by Craig against Murphy’s expressivist theory of  punishment is that it 
involves what H. L. A. Hart called a ‘definitional stop to short circuit debate’ (Hart 1968: 5; cited in Craig 
2018) in the sense of  ruling out by definition the possibility of  punishing someone other than the 
wrongdoer himself  (Craig 2018: 512). To which, argues Craig, one could avail oneself  of  Feinberg’s own 
distinction between penalties and punishments (a distinction which Murphy endorses) and simply rephrase 
penal substitution as that of  God penalizing Christ for our sins (id.). Simply stated, Craig’s argument here is 
that if  the use of  the word punishment is conceptually incoherent when applied to the hard treatment 
inflicted on an innocent person (the substitute), then one could circumvent such semantic hurdle by simply 
using a word other than punishment (id.). 
 But even if  one wanted to retain the word punishment in a penal substitutionary account, there is a 
possible way of  wording the theory, claims Craig, that avoids the conceptual issues raised by Murphy. And 
the way to do this is by simply abandoning an expressivist theory of  punishment (ibid., p.513). Since it is 
not in the scope of  this paper to cover the many ways in which Craig believes to counter the merits of  
Murphy’s adaptation of  the theory of  punishment we have been working with to the atonement, let us 
simply mention that he provides convincing argumentation to the points that: (1) this expressivist theory 
does not in fact carve the cases properly: that ‘the line between punishments and mere penalties in the law 
does not coincide with the line between condemnatory and non-condemnatory harsh treatment’ (id.); and 
(2) that actus reus is sufficient for conviction in our criminal systems, as cases of  strict liability illustrate, and 
that therefore mens rea is not indispensable for issuing a conviction (condemnation) (ibid., p.514). 
 Craig also holds that despite what we have mentioned so far, an expressivist theory of  punishment 
is not inconsistent with penal substitution, for it is no part of  such a theory that ‘the censure or 
condemnation expressed by punishment be directed towards a particular person’ (ibid., p.517). 
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Expressivism, according to Craig, merely states that ‘a certain stigma [is] attached to punishment [and] in 
the absence of  which the harsh treatment is not punishment’ (id.). But even if  one wanted to retain the 
idea that expressivism entails censure of  the person punished, one could avoid the conceptual incoherence 
raised by Murphy by availing oneself  of  the Reformer’s doctrine of  the imputation of  our sins to Christ 
(ibid., p.517). Under such a scheme, Christ, though personally blameless, is nonetheless treated by God as if 
he had in fact committed such sins and thus ‘declared legally guilty before God’ (id.). Craig defends such 
imputation by equating it to other legal fictions in our systems of  justice and the good ends attained 
through such mechanisms (ibid., pp.518-519); an argument that, though ingenious, turns out personally 
unconvincing. 
 
2. Chauncy’s Redemption Thoughts 
It is well due for us to provide the main contours of  Chauncy’s ideas concerning redemption and to 
explicate our reasons for considering him as providing an account that could be described as exemplarist in 
nature. It is also important to mention that Chauncy’s ideas are not so much against Craig in the sense of  
rebutting his defence of  penal substitution. But he is decidedly against any theory that purports that a 
transaction of  some sort―be this a ransom, a sacrifice, a satisfaction or compensation, or some form of  
retribution, including the one effected in a substitute as both Porter and Craig defend―was necessary in 
order to change God’s attitude towards ourselves: from divine anger to divine mercy. Therefore, his 
position is clearly also at odds with the other positions covered so far, be those revolving around the 
concept of  compensation or satisfaction (Swinburne and his historical counterpart Anselm), or those 
advanced by Murphy and his theory of  vicarious punishment. For as Chauncy clearly hints, it is not God 
that needs to be propitiated, to be changed, but ourselves: for instance, in response to those that think that 
Christ was sent to earth in order to pacify divine wrath, and ‘influence him to have mercy upon the sinful 
sons of  men’, he indubitably affirms that not only does such an assertion reflects injuriously on the 
infinitely benevolent deity, but argues that God was as inclined to infinite mercy before, as after the Passion 
and death of  His only begotten Son (Chauncy 1785: 246). 
 We saw that we were not declared, but made righteous, according to our theologian. Made 
righteous through a process that respects our natures as indeterministically free, moral beings. A process 
that consists in the progressive acquirement of  a moral character that resembles, as it is humanly possible 
of  course, that moral perfection exhibited by our Lord more than two thousand years ago. This 
developmental take on moral growth―this growing in the likeness of  God―itself  as the outcome of  our 
interactions with a physical and social environment whose main design is to educate us in love (divine 
pedagogy). Thus, what God seeks as we have said repeatedly, is our repentance and a genuine change of  
heart. Moreover, God is not indifferent towards His creation; He is not an impassible God as we noted in 
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the previous chapter. He willed the creation of  intelligent moral beings and to ultimately bring them into 
fellowship with Himself; and since the nature of  relationships requires the free engagement of  its 
participants, God had to let us figure out for ourselves that the greatest good available was this possibility 
of  fellowship with Himself. And so as to fend off  possible charges of  Pelagianism, he insists repeatedly on 
the absolute dependence on divine grace for such an internal change in the contrite sinner to be achieved. 
 To sum up and in answering how God will exert such influence on ourselves, Chauncy does so, to 
the best of  our knowledge, by relying on two factors: (1) Christ life and death (both his active and passive 
obedience) as the quintessential example of  a Christian existence devoted in love to God and neighbour; 
and (2) his conviction that the hardships and evils experienced in this life (as well as those of  the afterlife 
as it will become evident in the last chapters of  this work) are meant to educate us; that is, to the 
omnipresent topic in Chauncy’s works of  the divine pedagogy (vid. Ch. 4). It is then through both the 
example of  Christ’s life no less than his death, and through the creation of  a moral environment that 
teaches us what Thomas Talbott once called the self-defeating nature of  evil, that God influences us into 
becoming redeemed. Evils and sufferings, not only in this earthly realm but afterwards as well, have then a 
reformative and temporal character, rather than being vindictive (retributive) and eternal. So it seems that 
in a manner similar to both Richard Cross and Phillip Quinn, Chauncy believes that what is fundamentally 
required for redemption and hence atonement between God and us is a voluntary submission on our part; 
a free consent of  our wills. A voluntary submission to God’s moral government that is predicated on an 
internal moral change in the sinner (Quinn), and such internal change itself  as the logical outcome of  an 
apologetic disposition in the contrite sinner (Cross). 
  
3. The Purpose of  Punishment in a Developmental Account of  Redemption 
In everything discussed so far lies the assumption that the hardships we endure have a reformative 
character, that is, they are meant to be the springs from where moral rehabilitation or healing is achieved in 
the contrite sinner. And even though there is ample biblical support for such a view, the general thrust of  
Christian thought, particularly since Augustine, has tended to favour the equally biblically warranted 
outlook in which these pains and sufferings are but our rightful desert, and thus have a retributive character 
to them. In the present section we will therefore describe these two strands of  Christian thinking 
highlighting those commendable aspects, as well as the demerits of  what some have termed the 
Augustinian (Calvinistic), and the Irenaean positions on divine punishment and their overriding purpose. 
And since these different understandings of  divine punishment are themselves connected to contrasting 
pictures or images of  the divine nature, we will commence by briefly describing these images, an issue 
which we will retake later on, albeit with a different purpose, in the third section of  our work (vid. Ch.7). 
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 Historically, the positions to be described have fallen under the labels Augustinian, Arminian, and 
Universalist; and a helpful manner of  making sense of  these different positions is to frame them along the 
lines of  three variables: divine love, divine sovereignty, and the doctrine of  eternal damnation (Talbott 
2014: 38). Accordingly, we provide below a set of  three inconsistent claims for which there is, individually, 
apparent biblical support, but which as a matter of  logical consistency cannot be all true (id.). 
1. God sincerely loves all of  His human creatures equally, and His redemptive activity is always at 
work with the intention of  reconciling each and everyone to Himself.52 
2. In His omnipotence God will achieve in the end the reconciliation of  every individual whose 
salvation He desires. 
While the former proposition establishes the universal character of  divine love, the latter one has to 
do with the sovereignty of  the divine will, an issue we alluded to in a previous segment of  this work; lastly, 
alas!, there is, as Calvinists stress, apparent biblical support for the doctrine of  eternal punishment in the 
afterlife, such that, 
3. At least some sinners will never be reconciled to God and will henceforth remain separated from 
Him. 
The Augustinian picture of  God presents Him as entirely sovereign over His creation (2), though 
not universally loving towards it; i.e., they deny proposition (1), which leads them to endorse the doctrine 
of  eternal damnation (3). The Arminian position by contrast endorses both (1) and (3), but sees God as 
limited in sovereignty in that He is ultimately unable to bring about the redemption of  all His human 
creatures. Finally, the Universalist position conceives of  God as both omnibenevolent or universally loving 
(1), and also as in complete control of  His creation (2), and therefore ends up rejecting proposition (3) 
(Talbott 2014: 41-42). Again, a more detailed account of  these different positions will be reserved for a 
latter part of  this work. 
 Having delimited the positions, it seems appropriate to say a few words about the nature of  the 
hardships we will be discussing. At the outset we should make explicit a by now fairly common distinction 
between pain and suffering, though it is true that, commonly, the former tends to trigger the latter (Hick 
2010: 292). We say commonly owing to the evident fact that pain as a physical sensation tends to produce 
very different reactions in those going through it, as evidenced by the cases of, for instance, injured 
athletes, soldiers in battle, explorers, martyrs, and so on, who are able to endure substantial pain without 
having thereby the quality of  their experiences significantly altered (ibid., pp.295-296). It is thus plain that 
physical pain (the pain sensation) is variously affected―both mitigated and enhanced―by factors such as 
distraction, emotion, expectation, judgement, and others, in the person going through it, and which in turn 
 
52 My presentation of  these differing pictures and claims is taken from Talbott 2014. 
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leads to the distinction between this physical sensation understood as physical pain, and the pain experience 
which we associate to the emotionally negative (psychic) experience we call suffering (ibid., pp.293,295-
297). Suffering however can be, and in fact in most instances is, the result of  events that have no direct 
connection to physical pain, or at least where this pain stimulus is not the primordial factor in its 
generation―remorse, guilt, bereavement, anxiety, boredom, frustration, injustice, ‘unrequited affection’, and 
an apparently endless list of  others prove to us that emotional suffering is by far the most steadfast 
tormentor we encounter here on earth (ibid., p.293). 
 Seen under this light, the bulk of  human suffering is the result of  the quality or character of  our 
interactions with our fellow beings; of  our actions or omissions towards them; of  our intentions and even 
of  those unintentional features of  our selfhood that reveal the place we assign to others in our 
considerations (vid. Ch.3). Suffering, as John Hick remarks, is thus ‘a function of  sin’: it is the outcome of  
engaging our lives, particularly with our living environment, in a self-centred manner (ibid., p.319). But 
before addressing the Irenaean outlook on divine punishment, let us go over the Augustinian or 
retributivist understanding of  the trials and tribulations we go through here on earth. 
 
3.1 A Retributive God? 
According to the three pictures or schools of  theology in the West that we mentioned above, it is clear that 
the Augustinian version presents us with a divine nature where it would appear that justice and mercy are 
different and opposing divine attributes (Talbott 2014: 134). One where divine justice would require the 
punishment of  sin, while divine mercy would permit its forgiveness (ibid., p.136). This is likewise a view of  
the divine nature shared by some Arminians (e.g. Milton), and one in which these different attributes would 
seem to pull God in opposite directions;53 and thus a view under which someone else, namely Jesus Christ 
His Son, has to resolve in order to overcome this internal strife, so that He ‘might be merciful to sinners 
without doing violence to His own sense of  justice’ (ibid., p.135). Now as for the unavoidable consequence 
(for Augustinians and Calvinists) of  dying in a sinful condition, it would be the swift consignment into the 
Devil’s custody where they would have to endure eternally what we before referred to as poena damni and 
poena sensus (ibid., p.136).          
 This doctrine of  eternal torment implies a philosophical theory of  the nature of  punishment which 
has been regularly referred to as retributive, and according to which the purpose of  punishment has not, or 
should have nothing to do with liberal or humanitarian conceptions of  punishment such as deterrence or 
 
53 Early heretical sects like the Marcionites and the Gnostics were among the first Christians to call 
attention to the apparently opposing attributes of  justice and mercy. An opposition some of  them 
resolved by denying all identity between the God of  the Hebrews (the God of  the Old Testament), and 
the God revealed by Jesus of  Nazareth (Rashdall 1919: 234; Trocmé 1993) 
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rehabilitation (id.). The only purpose of  punishment from a retributive perspective would be to make 
satisfaction, or be a compensation for the wrong incurred in; to somehow ‘balance the scales of  justice’ by 
either inflicting suffering upon the culprit, or by extracting a ‘compensating loss’ from him (ibid., pp.136-
137). Under these circumstances the most relevant factor to consider when thinking about punishment as 
punishment ‘is whether the punishment in fact fits the crime’ (ibid., p.137). This proportionality between 
crime and punishment being one of  the main tenets of  a retributive theory of  punishment, raises 
significant, if  not insuperable objections to its use or its projection as the divine rationale for afterlife 
judgement, as will be described at length in other parts of  this work (vid. Ch.6 and 7). For now, let us go 
over those positive or commendable features that a retributive theory of  punishment might have to offer. 
 First, retributivists have called attention to the way in which such humanitarian or liberal doctrines 
of  punishment as deterrence or rehabilitation ‘tend to sever the concept of  punishment from that of  
justice’ (ibid., p.137); or as C.S. Lewis words it, to remove ‘from punishment the concept of  desert’, and 
which could lead in turn to the loss of  basic human rights that characterize tyrannical forms of  authority 
(1954: 225). For instance, if  our guiding principle in the discharging of  sentences is in fact deterrence, and 
on a specific instance a ruler finds that such an outcome is better served by the execution of  an innocent 
person, though widely believed to be guilty by the society where he lives, then this apparent lofty purpose 
would appear to justify the punishment of  an innocent individual (Talbott 2014: 137). Or if  our intention 
is to reform or rehabilitate the criminal, then this could surely be carried out regardless of  the criminal’s 
voice in the matter; and this in turn might open the door to excessive punishment if  it is then deemed to 
better promote such rehabilitation (ibid. pp.137-138). 
 Secondly, there is an unavoidable element of  retribution in the very concept of  law or regulations 
of  any kind, as opposed to mere requests or suggestions. For as it is painfully evident in the political 
history of  many countries (including my own), it is simply impossible to have laws, except in paper only, 
without a clear and corresponding penalty to be paid in case that they are violated. So if, as Talbott 
remarks, ‘God wants to do more than simply make requests... He must also ensure that those who disobey 
his commands or his laws suffer a punishment of  some kind’ (ibid., p.138). 
 However, if  the retributive position defends as one of  its main principles the idea of  equal or 
proportionate retaliation according to the wrong committed (the lex talionis is one example of  this line of  
thinking), and particularly to the degree of  harm done to others; and moreover, if  this retributive theory of  
punishment has been the basis for a defence of  the doctrine of  eternal damnation, the following and 
damaging question becomes inevitable: for what sort of  crime or offense would eternal damnation be a 
commensurable punishment? (ibid., p.139). As we will afterwards describe (Ch.6 and 7) Chauncy criticizes 
along these lines this philosophical theory of  punishment and the doctrine of  eternal torment it gives 
sanction to. But beyond its connection to eschatological locations, there is one more fundamental 
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drawback to be hurled against this retributive notion of  punishment, and for which I believe the story of  a 
close friend of  a family member could be helpful. 
 The story to put it shortly, is about a woman whose son was murdered by a group of  men whose 
original intention appears to have been not to kill him; they wanted certainly to cause great physical harm 
to him, even to maim him, though apparently not to put him out of  existence altogether. My relative knew, 
after some years of  the tragic incident, that the murderous group was about to be released from prison and 
she asked her friend (the mother of  the murdered person) how she felt about it; if  she was understandably 
outraged and to my relative’s surprise, her response was that she felt indifferent towards it, that in fact, for 
all she cared, she wanted them released; that, and this is key, keeping them in prison would not bring her 
son back. We shall return briefly to this tragic story. 
 Now for less serious crimes or misdemeanours, it certainly could be possible for the wrongdoer to 
make atonement for his offense. Not only with the intention of  expunging the stain of  guilt in his own 
heart, but specially with the aim of  undoing or removing, to the degree that this is possible, the 
consequences of  the wrongful past action (Swinburne 2009: 356-357). These consequences are, according 
to Swinburne, twofold: (1) the damage inflicted in the victim, which might naturally include those closest to 
him; and (2) ‘the purposive attitude of  the guilty one toward the wronged one manifested in the causing of  
harm’ (ibid., p.357). So, if  for these less serious types of  crimes it is open to the criminal to somehow 
restore or compensate the victim of  his crime, then we can speak of  him as making reparation for his 
offense (id.). For both Swinburne and Talbott, the last stage of  this process would be the forgiveness of  
the sinner by the victim. As an example, if  you offer to me your beach house, and during my time there 
your bathtub is damaged, then a clear manner for me of  making things right between ourselves would be 
to first, sincerely apologize for my lack of  care, and afterwards to either correct the aforementioned harm 
to your bathtub or to buy you a new one of  the same kind. Having done all this and having received the 
acceptance of  forgiveness by you, we could say that the issue has been truly left behind us. Justice for this 
case has been served. 
 However, for more serious crimes such as the story described above, it is simply impossible for the 
offender to make true reparation for his crime; for aside from our belief  in the supernatural powers of  
Jesus of  Nazareth, we know of  no one capable of  bringing back to life the deceased. At this point and in 
connection with both the cases just described, it seems important to bring a question raised by Talbott: 
what would satisfy justice to the full? For the latter and minor offense of  an affected piece of  property, it is 
clear that the path there suggested for the one making reparation and hence atonement, clearly 
approximates to this idea of  perfect justice; whereas for the former case this ideal of  perfect justice seems 
more elusive if  not downright impossible to achieve. We could certainly understand and even sympathize 
with the affected relatives of  victims of  murder in their desire to inflict suffering upon the criminal, and we 
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certainly have legal systems that allow us to quench this thirst for revenge (Talbott 2014: 146). But still our 
fundamental concern would remain unsolved for even though―in the words of  Herbert Morris―if  by 
punishing the murderer with life in prison or even with the loss of  his own life, we somehow remove the 
unfair advantage he had gained by his murderous act, the victim’s unfair disadvantage, viz., the loss of  his 
life and the enormous damage caused to his loved ones, remains unabated (Morris 1968: 478; cited in 
Talbott 2014.). And the reason for this is that ‘punishment is simply not the kind of  thing that could pay 
for any offense; it is no equipoise at all for sin’ (Talbott 2014: 144). If  the murderer were to be punished 
perpetually, first here on earth and afterwards in agonizing pain in hell, this would not make up for, 
compensate, or cancel out any given sin he had incurred in; let alone that of  such heinous crime as the 
taking of  someone’s life. This is probably the most damaging critique to be raised against the retributive 
theory of  punishment. It exhibits the very limited context in which its application seems warranted, viz., 
where the concept of  perfect justice seems impossible to achieve (Talbott 2014). 
 
3.2 Reformative Punishment 
If, as found in the gospels, one of  the most adequate ways for thinking about the relationship of  God to 
man is on the analogy of  the best possible parental human care―a parental care which would not conceive 
of  making its children happy apart from making them better or good―, then the thesis put forward first by 
Irenaeus and other Greek Christian writers54 in which the first couple were thought of  as immature and 
imperfect creatures meant to experience moral development through their interactions with the world in 
which they were placed in; a world which is moreover characterized by an apparent random distribution of  
good and evil; then we say, this Irenaean type of  theodicy gains in favour as a better explanation for the 
sufferings that are an unavoidable feature of  any human life. 
 In the case of  those Hellenistic non-canonical paters we mentioned in the previous chapter, we 
easily encounter this instrumental conception of  the hardships we endure. In Clement for example we find 
the Platonic endorsement of  the idea of  punishment, as distinct from vengeance, as being for the benefit 
of  the wrongdoer himself; as being a sort of  moral medicine intended to improve the (moral) state of  the 
offender (Rashdall 1919: 230-231). It is clear that for Clement the removal of  sin is but a gradual process 
and that forgiveness can only take place once the sinner has become a better person (ibid., p.230). In 
Origen as well the efficacy of  Christ’s life and death resides in the moral change it can bring about in the 
believer (ibid., p.264). A process that, just like it is for Chauncy, is most likely to continue in the hereafter 
 
54 Other early Greek non canonical writers that thought of  Adam as immature were Clement of  
Alexandria, Methodius, and Saint Gregory of  Nazanzius (Hick 2010: 216). More contemporary writers 
that think along similar lines include Schleiermacher, John Hick, Thomas Talbott and our very own 
Charles Chauncy. 
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(vid. Ch.7) (id.). Clement’s picture of  redemption is accordingly much more interested in the role of  the 
Logos in aiding the spiritual growth of  His creatures through the tools of  reward and punishment. Again, 
this is a conception of  punishment that, far from being divorced or incompatible with divine love actually 
presupposes it, in the fact that God, as any good parent would, would not think of  making any of  His 
children happy at the expense of  making them morally better (ibid., p.232). God only punishes according to 
this picture, ‘only when it is merciful to do so’ (Talbott 2014: 147). 
 This moralistic or reformative idea of  the sufferings we endure is one that might be more appealing 
to a modern reader, but it is not altogether without its problems, for as we could easily imagine a putative 
objector to state, there is significant suffering here on earth that seems to serve no purpose whatsoever, 
either for the person going through it or for those close to him. Gratuitous or dysteleological suffering that 
inevitably make us wonder about any conceivable use or higher purpose such ordeals are meant to serve. 
Hick’s response for instance is to follow the counterfactual strategy of  imagining the consequences, 
morally and practically, that the removal of  excessive or unmerited suffering would entail; thereby 
demonstrating that the random and apparently unfair distribution and the ‘often destructive and 
dysteleological effects of  suffering have a positive significance in that they call forth human sympathy and 
self-sacrifice, and crate a human situation’ in which good actions are to be carried out for their own sake 
and not in expectation of  any assured reward (2010: 353). 
 We are aware that despite its ingenuity, such an argument is but poor consolation for people 
agonizing under the pressure of  what seem to be unmerited and unbearable sufferings, and we must 
conclude at this point with the remark that such an intractable issue as the problem of  evil has been to any 
theistic mind, lies outside the scope of  the present chapter and work. 
 
4. Objections to Moral Influence Theories of  the Atonement 
Most of  the criticisms against exemplarist versions of  the doctrine of  atonement to be described below 
have their provenance in feminist theology and their worries concerning their implications in both the lives 
of  believers (their pastoral efficacy), and in the wider cultural context where they seem to raise questions 
of  epistemic injustice (Pogin, N.D.: 13). These theologians, it is important to notice, do not circumscribe 
their objections to exemplarist theories, nor do they only direct their concerns to specific models of  the 
doctrine, but instead question the entire historical process of  theoretical construction of  existing models 
owing to what they plausibly regard as a ‘backdrop of  a sexist tradition that has victimized women (among 
others)’ (ibid., p.5). For the purposes at hand however, we will only cover those concerns more directly 
related to moral influence versions of  the doctrine. 
 Unlike other models, the beneficiaries of  Christ’s sacrifice in an exemplarist account is not God 
(even less could it be Satan as it is in some ransom models), but us; it is this death understood as the 
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supreme revelation of  divine love that is supposed to inspire us to change our ways and turn to God (ibid., 
p.3). Now when confronted with such a theory, a putative objector might understandably wonder why the 
Christian God seems to require as a condition for redemption the sacrifice of  someone, let alone that of  a 
blameless and sinless individual (Vid. similar arguments by Denny Weaver and Ryan Davis in Chapter 4); or 
why is that ‘submission to violence should constitute part of  having lived perfectly?’ (ibid., p.7). But before 
going over its more gendered and epistemological considerations, let us first look at the very issue of  
martyrdom.  
So, from a more practical perspective, and even supposing that we have ‘no duties to respect and 
preserve our own lives’, we surely could agree in that we could be of  more use and help to our loved ones 
while we are in fact alive and well (ibid., p.8). For although there could be a sense in which a deceased 
person could provide some sort of  support or counsel, when in want of  such things we generally turn to 
those around and closest to us. There are, as Pogin rightly remarks, not many instances in which we could 
be of  more help to ‘to our friends in death than in life’ (id.). Instead of  considering immolation as the 
exemplar of  righteous or loving behaviour Pogin continues, it should be, as common wisdom would 
normally have it, a last resort; a decision to be made and acted upon only when all other options have been 
definitely ruled out (id). 
 As for the gendered and problematic implications of  existing theories of  atonement, and in 
particular for the exemplarist sort, Pogin calls our attention to how the ways in which different ‘religions 
conceptualize their doctrines has a significant effect on our broader understanding of  the world’ (ibid., p.9). 
And within our Christian context and its portrayal of  the atonement as the most eminent revelation of  
divine love, the different ways in which the doctrine has been framed has had far-reaching repercussions 
for our notions of  relationship, ‘and thus ethical conduct and love generally’ (id.). With the intention of  
better contextualizing her argument, Pogin cogently argues how women in the Christian tradition have 
usually been abused, victimized, and in general held to higher moral standards than most men (e.g. Jezebel); 
and where the most commendable features of  such subjects of  abuse have been usually resignation, 
humility, and submission to violence (e.g. Esther) (id.). Indeed, these features have typically been described 
and thought of  as ‘standing in positive relation to salvation, covenant, and redemption’ (ibid., p.6). And this 
might in turn help to explain why Christian women seem to brook for longer periods of  time domestic 
violence, even though statistical evidence shows that the prevalence of  such violence is not more prevalent 
in Christian families that it is in society as a whole (Nason-Clark 2004: 304; cited in ibid.). Moreover, this 
apparent vulnerability of  Christian women to domestic violence cannot be fully accounted for by Christian 
theologies of  divorce, for as statistical evidence shows, certain segments of  Christianity, particularly 
conservative protestants, evince divorce rates that are above the average (ibid. pp.10-11); and in the case of  
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evangelicals in the U.S. for instance, their divorce rates are in fact higher than those of  agnostics and 
atheist.55 
 The conspicuous presence and pervasive cove up of  cases of  child abuse in Christian institutions 
could also be seen in part as another unfortunate consequence of  this promotion of  godly patience in the 
face of  tribulation that seems to be entailed by the Christian understanding of  redemption. These 
lamentable results should come as no surprise, for when one conceives of  redemption as the outcome of  
an innocent person obediently submitting to violence inflicted by others; and where the objective is to 
precisely redeem these tormentors, ‘it is [only] natural to see suffering as something that we should take on 
cheerfully if  we are to be godly’ (ibid., p.16). 
 Now it appears that in the tragic instances just mentioned (domestic violence and child abuse at the 
hands of  religious authority figures) ‘limits have been imposed [on the] moral imagination of  the victims’ 
(ibid., p.12), and in this respect the concept of  hermeneutical (or epistemic) injustice could prove to be of  
value. According to Miranda Fricker, by epistemic injustice we are to understand ‘the injustice of  having 
some significant area of  one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to 
hermeneutical marginalization’ (Fricker 2007: 155; cited in ibid.). Pogin’s adaptation of  Fricker’s conceptual 
tool for our present purposes would operate along the following lines. 
 If  our conceptual landscape is mainly (or even solely) the outcome of  our social milieu, that is, if  
our concepts are nothing but social constructions, then the possibility arises that dominant social groups 
might ‘exert undue influence on the shape of  [this] conceptual landscape’ (ibid., p.12); i.e., that such groups 
might end up thwarting the process of  conceptual (social) construction when they consider it detrimental 
to their interests by either: (1) preventing the emergence and availability of  conceptual tools that might 
better enable ‘members of  dominated groups to clearly understand the nature of  their domination’, or by 
(2) upholding existing conceptual frameworks that preclude the possibility for those dominated groups to 
even understand their oppression as unjust (id.). And it is with this latter expression of  epistemic injustice 
that Pogin concerns herself  when rebuking traditional theories of  the atonement―on their corrupting 
influence on our shared ‘hermeneutical resources...and through which we understand our experiences 
(especially those which involve suffering as a result of  unjust treatment) and ethical conduct proper to right 
relationship’ (ibid., p.13). We are thus, in such an adulterated conceptual framework, more likely to 
downplay the importance of  resistance to injustice; to favour the ‘subversion of  the self ’ by placing the 
well-being of  others above our own, even when these very others are inflicting violence on ourselves (id.). 
 
55 Council on Contemporary Families report, ‘Civil Rights Symposium: Fifty Years of  Religious Change: 
1964-2014’ https://contemporaryfamilies.org/50-years-of-religious-change / ; cited in Pogin.  
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Pogin’s case against existing theories of  the atonement for their failure to take into account ‘the social 
experiences of  the marginalized and oppressed’ is hence not without justification (ibid., p.14). 
 
5. Contemporary Models 
5.1 A Glimpse of  the Divine in Human Conditions. Hastings Rashdall. 
Even before arriving to the last and more constructive stage of  his lengthy historical survey on the concept 
of  atonement, it becomes evident for the reader that Rashdall’s sympathies lie with the Abelardian/ 
Origenistic outlook on the topic; and that he thus accordingly recoils from ‘objective’ approaches such as 
those associated with substitutionary, expiatory, or ransom-type models. So before addressing what 
Rashdall’s position on atonement is, let us begin by considering an ‘objective’ criticism commonly raised 
against subjective doctrines such as the one we are concerning ourselves in this chapter, and which 
Rashdall himself  answers back. 
 The typical critique raised by objectivists against exemplarist versions of  the doctrine of  atonement 
would be that it ‘contains no objective transaction’ (Swinburne 1989: 162); that apart from any objective 
necessity for the death of  Christ in taking away sin or its punitive consequences, and independently of  the 
subjective fruits it might bring forth in the believer, that the doctrine is made unintelligible; i.e., that without 
a ‘rational connection between that death and the responsibilities that sin involves, and from which that 
death delivers’, the doctrine is simply rendered unfathomable (Denney 1902: 126; cited in Rashdall). 
 For Rashdall such a death, as the culminating act of  a life devoted in love to God and His fellow 
men, represents, like no other, the proof  of  the extent of  the divine love towards mankind. To this effect 
and in answering the criticism just described, Rashdall advances that: (1) Christ did not prove His love by 
merely submitting ‘as a kind of  ritual act to the process of  dying’, nor did He, as it sometimes seems to be 
entailed by this version of  the critique, precipitated His own death; (2) if  a death was required, as it had to 
be since the Logos had assumed human flesh, then it had to be the outcome or have been brought about 
by others; an assertion corroborated we might add by the synoptics themselves, since it seems clear that 
Jesus entertained the idea to the very last moment of  accomplishing His mission without having to 
undergo such a violent and painful death; (3) moreover, such scourging and death were directly connected 
to the fidelity evinced by Christ to His messianic calling. His acceptance of  such sufferings, in the words of  
Ritschl, are to be regarded as the [necessary] accidents of  ‘His positive fidelity to His vocation’ (Ritschl 
1902: 565-566; cited in Rashdall). It was then by willingly becoming incarnate in a humble Palestinian Jew, 
and in undergoing (voluntarily as well) a death brought about by others, a death He understandably feared 
(Gethsemane) and that He could have avoided ‘if  He had wanted to do so’, and that bore a direct 
connection to His whole life and ministry, that He manifested divine love towards mankind (Rashdall 1919: 
441). 
122 
 A contemporary version of  this characteristically ‘objectivist’ objection against exemplarist readings 
of  the atonement was advanced by Thomas Williams during his analysis of  Abelard’s conceptions of  sin, 
grace and redemption. Williams contends that ‘unless the Passion actually accomplishes something, unless 
there is an objective transaction made in and through the death of  Christ, there is nothing about the Passion to 
inspire our love: pity, perhaps, or sympathy, but not love or gratitude’ (Williams 2004: 260). We can 
mention how Williams here lumps together the ideas of  ‘accomplishing something’ and that of  the 
existence of  an objective transaction effected in and through the Passion. And we bring attention to this 
since one could plausibly claim, as does P. Fiddes, that what was accomplished at Golgotha was the most 
eminent manifestation of  divine love, owing to the utmost possible identification of  God with His fallen 
creation; i.e., that by ‘enduring to the uttermost the estrangement of  his own creation’, the Son made clear 
the depth of  divinity’s identification with us, and thus the extent of  His love for us (Fiddes 1989: 157).  
 Kathryn Pogin likewise challenges this objectivist criticism of  moral influence theories of  the 
atonement, a criticism that has other known advocates like Richard Swinburne. Again, Pogin questions the 
necessity of  an objective transaction for the atonement to be rendered coherent, and does this by relying 
on Richard Cross’ ‘merit theory’ of  the doctrine―an alternative which Cross constructs from the materials 
provided by Swinburne’s work on the topic―which stipulates that reconciliation with God can be attained 
by ‘no more than repentance and apology’ (Pogin N.D.: 16; Cross 2001: 397,407). On Cross’ theory the 
atoning value of  Christ’s death is predicated on a divine obligation to forgive that is itself  the result of  an 
indirect promise (by God towards Christ, or by the first person to the second person of  the Trinity)to do 
so;56 i.e., that it was Christ’s death the ‘supererogatorily good act’ that earns from His heavenly Father such 
a promise to forgive those sinners who are truly penitent (Cross 2001: 408) 
 But returning to Rashdall, one could claim that the extent and depth of  the divine love manifested 
pre-eminently in the death of  Christ saves by providing an example for us to imitate; and where its efficacy 
lies in the moral effects it produces on the believer (Rashdall 1919: 443). But as Rashdall makes clear, it 
becomes evident that such a doctrine can attain its full significance only if  we can plausibly advance the 
thought that in the historical Jesus a supreme revelation of  God took place; and in this respect (as with 
others) we can see the influence of  Greek patristic theology in the English philosopher (ibid. p.447). The 
best and clearest manner for stating in contemporary terms the technical language of  patristic and 
scholastic theologians as to the divinity of  Jesus, is to ‘think of  the revelation of  God in Christ [...] after the 
analogy of  the imperfect but progressive revelation of  God in other men―in the expanding, developing 
mind of  man, in the reason and conscience of  the best men...’ (id.). The idea being that, generally speaking, 
 
56 The two conditions under which God, according to Cross, would, or at least could be thought of  as 
indirectly obligated to forgive would be because: ‘(1) He promises that He will do as person X asks, and 
(2) X asks God to forgive the sins of  the penitent’ (Cross 2001: 408). 
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one can catch a glimpse of  the divine in mankind itself; that ‘in the conditions of  human life we have 
access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of  the divine’ (ibid., p.448); and particularly a higher degree of  
such divine revelation in the best of  us: heroes, prophets, martyrs, etc; a revelation which reached its most 
complete or culminating form in the moral perfection encountered in the teaching and example of  the 
historical Jesus. 
 As with other exemplarists, Rashdall’s doctrine assigns pride of  place to the divine love and to its 
alleged regenerating effects upon the sinner; and here once again the English philosopher attempts to shed 
light on the divine via the humane. All human love, says Rashdall, and particularly the most intense of  
human love, mirrors the divine love (ibid., p.449). We are here to think of  sacrificial love―the one exhibited 
by martyrs or heroes throughout history for example―as being a revelation of  God and the strongest 
earthly incentive for ‘attracting to that goodness of  which love is the supreme element[...], and for 
producing repentance for that lack of  love in which sin essentially consists’ (ibid., p.450). Upon 
contemplating the divine self-sacrifice, and in the unmerited and boundless love it manifests (agape), the 
sinner is moved to gratitude, which in turn is the first step in a process that includes repentance for past 
misdeeds, and hopefully a real change of  heart.57 Christ saves according to most exemplarists including 
Chauncy, by effecting a real moral change within the sinner; that is, by making the sinner actually better. Its 
efficacy lies predominantly in the subjective influence it exerts in the mind of  the repentant sinner (ibid., 
p.358). 
 This exemplarist account, moreover, tends to remove or overcome for Rashdall the undue one-
sidedness accorded to His death by most Christians, and regards His salvific efficacy as residing in His 
whole life and ministry. On such an understanding Christ’s death remains an indispensable part of  the 
Incarnation as a whole, probably its most eminent part, but it is still notwithstanding only a part (ibid., 
p.443). The other equally important aspect for Rashdall is understandably Christ’s ministry here on earth, 
for it is especially through His teaching that God was made known to us. To this effect he brings our 
attention to the fact that it was mainly through His teaching that His divinity was evinced to the disciples 
and the early fathers of  the church, and in this respect it is important to remember that miracle workers 
were not an altogether absent feature in the Palestine of  the first century. For if  it be the case, as Rashdall 
points out, that it was false that ‘never a man spake like this man, [then] there is simply no foundation for 
any theory of  Christ’s person’ that would portray Him as anything else than an eminent prophet whose 
destiny, like all other prophets, is to be superseded when new and more inspired ones appear in the 
 
57 Rashdall makes an interesting point to the effect that gratitude is the last element of  the divine image to 
disappear from the soul of  the recalcitrant sinner (ibid., p.361). And if  the benefactor is perceived to be 
none other than the Son of  God, the gratitude felt for Christ ‘passes into and becomes indistinguishable 
from gratitude to the Father whom He reveals’ (ibid., p.361). 
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religious and moral landscape of  mankind (ibid., p.455). It is thus His teaching the true foundation for the 
Christology that purports to express that in Him the Logos was united to human flesh as never before 
(ibid., p.457). 
 
5.2 A Developmental and Teleological Version of  Redemption. John Hick 
The present section will have for its purpose the presentation of  John Hick’s soul-making theodicy as put 
forward in his now classical work Evil and the God of  Love (1966), for it connects to both the Hellenistic 
fathers’ outlook on redemption (Ch.4), and it likewise shares important features with Chauncy’s 
soteriological ideas, as will become evident in the remainder of  this work. 
 Hick’s starting point is his endorsement of  what he calls the Irenaean tradition―as distinct from 
the Augustinian theodicy―, and which, let us recall, instead of  conceiving of  the first couple as created as 
finitely perfect creatures (that is, as the recipients of  original justice or righteousness, and then inexplicably 
falling away from such state by disobedience to a single positive command in Eden) this Irenaean tradition 
envisages man as in a continuous process of  creation. Adam and Eve were created as sharing the divine 
image, though lacking in the divine likeness, which is to be thought of  as a quality of  personal existence 
arrived to via the free engagement with the physical and social environment in which God placed them in 
(2010:253-255). 
 A convenient procedure for bringing to the fore those aspects of  Hick’s theodicy that we consider 
to be more relevant to our present purposes, is to take up the very familiar criticism raised by atheists or 
agnostics against the God of  traditional theism, and in particular that of  Christianity: the presence and 
extent of  evil in our world; what is also known as the antitheistic argument from evil.58 The rationale is well 
known: if  God is all loving and all powerful, how can the existence of  evil be accounted for? Such 
seemingly pointless suffering of, let’s say, children suffering from a chronic disease such as cancer, either 
renders the God of  traditional theism as non-existent, so the putative objector would claim; and if  He does 
exist, then he is either incapable of  preventing such misfortunes, or, worst even, if  omnipotent, then He is 
unwilling to ward off  such heinous evil. Underlying this position, as Hick remarks, lies a conception of  the 
divine purpose which is fundamentally at odds with what Christians have traditionally believed, or have 
ought to believe, with respect to this issue (ibid., p.256). These anti-theistic critics assume that a loving 
God’s purpose for His creatures ought to have been the creation of  a hedonistic utopia or paradise 
deprived of  all suffering and pain (id.). ‘They think of  God’s relation to the earth on the model of  a human 
 
58 It will be the more extreme logical or deductive version of  the antitheistic argument that will be taken up 
in our discussion. The more modest inductive or evidential version of  the argument will not be 
considered. For a definition of  the two versions of  this argument see Talbott, T., The Inescapable Love of  
God (2014). 
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being building a cage for his pet animal to dwell in’ (ibid., p.257). A loving and able pet-owner would 
therefore try to make the domains of  his pet as comfortable and pain-free as possible, and to the extent 
that this is not the case, it either proves Him unable or unwilling to do so (id.). But as just mentioned, this 
is not how Christians have thought about the relation of  God to His human creatures and the environment 
in which He placed them in. And to this effect it seems warranted to bring our focus to a powerful image 
with strong scriptural backing (and shared by Chauncy) in the preaching of  our Lord Himself: God as our 
loving heavenly father. 
 Jesus likened the attitude of  God towards man with that of  human parents (at their best) towards 
their own children as the most appropriate way for us to think about God’s attitude to His human 
creatures. Granted this, it seems correct for us to ask about the way in which the best parental care 
manifests itself, and our intuitions here will further confirm the teleological character in both Hick’s, and 
later on, in Chauncy’s theodicy. A loving and responsible parent will no doubt go to great lengths in the 
intention of  securing the least amount of  pain and suffering possible for his offspring. He will in fact 
endeavour to acquire for his children pleasure and happiness in manifold ways, though not at the expense 
of  the acquisition of  the most valuable human traits, such as respect for the truth, compassion, a strong 
sense of  justice, moral integrity, and possibly above all, a loving disposition towards his fellow men (ibid., 
p.258). A parent whose only concern―as it is sadly very common in everyday experience―is to make his 
son’s existence as pleasurable and pain-free as possible, could hardly be regarded as having his son’s best 
interests in mind. A child caught swindling old ladies, to use one of  Talbott’ s examples, and whose parents 
did nothing to remedy the situation, might rightfully be called indifferent or indolent, though certainly not 
very loving (Talbott 2014: 110). Such a child would most likely end up being unable to cope with the 
distressful and tragic eventualities that inevitably befall during the course of  a person’s life. He would most 
likely grow to be morally immature and in general, as the depositary of  an unattractive personality that 
makes him incapable of  relating properly to his fellow beings (Hick 2010). We are here then to think of  
God in this same manner; accordingly, if  He were to condone ‘our selfishness, our vicious attitudes, our 
tendency to promote our own interest (as we perceive it) at the expense of  others’, and most importantly, 
at the expense of  our own future moral development, He would likewise have ‘no real regard for our 
future happiness’ (Talbott 2014: 110). 
 Linking this widespread Christian image of  God as our loving Father with Hick’s endorsement of  
the Irenaean picture of  man as morally immature, it becomes clear what Christians have traditionally 
believed to be the divine purpose for themselves in the world they were placed in: we are meant to grow 
morally through our free interactions with the environment He placed us in. As creatures currently in the 
process of  becoming perfected after the likeness of  our saviour, our surroundings were never intended to 
be a hedonistic paradise. The most conducive environment for such a task of  soul-making would be one 
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where the greater part of  the goods and ills we experience are the direct (or indirect) consequences of  our 
very actions, and one where we are meant to learn through bitter personal experience what some have 
called the self-defeating nature of  evil. In short, our physical universe and everything in it are not to be 
thought of  as wanting in additional joys or as unduly charged with unwarranted evils of  all sorts, but as a 
fitting environment for the ‘realization of  the most valuable potentialities of  human personality’ (Hick 
2010: 258). This general picture, as made manifest in the pages of  this work, is shared by Chauncy. 
 
6. Other Concerns 
6.1 Divine Voluntariness 
During our summary of  Rashdall’s position on atonement we paid attention to his rebuttal of  a 
characteristic objectivist criticism raised against exemplarist (or more generally against subjectivist) versions of  
the doctrine. Although he plausibly defended in his work the conviction that Jesus’ death had been the 
outcome of  the free acts of  others, that is, that He manifested divine love by submitting to a death brought 
about by others, ‘the incarnation itself―Christ’s entrance upon human life which made such a death 
necessary―was, according to the traditional representations, the voluntary act of  the pre-existent Son of  
God’ (Rashdall 1919: 444). 
 Rashdall is surely on target when he asserts that Arianism (and perhaps even possibly Ditheism) is 
the take on the doctrine that more closely corresponds to the popular understanding on the matter; i.e., to 
the idea of  the pre-existent Son of  God―existing side by side with the Father from all eternity, and with a 
separate or distinct mind or consciousness from that of  the Father―deciding to undertake the redemption 
of  fallen man ‘by an act of  voluntary choice [and] distinct from the volition of  His Father’ (id.). An 
unfortunate though understandable development given Tertullian’s legacy on Trinitarian doctrine,59 
particularly his use of  the term ‘person’ to speak about the divisions within the Godhead, and the sheer 
intractable nature of  trinitarian dogma itself  (ibid., p.446). 
 We mentioned previously some of  the trinitarian concerns that a juridical or transactional reading 
of  the atonement process entails, such as the questioning of  the supererogatory character of  Christ’s death 
or the apparent enmity they seem to entail between the Son and the Father. Difficulties that seem to arise 
from the proclivity to regard the relations within the Godhead, especially those between the Father and 
Son as those of  ‘distinct juridical persons’ (id.). Whether in the form of  sacrifice, where the Son offers and 
the Father receives, or that of  punishment, and where the Father imposes and the Son endures. Now such 
a conception of  the relations within the persons of  the Godhead is clearly at odds with orthodoxy as 
 
59 In Against Praxeas Tertullian employs the Aristotelian concept of  substance in the sense of  there being 
only one God, but also in the sense of  there existing three distinct persons sharing ‘the same essential 
nature’ (Moreland & Craig 2003: 579). 
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encountered in the Nicene and Constantinopolitan creeds. In those credal formulations, and in the 
expositions centuries later advanced by the likes of  Augustine and Aquinas, God has but one mind, not 
two nor three.60 If  as Augustine, and before him Philo of  Alexandria both held, the Son is the pre-existent 
wisdom of  the Father―in His pre-incarnate condition that is―then as Rashdall rightly remarks, it is 
unwarranted for us to conceive of  the Son as entertaining separate thoughts or as desiring differently or 
even separately, from that of  His Father (ibid., p.445; Moreland & Craig 2003: 579-582). We should 
therefore avoid the anachronistic reading of  the term ‘person’ in Tertullian in the ‘modern psychological 
sense of  three different centres of  self-consciousness’ (Moreland & Craig 2003: 579). 
 
6.2 A Passible God? 
In everything discussed so far lies the belief  that what an exemplarist/infusionist type of  model is aiming 
for is our reconciliation with our maker; not evidently because of  some obstacle or grudge to be attributed 
to God, but owing to our own rejection of  His ever-available grace. A restored relationship with divinity, 
for, lest we forget, we were made in His image and with the intention of  entering into fellowship with Him, 
is thus the grand outcome that the atonement is meant to achieve. 
 We already mentioned Fiddes’ suggestion that by undergoing the gruesome reality of  death on the 
cross, and therefore by identifying with the estrangement that characterizes our fallen condition, God 
manifested His love towards us. During his treatment of  Abelard’s doctrine on atonement Fiddes regretted 
the fact that for him, Abelard stops short of  complete freedom when it comes to the expression of  God’s 
love for His creatures; for Abelard seems to operate under the assumption of  the impassibility of  God, a 
divine feature which he understandably extends to Jesus (1989: 157). Framed within the Christological 
belief  of  the two natures of  Christ,61 this means that when Christ suffered and died, it was only in His 
humanity that such events took place; His divinity remaining unscathed (id.). For Abelard believed, and 
indeed it might seem for the vast majority of  Christian theologians down the ages, that for God ‘love 
cannot be unto death’ (ibid., p.158). 
 
60 In this respect Bernard of  Clairvaux’s distinction between the ‘union of  wills’ a person could attain with 
God, and the ‘unity of  will’ one is required to speak when considering the ‘persons’ within the Trinity, 
might prove to be instructive (Brümmer 1992: 447). For Bernard, since in the Father and Son we 
encounter but one will, and one essence, ‘there can be no agreement or combining or incorporation […] 
for there must be at least two wills for there to be agreement, and two essences for there to be 
combining and uniting in agreement’ (St. Bernard, ‘On the Song of  Songs’, Sermon 71; cited in ibid.). 
Whereas in the case of  a believer and God, being of  different essences and wills, when there is unity 
between them we are to understand a ‘communion of  wills and an agreement in charity’ (id.). If  there is 
thus agreement between Father and Son it is in this stronger sense of  a unity of  will, which entails that 
their purposes and attitudes towards us should be identical (Brümmer 1992: 447). 
61 By the doctrine of  the two natures of  Christ we are to understand that Jesus Christ was both human and 
divine (McGrath 2011: 471). See also the concept of  hypostatic union. 
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 Against this damnosa hereditas of  Greek philosophy into Christian theology, Karl Barth enunciated a 
conception of  the divine nature truly unbounded by any non-logical constraint as the one just described (a 
different yet related alleged divine attribute would be that of  immutability). For Barth the divine nature was 
made evident in His own self-revelation, and that revelation makes it abundantly clear that God decided to 
humble Himself  and go through the ordeal that we now call the Passion with the intention of  redeeming 
fallen man (id.). God, according to Barth, ‘is his own decision’, and should not be thought of  as 
constrained by a nature whose features are derived from extra-scriptural sources (Barth 1936-1977: 472). 
He therefore decided to be conditioned by His creation, to (somehow) be affected by His relationship with 
us; just as it was open to Him in His omnipotence to remain unconditioned by it (Fiddes 1989: 158). 
 This rethinking of  the divine nature in relationship with us adds an interesting dimension to the 
Abelardian (and Pauline) representation of  divine love as essentially disinterested; as ‘extravagantly self-
giving’ (ibid., pp.158-159). For if  God is indeed impassible (or immutable), the He cannot be said to benefit 
in any way from His creatures, nor will His happiness depend in any sense on their moral condition (id.). 
Likewise, this might have the undesired outcome of  belittling the objects of  such love, for it seems to 
preclude any significant contribution to the relationship on their part (id.). Fiddes seems to us to be on spot 
when he claims that a complete emphasis on the self-giving and disinterested nature of  love ‘belongs with 
impassibility and immutability’ (ibid., p.159). 
  Fiddes point is that Abelard’s ideas on atonement would have greatly benefited from this addition 
of  the eros dimension in the divine-human relationship that Barth puts forward. For, to use a phrase from 
Barth himself, if  we conceive of  God as ‘the one who loves in freedom’, this certainly contributes to 
Abelard’s contention that in both the incarnation and the atonement God was merely satisfying His own 
loving nature (Barth 1936-1977: 306); and it also adds further weight to Abelard’s claim that the death of  
Christ saves primarily by the exhibition/infusion of  divine love it manifests/imbues on the believer. 
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Chapter 6. Chauncy’s Theology of  the Afterlife 
 
1. Introduction to Eschatological Locations 
The idea that unending post-mortem torments in hell, or the enjoyment of  eternal and perfect bliss in 
heaven as the outcome of  a spiritual union with divinity, has long played a significant role in both Christian 
dogma, as well as in the more general moral foundations of  Western civilization as a deterrent in the 
manner of  ultimate penalties or sanctions. And although one can easily encounter accounts of  afterlife 
rewards and punishments that predate Christianity in various ancient cultures,62 it is the distinctively 
Christian narrative of  the afterlife that has exerted the most decisive influence in both religious reflection, 
as well as in the conduct of  the lives of  people in the Western world (Walls 2009: 491-492). 
 It will therefore be eschatological issues (from the Greek term ta eschata: the last things), and 
particularly the interpretation of  such issues by Chauncy, the subject matter of  the present section of  this 
work. And following the pattern adopted in our theological chapters on original sin (Ch.2) and redemption 
(Ch.4), we will commence with a rather concise (1) theological introduction aimed at describing the central 
elements of  a Christian understanding of  the afterlife, to then move on to consider some of  Chauncy’s 
thoughts grouped under the headings of: (2) God’s Nature, (3) Death, (4) Everlasting Fire, (5) Purgatory, 
(6) Universalism, (7) Proportionality Objection, (8) The Next State, (9) Millenialism, and that of  (10) Social 
Order and the Classical Doctrine of  Hell. 
 A central and distinctive feature of  Christian belief  that is important to state at this point is that 
‘time is lineal, not cyclical. History had a beginning; it will one day come to an end’ (McGrath 2011: 444). 
With this in mind, eschatology in the Christian sense could refer to either the end of  the present age―that 
is, to life and history―, or could also point to the narrower notion of  the end of  an individual’s existence 
(id.). Hence, this ‘discourse about the end’ that will be engaged in the following pages is concerned with a 
host of  connected topics or doctrines such as the resurrection of  the body, salvation, eschatological 
locations, and others. (id.). 
 Scripturally speaking, the two main sources for Christian reflection on the afterlife have been the 
preaching of  Jesus, and the Pauline sections of  the New Testament (ibid., p.445). In the ministry of  Jesus 
one of  the most recurrent themes, and one with important eschatological connotations, is that of  the 
coming of  God’ s kingdom, a rather uncommon topic among Jewish writings of  the time. This topic, 
 
62 To give but a couple of  examples of  this and that might be argue to have influenced early Christian 
thinking on the topic: in ancient Greece the myth of  Hades where the deceased were carried through 
the river Styx to the underworld by Charon, and once there to partake in a family reunion with 
previously deceased relatives; or in ancient Rome (itself  heavily influenced by Hellenistic culture) where 
writers such as Cicero in his dialogue On Old Age spoke likewise of  an afterlife family reunion (McGrath 
2011: 446-447). 
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moreover, has ‘both present and future associations. The kingdom is something which is drawing near (Mark 
1:15), yet which still belongs in its fullness to the future’.63 This inaugurated eschatology64―in the sense of  
relating a past inauguration, and the future fulfilment of  God’ s kingdom―with its implicit ‘tension 
between the ‘now’ and the ‘not yet’’ is also found in the Pauline letters, where Jesus’ resurrection becomes 
both proof  and omen: proof  that indeed in Jesus a new age has dawned, and an omen that enables 
Christians to believe that earthly death is not the last word in our histories (ibid., pp.445- 446). 
 As for eschatological locations themselves, we will go against the current on this and begin with 
heaven and the distinctively Christian understanding of  salvation, since we believe it will become easier to 
describe the characteristics of  hell once we are through with our description of  the celestial sphere. We say 
go against the current since traditionally hell has attracted more the attention of  both theologians, 
philosophers, and people of  faith in general for fairly obvious reasons. 
 Salvation for Christians entails first and foremost a ‘clear or direct ongoing experience of  the divine 
essence’, i.e., what is commonly referred to as the beatific vision (Kronen & Reitan 2011: 12-13). This 
spiritual union with divinity deserves some elaboration. Perfect and eternal bliss is naturally thought to be 
the most immediate consequence of  such a close relationship, but equally and perhaps even more 
important is that of  moral sanctification or perfection, that is, ‘the purging of  all sinful dispositions’ in the 
believer (ibid., p.13). And as to the related goods produced by such vision according to Christian tradition 
we find: the ‘most perfect enlightenment of  the intellect’, or perfect ‘rectitude of  will and appetite’, to be 
understood as the complete subordination of  our bodily or animal nature to our spiritual and moral 
imperatives; and of  course what J. A. Quenstedt, a seventeenth century Lutheran theologian called ‘the 
most delightful intercourse with God... and the angels... and all the blessed... consisting in mutual presence 
and most agreeable conversation, and rendering of  mutual honor joined with mutual love’ (Quenstedt 
1685: 661-662; cited in ibid.).         
 Conversely, the fate of  those obdurate creatures who reject God’s grace to the very end, and who 
 
63 When reading Paul on the chronology of  salvation, one should bear in mind that although the apostle 
refers sometimes to justification as the starting point of  the life of  faith for the believer, and of  
sanctification as an ongoing process of  spiritual growth with future consequences (viz., salvation), one is 
to avoid what McGrath calls a simplistic understanding of  such chronology in the sense of  thinking of  
this three element framework in a linear past (justification), present (sanctification), and future 
(salvation) timetable. Rather, salvation for Christianity ‘presupposes that something has happened, that 
something is now happening, and that something further will still happen to believers’ (McGrath 2011: 319). 
64 This is one, albeit the most accepted one by twentieth century theologians, of  three general positions 
relating to the eschatology of  the New Testament. These positions are: (1) Futurist, that places the 
kingdom of  God in the distant future; (2) Inaugurated, by which we are to understand that God’s 
kingdom has already ‘begun to exercise its influence within human history, although its full realization 
and fulfilment lie in the future’; and (3) Realized eschatology, in which the kingdom of  God was realized 
in the (first) coming of  Jesus (McGrath 2011: 452). 
131 
thus die in a sinful state, will be, according to Augustine, ‘immediate, unending, physical and retributive’ 
(Patasalidou 2012: 811). No good shall ever befall on them again since ‘deserved and supreme misery shall 
be’ their portion (Augustine, Bk. XX, Chap.1; cited in Talbott 2014). The word retributive deserves some 
attention as it is generally agreed within the literature that there are essentially two families of  doctrines of  
hell―the classical (medieval) or juridical doctrines of  hell that appeal to the concept of  retributive justice, 
and, what are called liberal doctrines of  hell that tend to place a prime in God’s respect for creaturely 
autonomy (Patsalidou 2012: 810); i.e., to our freedom taken in a rather indeterministic sense, and which to 
all appearances is actually Chauncy’s position. In this last set of  theories of  hell our damnation is 
connected to our free choices which somehow God is unable to undo, at least not in a morally permissible 
manner (Kronen & Reitan 2011). 
 Suffice it to say at this stage of  our work, that all of  the different versions of  hell share the 
conviction that the crux of  damnation is that of  the privation of  the beatific vision, and all the related 
inconveniences it carries with it (Kronen & Reitan, 2011: 13); chief  among them is eternal moral 
wickedness, since according to every version of  hell our moral natures are only perfected, and sin is 
definitely conquered, only as the result of  enjoying the beatific vision (ibid., p.14). 
 Juridical or classical doctrines of  hell however, also argue for the infliction of  further ills that can 
affect both body and soul such as: unending ‘pangs of  conscience’, animosity or hostility towards God, 
literal torments to be inflicted by other residents of  hell (devils essentially), as well as the perennial agony 
resultant from dwelling in the lake of  fire of  the underworld (id.). There are therefore as we have seen, two 
distinct sets of  torments awaiting the damned in hell and these are: (1) eternal loss of  the beatific vision, 
and hence irreparable separation from God; what is termed pain of  loss (poena damni); and (2) literal and 
unending physical torments to be endured by the damned in hell; what is regularly termed pain of  sense 
(poena sensus) (Walls 2009: 494; Talbott 2014: 136; Patsalidou 2012: 811). 
 So now, without further ado, let us move to consider some of  Chauncy’s thoughts on the issues just 
mentioned, beginning with what is usually taken to be one of  the most employed arguments in defending 
the doctrine of  Universalism in soteriological matters: love as the decisive moral trait of  divinity. 
 
2. God’s Nature 
Our writer starts from the orthodox assumption of  the infinite benevolence of  the deity, and from there 
assumes that it would be difficult to imagine Him deciding to create mankind unless He intended it for all 
to be ultimately happy. As he naturally ascribes infinite wisdom and intelligence to the deity, he concludes 
that if  to make all of  men happy was indeed His intention, then it would be difficult to conceive Him as 
unable to devise a plan or project to secure this goal (Chauncy 1784: 1). As it will be clear in the following 
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chapter, in common with contemporary universalists, our author considers that God’s loving nature and 
omnipotence precludes the possibility of  anyone enduring an existence of  eternal torment. 
In the case of  those that suggest that the existence of  free agents, capable of  misusing their 
faculties and therefore making themselves liable to condemnation, would somehow hamper divinity’s 
designs in this matter, Chauncy clearly states that this would be an impossibility. As God is infinitely wise, 
He would easily device suitable methods that, not contrary to the liberty of  such agents, would conduce 
them to preparation for happiness. It would be hard to imagine, Chauncy argues, ‘that infinite wisdom 
should finally be outdone by the obstinacy and folly of  any free agent whatsoever’ (ibid., p.2). With the 
intention of  making his case ever clearer, Chauncy asserts that the expression of  such a sincere desire by 
divinity amounts to affirming that in fact, we shall all be saved; to think otherwise tantamount to absurdity, 
and contains its own confutation (ibid., p.168). This notion of  an alleged incoherence in the perennial 
rejection of  God by a rational creature―a rational being naturally or intrinsically ordered towards union 
with its maker―will be developed further in our subsequent chapter, as it finds contemporary support in 
the work of  Thomas Talbott. In the next chapter as well, we will describe in what exactly Chauncy 
considers this scheme or divine plan to consist in, and which is supposed to guarantee the universal 
salvation of  mankind. 
Now as stated before, another essential divine attribute for our author, and connected with what is 
termed Middle Knowledge, is the capacity to make use of  what are called counterfactuals of  creaturely 
freedom. This comes about when Chauncy considers that God, as being infinitely wise and benevolent, 
and in the case of  knowing that certain of  His creatures would, despite His outmost efforts, make 
themselves unhappy by misusing their moral powers, would most likely withhold the gift of  existence from 
them (ibid., p.3); v.gr. when discussing Rom. 8:29, 30, he declares that God, through His infinite prescience, 
and before all worlds, discerned who would among mankind be of  such a disposition as to be, under the 
means used in this present state, wrought upon or subjected to God’s moral government (ibid., p.229); i.e., 
that through this prescience we speak of, God knew who would be ‘so disposed as that they might, in 
consistency with their liberty as free agents, be brought upon to become his obedient subjects, in 
consequence of  the means his wisdom thought proper to use with them in this present state’ (ibid., p.230). 
In order to provide an adequate, though succinct account of  what counterfactuals of  creaturely 
freedom stand for, and due to the importance that this concept bears on our author and for the following 
chapter in particular, we find it inevitable to indulge in a brief  digression at this point. Furthermore, 
although the origins of  such concept lie in theological disputes between Jesuits and Dominicans of  the late 
sixteenth century and that were concerned with the connection of  divine grace with human free will, we 
will not dwell here with the historical provenance of  the doctrine, and instead will concern ourselves in 
merely explicating the concept (Adams 1977: 109). 
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Since what the concept mainly attempts to reconcile is a robust understanding of  free will with the 
traditional, and strong concept of  providence that Christians subscribe to, it is ineludible to say a few 
words of  the latter in order to proceed on a firmer footing. Even though the concept of  providence might 
take into account other elements, it will include at the very least the following three: (1) foreknowledge 
(infinite knowledge) in the sense that all events were foreseen with certainty by God; (2) 
sovereignty―unlike the absent clockmaker of  Deism who, acting as a mere primum movens, dissociates 
Himself  from His creation (general providence), Christians believe that God’s sovereignty reaches out or 
includes ‘every event that takes place’ (particular providence) (Flint 1988: 151); and (3) that both this divine 
foreknowledge and particular providence (sovereignty) are exercised according to an established, and 
morally commendable plan or purpose for the created order.65 
A note before moving on: in our elucidation of  this connection of  divine sovereignty (particular 
providence) with human free will, we shall make use of  the concept of  possible worlds, which is to be 
taken as ‘the maximal possible state of  affairs, a state of  affairs that specifies a complete history (from 
beginning to end) of  how things might have been. Infinitely many such worlds exist, but only one obtains or 
is actual...’ (id.). 
This particular providence theory could be considered as flanked by two extreme positions that, as 
Thomas Flint observes, have generally been eschewed by orthodox Christianity―one that asserts that the 
present or actual world, albeit the outcome of  divine will, could not have been otherwise because divine 
will was somehow constrained or determined in some manner (by for example omniscience and infinite 
beneficence), and associated with philosophers as Spinoza and Leibniz. And another that vindicates divine 
freedom in a complete or unlimited sense, and associated with Descartes (ibid., pp.151-152; Hick 2010: 
100).             
 In trying to encounter a middle ground between these positions or interpretations of  particular 
 
65 This theological dispute could be thought of  as connected to an earlier one spurred by a form of  
determinism associated to Averroes (1126-1198), and that had the University of  Paris in the thirteenth 
century for its milieu. Averroes claimed that divine reliability was due to external factors, a claim that 
naturally generated opposition within significant sectors that saw it as a denial of  God’s freedom 
(McGrath 2011: 210). The response provided by the likes of  Duns Scotus (1266-1308) and William of  
Ockham (1285-1347) asserted that divine reliability rested ultimately on the divine nature itself, on 
‘God’s own character’, i.e., in ‘a deliberate and free decision to act like this’ on His part (id.). When 
pondering the significance of  the divine attribute of  almightiness, Ockham drew a distinction between 
what he called the two powers of  God: the absolute power of  God (potentia absoluta) which refers to the 
alternatives open to divinity prior to His creative act of  the universe; and, the ordained power of  God 
(potentia ordinata) having to do with the order established by Him and that both reflects His character and 
intentions, as well as constrains His subsequent decisions (id.). The idea being that God was once 
completely free to do as He wanted, but by creating an established order, an order that ‘reflects a loving 
and righteous divine will’, He has committed Himself  to withholding it, such that He is ‘not now able to 
do anything which contradicts [it]’ (id.). 
134 
providence, we arrive at the topic of  God’s knowledge in the process of  creation, and according to which 
divine knowledge should be classified as follows: (I) Natural Knowledge (or knowledge of  simple intelligence) 
as the one by which divinity knows which worlds are possible; and (II) Free Knowledge (or knowledge of  
vision) as the complete and perfect knowledge God has of  the actual world He brought about through His 
creative act of  will (Flint 1988: 153). The key issue here is the explication of  the transition in God’s 
knowledge from natural to free (id.). What allows divinity to exercise particular providence, to pass from 
natural to free knowledge with regard to the free beings He created, is the concept of  counterfactuals of  
creaturely freedom, that is, counterfactuals that specify the ‘complete set of  circumstances in which a 
creature is placed and left free’ (ibid., p.154); i.e., divine foreknowledge can only take place if  ‘God knows 
with certainty what every possible free creature would freely do in every situation in which that creature 
could possibly find himself  in’ (Adams 1977: 109). 
As we have already seen, another recurrent image employed by Chauncy to describe the divine 
nature is that of  God as our loving father; an image especially important in connection with Chauncy’s 
soteriological universalism. Such a scheme of  universal redemption, argues Chauncy, speaks more amiably 
of  the deity, and avoids the perplexity that assaults most people when trying to reconcile the idea of  a 
perfectly benevolent God, with a providential account that would have the most of  our race as eternally 
condemned (Chauncy 1784: 13). Thus, it is a thought inconsistent with our infinitely benevolent God to 
think He would have allowed the world to be ‘filled with weak miserable creatures, had he not intended 
them objects of  his mercy’ (id.). And so as to leave no room for doubt, he further adds in another work 
that ‘[a] more shocking idea can scarce be given of  the Deity than that which represents him as arbitrarily 
dooming the greater part of  the race of  men to eternal misery’ (Chauncy, 1784b: VIII). 
 Would this be the behaviour of  a loving father? Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the 
miseries of  the next state are ‘a proper discipline in order to accomplish’ their reformation, than that ‘they 
should be final and vindictive only?’ (Chauncy 1784: 322). This is once again calling into action the 
principle known as divine pedagogy, except that on this occasion it is projected into the afterlife where still 
divinity will be operating upon us in order to reform and, in the words of  our writer, make us meet for the 
enjoyment of  eternal life in heaven. Another instance of  this: when speaking of  those obdurate creatures, 
that impervious to the means employed by divinity in order to persuade them into a more virtuous temper 
of  mind, and expressing that they will indeed be ‘awfully miserable’, he nonetheless specifies that such 
misery is not to be understood in an everlasting manner in the state next to come; and this in order to 
convince them of  their folly, and in order to be ‘recovered to a virtuous state of  mind’ (ibid., p.12). We will 
say much more about the use of  the word everlasting in Scripture a few pages down. 
In addition, reason just as Scripture does (Matt. 7:11), makes it evident that God is to be regarded 
as the universal father of  mankind; and if  earthly fathers, despite their natural sinful proclivities, do good 
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to their children when they behave properly, but just as well chastise them for their own benefit, when they 
stand in need of  discipline or correction, and all the while they do discipline them, do so with a heavy 
heart, why ought we to think differently of  our father in heaven? when it is the punishment and miseries 
of  the next state that we are speaking of. Surely, Chauncy argues, we would hold a very base concept of  
those fathers ‘who should inflict misery on their own children without any intention to promote their 
welfare thereby’ (ibid., p.327). How could we then hold such an opinion of  God? who is but infinite 
benevolence, and love, if  the doctrine of  everlasting torments is to be true, that is, if  He was to ‘torment 
them eternally, without any intention to do them the least imaginable good’ (id.).    
 As stated previously, we see here Chauncy articulating a criticism to the idea of  hell that was to be 
repeated during the nineteenth century, viz., a criticism directed against the rather unchristian notion of  
vindictive justice, that is, the difficulty of  reconciling ‘the idea of  a loving [and compassionate] God with 
the notion of  the continuing vindictive or retributive punishment of  sinners’ (McGrath 2011: 458); as 
Daniel Migliore (articulating a thought no doubt most of  us have entertained at some time or another) is 
quick to point out: the God who was made known to us in the cross ‘does not exercise vindictive 
judgement’ (2004: 345). The main problem on this account, as we will go about in the following chapter, is 
that the traditional account of  hell is paradigmatic as an instance of  pointless and rather wanton suffering, 
since no good could come out of  hell in such a narrative (Kvanvig 1993:3-4; cited in Patsalidou 2012). 
 Chauncy has also things to say confuting those that claim that the perennial torments of  hell are 
contained in the death threatened to Adam on account of  his original lapse. It goes against reason for the 
Bostonian to suppose that all of  Adam’s posterity should be subjected to such a treatment owing to his 
original transgression. To conceive that a good God would condemn to eternal misery all of  the beings 
that sadly die before arriving to a state of  moral responsibility or agency (babies and infants) for no other 
reason than that their first father had disobeyed a positive command, would be both an ‘injurious 
reflection’ on God, as well as a contradiction to ‘all the natural notions we have both of  justice and 
benevolence’ (Chauncy 1785: 142). But let us now pass from our author’s thoughts concerning the divine 
character, to those of  death, both physical and spiritual. 
 
3. Death 
The first death (physical death) according to our author was ‘never intended to put an end to our existence, 
but only to its present mode, with all its connections and dependencies’ (Chauncy 1784: 279). The first 
death then puts an end to the union or connection there is between these two parts that constitute us as 
living rational agents, but it does not directly put us out of  existence altogether, either in its bodily or 
spiritual components, so that no more ideas are introduced into the mind by way of  the senses, nor can the 
soul exert itself  through the body in this present state (ibid., p.280). 
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 Now such a characterization of  the first death will shed light on the characteristics of  the second 
one, for as Chauncy describes it, after the general resurrection the souls of  wicked men, just as those of  
the virtuous or righteous, will be reunited to ‘particular systems of  matter […]adapted, by the wisdom of  
God, to render them capable of  communication with the world they shall then be placed in’ (1784: 281); 
and even though the manner might be to us at present unknown, ideas will once again be introduced into 
their minds by way of  the systems of  matter they will then be endowed with. 
 During his rather lengthy refutation of  other opinions on this issue, we find a couple of  thoughts 
worth mentioning. First, although conceding certain assistance of  reason in those who interpret the word 
death to mean a state of  eternal misery, and by life a perpetual state of  happiness, he points to the absence 
of  Scriptural passages that might validate such interpretations. The same goes for those who claim to 
defend this position by stating that the eternal misery here mentioned must refer to the perpetual existence 
of  the soul or spirit as such, that is, after the body had been separated from it after death (as disembodied 
spirits that is). If  God had intended, says Chauncy, to make the first man suffer eternally for his offence, 
He must likely had then decided to make his body immortal instead; i.e., he should ‘have suffered, as a 
human creature, in that body in which he had sinned’ (1785: 121). 
A couple of  other considerations regarding the death that humanity was universally subjected to 
since the original lapse: to those who claim that death not only consists in the return to dust of  that 
corporeal exterior that the scriptures talk about (among them John Locke as Chauncy affirms), but also of  
the ‘entire destruction of  its animating principle’ (ibid., p.134), call it soul or spirit, Chauncy has the 
following things to say: first, there is no support or validation in the Bible for such a statement; secondly, if  
this was to be the case, then it would be impossible to properly speak of  a universal resurrection, for then 
we would be more rightly talking of  the creation or production of  new beings that ‘would constitute 
different individual agent[s]’ with no connection whatsoever with the previous moral behaviour ‘of  that 
which existed before’ (ibid., p.140). 
 If  not for the mediation of  grace, this interpretation of  death would entail an impossibility of  
‘perception or exertion in any shape for ever’ (ibid., pp.140-141). This new constitution of  grace through 
Christ signifies a ‘new foundation for perception and enjoyment [by the soul] after death’ (id.). The idea 
being that by resurrection we are to understand the reconstruction, or as Chauncy calls it, ‘the putting 
together again of  the bodily machine, and animating it’ with the same breath of  life (id.). 
Another point has to do with the immortality Adam and Eve enjoyed in Eden as a gift as well as 
the absurdity of  placing any sort of  obligation on God to prevent their postlapsarian (earthly or bodily) 
death. In a manner similar to Keith Wyma, their immortality and existence is to be regarded as essentially a 
gift, and as such, we have no right to make any demands upon the nature of  such endowment (Wyma 
2004); i.e., we are in no position to be asserting any moral obligations upon God as to the status of  our 
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creation –‘And what obligation can it be supposed God could be under to prevent that death?’ asks 
Chauncy (1785: 157). The judicial sentence ‘dooming Adam to death, was really nothing more than the 
withdrawment of  that free favour, to which it was entirely owing, that he might have enjoyed immortality, 
without passing through death’ (ibid., pp.156-57). 
And if  all things will indeed be subjected to Christ, as Chauncy is fond of  repeating, then death, 
both the first and the second one, will be subjected as well. Everyone admits, says Chauncy, that the first 
death will be conquered, even with regard of  wicked men, ‘as that they shall be again restored to life’, and 
if  Scripture is to be relied on then the second death will necessarily be ‘swallowed up in victory’ as well 
(Chauncy 1784: 184). Moreover, the last enemy that must be destroyed before Christ can hand over the 
kingdom is death, the second death, ‘before they can be reduced under subjection to Jesus Christ’ (id.). By 
second death he refers to the one that wicked men will suffer; those that die in a sinful condition (ibid., 
p.210). 
That this second death, just as the first one, is a sure enemy for men to be admitted to a glorious 
immortality, and in fact much more than the first one; for if  not subdued it will be a ‘visible standing 
demonstration, that they are not as yet reduced under subjection to Christ, as the faithful and obedient 
servants of  his kingdom’ (id.). This second death is the last enemy then, the only one according to our 
writer, that Paul concerns himself  with, ‘for it is an enemy that has no existence till after the first death is 
so far destroyed’, that is, till everyone who was dead owing to Adam’s sin are restored to life (ibid., p.211). 
 Having provided some of  our author’s ideas concerning the divine nature and death, the stage is set 
for us to develop his thoughts that are more directly related to his soteriological universalism: his reading 
pertaining the sense in which we are to understand the term everlasting in Scripture (4); his belief  in the 
existence of  afterlife stages that are essentially purgatorial in kind (5); his universalist scheme itself  (6); and 
finally, his endorsement of  what is commonly known as the proportionality objection (against the idea of  
an endless afterlife of  torments and misery) (7). We begin then with Chauncy’s thoughts on the correct 
interpretation of  the term everlasting in Scripture. 
 
4. Everlasting Fire 
On this topic we find once again some recourse to common sense or reason by our author, for he 
mentions that though in Scripture there is talk of  the hills and mountains as being everlasting, or of  an 
eternal succession of  prophets, common sense moves us to understand this eternity in a limited sense. So 
why should we not apply this reasoning to the issue of  an alleged eternal fire? ‘For it is, perhaps, as great an 
absurdity to suppose fire to be […] eternal, as to suppose the earth, or mountains, or prophets in 
succession, to be so’ (ibid., p.273). The laws of  nature, says our writer, tell us that fire ‘naturally tends to an 
end, and will in time, actually come to an end’ (id.). 
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So for our author a ‘restrained interpretation of  the word, when connected with fire’ is both the 
most natural as well as the most rational (ibid., p.274). It is meant to last for a certain dispensation, age, or 
period, in order to carry out ‘the end for which it was enkindled’ (id.). Scripture, according to Chauncy, 
supports reason on this when it mentions, with reference to the cities of  Sodoma and Gomorrah that they 
were ‘set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of  eternal fire’ (id.); for it is definitely not necessary 
to ‘do justice to Scripture’ here to believe ‘that those cities are now in flames, and will be so to all eternity’ 
(id.). Surely the fire lasted, says Chauncy, till ‘it had accomplished the design of  heaven’ in this matter, and it 
is fit that we should think in like manner when the fire of  hell is coupled with the adjectives eternal or 
everlasting (id.). Furthermore, fire, being a destructive element, and tending to provoke the dissolution of  
every body cast into it (according to the laws of  nature as our author regularly insists), cannot be thought 
to be the punishment of  the wicked in the literal sense that our translations make it to be, but in the 
everlasting sense with which Scripture speaks of  the hills and succession of  prophets as we have just 
mentioned (ibid., p.276). 
As for the rest of  Scripture passages that speak of  the future misery of  wicked men, it is not 
mentioned in any of  them according to Chauncy, that they will either ‘live in torment without dying, or that 
their bodies, at the resurrection, shall be immortal, or incorruptible, or indissoluble’ (ibid., p.277). 
 The death here mentioned is that second death (Rev. 2:11; 20:14; 21:8); a death that shall be 
effected, remarkably points our author, by the fire of  hell. Those who are the subjects of  it are thus 
represented in Scripture as tares or withered branches (Matt. 3:12; 13:30, 40, 42; Luke 3:17; John 15:6), and 
not as things or creatures that could ‘bear the action of  fire, without being consumed’ (ibid., p.278). For 
similar reasons God is here called ‘not a perpetual tormenting, but consuming fire’, says Chauncy (Heb. 
12:29) (id.). 
It is perhaps impossible to ascertain beyond doubt according to our writer, whether the fire of  hell 
is to be taken literally or figuratively; but in either case it is plain that ‘the torments signified thereby, instead 
of  rendering wicked men never-ceasingly miserable, will, sooner or later, bring on their dissolution, 
destruction, or death’ (ibid., pp.278-279). So that despite the ‘sum total of  this judiciary proceeding may be 
for ages of  ages, it will not necessarily follow that the torture of  any, much less of  every individual, should 
continue for that length of  time’ (ibid., p.305). The truth is that their various times of  suffering will be ‘in 
proportion to their deserts’ (ibid., p.307); that is, ‘according to the indefinitely various degrees of  that moral 
depravity they have contracted in this present state’ (id). 
Chauncy mentions, however, that it is not improper to speak of  the blessed’s happiness as being 
everlasting, for even though the state they will next be in (after the general resurrection) will come to an 
end, ‘they will be swallowed up in the grand æconomy, of  which God will be immediate head and 
sovereign’, and will be so by a ‘quick and pleasing transmutation’ (ibid., p.283); i.e., not by dying again, and 
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(probably) analogous to the one that the righteous who are alive on earth will have to go through in their 
passing into the resurrection state upon Christ’s second coming. So it is not improper then to describe their 
happiness and life as never-ending, despite the fact that ‘their next mode of  existence, with all its 
connections and dependencies, will come to a period’, just as it will in the case of  the unrighteous (id.). 
Ultimately, our rule of  interpretation of  this word ought to depend on the nature of  the subjects to 
which it is applied. As previously mentioned, the point Chauncy here makes is very similar to the one 
raised by contemporary universalists, and which hinges on their understanding of  God’s nature as that of  
loving kindness (Talbott). If  God is indeed in his nature all powerful and all loving, then there is a clear 
inconsistency, if  not a downright contradiction (v.gr. Talbott, Adams, etc.) between His nature, and the idea 
of  unending and unbearable suffering in hell for some of  His creatures (Patsalidou, 2012: 814-815). 
Chauncy expresses this conviction when he mentions that it perfectly ‘falls in with the notions mankind 
universally entertain of  the infinite benevolence of  the deity, to interpret the word everlasting, in the 
endless sense, when joined with a reward’ (Chauncy 1784: 285); i.e., there is no repugnancy in such a 
construction with the ideas we have of  God’s nature. Whereas, who could hold the same to be true? that is, 
that ‘there is the like reason to understand the word everlasting, in the same sense, when joined with 
punishment’ (ibid., p.286). Why ought we not, he rhetorically asks, to interpret the sense of  one in an 
unlimited sense, and the other in a limited one? 
 
5. Purgatorius Ignis 
Concerning the issue of  the resurrection bodies, our author claims that something similar to what happens 
here on earth with our first death will be effected, for just as owing to the different constitution of  our 
bodies, some are able to endure more pain, both in quality and duration than others, God might saw fit 
that the resurrection bodies of  the wicked ‘be variously fitted, both for the sensations of  torment, and a 
continuance under the pressure of  them’ (ibid., pp.307-308). It is true our author argues, there is ample 
reason to think that the resurrection bodies of  the wicked ‘will be formed for a much longer duration, than 
they are capable of  enduring at present, and that they must pass through much more intense and it may be, 
various pains, before their dissolution will be effected’ (ibid., p.308). In fact, he states that it is reasonable to 
suppose that if  they are to undergo a second death as Scripture declares it to be, that ‘their dissolution will 
be thus variously effected, by the pains which they will suffer’ (id). 
 In an also familiar manner of  criticizing the orthodox concept of  hell, he considers the small 
quantity of  those that will be saved as further argument against it. For if  the next state is indeed the final 
one, only but a minority of  mankind will be united with divinity in heaven. How could then the scriptures 
describe God’s mercy, and the mediatorial agency of  Christ as good will to all people? asks Chauncy. What 
reflection could we make of  Christ’s office, in His design to defeat the Devil, if  ‘notwithstanding his 
140 
mediatory interposition, and all that he could do in opposition to him, should [the Devil] finally get the 
better of  him, by effecting the everlasting damnation of  the greater part of  those whom he came from 
heaven to save’ (ibid., p.324). Only the consideration of  hell as a purging fire ‘can make the matter fit easy 
upon one’s mind’ (id.). Our author makes clear that in the scheme he will later develop, even these 
otherworldly torments may, ‘in perfect consistency with both reason and Scripture […] be considered as 
means, under the government of  Christ, in order to awaken the attention […], and bring them to 
consideration, and finally gain the consent of  their wills’ (ibid., pp.191-192).  
 And by way of  response to one of  the most known arguments in support of  juridical doctrines of  
hell, and of  endless misery therein―the one associated to Anselm of  Canterbury, and which states that 
infinite punishment is a just retribution due to the enormity of  the crime; i.e., that all human sin is infinite 
in seriousness because it is committed against an infinite being―our author declares that such ‘metaphysical 
nicety’ goes against what Scripture states regarding the differences in the punishment that wicked men will 
suffer, owing to the different degrees of  their moral corruption here on earth (ibid., p.320). He mentions 
that if  this was to be true, then all sinners, regardless of  the differences in the offenses between them, 
‘must suffer to the outmost in degree, as well as duration’, an idea which would obviously goes against one 
of  the tenets of  a retributivist theory of  punishment―the philosophical theory about the nature of  
punishment that underpins the traditional doctrine of  hell―, namely, that it would be ‘impossible to assert 
gradations of  punishments in proportion to the gravity of  evil acts’ (Talbott 2014: 142). 
 Through the words of  the eighteenth-century British philosopher David Hartley, our author 
considers that the doctrine of  purgatory espoused by Catholicism is but a corruption of  a doctrine 
originally held by apostolic Christianity concerning a purifying fire. This doctrine of  an intermediate stage 
‘in which those who have died in a state of  grace are given an opportunity to purge themselves of  the guilt 
of  their sins before finally entering heaven’, remains one of  the fundamental divergences between Catholic 
and Protestant eschatological interpretations66 (McGrath 2011: 459). He seconds the aforementioned writer 
as well in the association he draws between the influence of  Neo-Platonism in early Christianity and the 
introduction of  the doctrine of  endless or never ceasing afterlife punishment. Hartley’s words to this effect 
are: ‘[it] was not received till after the introduction of  metaphysical subtleties relating to time, eternity, and 
 
66 This idea dates from the early church when patristic writers such as Clement of  Alexandria and Origen 
believed that those who had died prior to performing acts of  penance would be given this opportunity 
in the next state, where a purifying fire would cleanse their souls in order to be admitted into heaven 
(McGrath 2011: 458-459). Likewise, the practice of  praying for the dead during the fourth century 
played a part in this development, but it was not until the sixth century that through the writings of  
Gregory the Great, and in particular his interpretation of  Matt.12:32, that a formal account of  
purgatory was established (id.). 
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c.[…], that is, not till after the pagan philosophy, and vain deceit, had mixed itself, and corrupted 
Christianity’ (Hartley 1749: 429; cited in Chauncy 1784). 
Reason, as well as experience, assures us that the purpose of  the sufferings and punishments we 
sometimes endure in this life are to our own benefit, in order to discipline us, to humble or to do us good 
in general. All of  which is also confirmed by Scripture according to our writer (v.gr. Psalm 89:31, 32, 33). So 
why should we suppose that the miseries and punishments of  the next state have a different purpose? asks 
our author. Should we assume that God’s infinite benevolence is not the same in the next state for us? that 
He does not have the same ‘kind and good intentions in the punishments of  the next state, that he has in 
this?’ (Chauncy 1784: 325). For surely a ‘change in the mode and place, of  wicked men’s existence, will not 
infer a change in’ God’s benevolent dispositions (ibid., p.326). 
 
6. Universalism 
The idea that everyone, notwithstanding the obedience, or even the knowledge of  Christ’s redemptive 
work on the cross, will be saved and therefore united to divinity in the end, has exerted a powerful, yet 
intermittent influence on Christian soteriology down the ages. From Origen, whose rejection of  dualism67 
and his restorationist conviction of  the ‘final and ultimate triumph of  God over evil’,68 to Karl Barth’s 
rejection of  the doctrine of  predestination to damnation, this stance, though unorthodox, has regained 
momentum in later decades as both theologians and philosophers have begun to re-examine its 
implications, particularly in connection with the orthodox image of  God as omnipotent love (McGrath 
2011: 345, 370, 458; Kronen and Reitan 2011: 193). 
 Our author states that he will not concern himself  with objections that are purely rational, since he 
considers that reason, far from speaking against his ideas, rather support it. Or, at the very minimum, 
natural reason certainly does not speak against the possibility of  it, for, as he rhetorically asks his readers, 
what principle of  reason is contradicted by the claim that an ‘infinitely benevolent God may, if  he so 
pleases, make the human race finally happy?; and if  this is his desire, what would prevent him from 
opening his mind about it?’ (Chauncy 1784: 256). In any case, whatever misgivings may remain when we 
consider the final state of  mankind ‘upon the principles of  mere reason’, all disappear when we concern 
ourselves with what is said of  the matter in Scripture. For it is clearly stated there (for Chauncy that is) that 
 
67 By dualism we are to understand here the conviction, usually associated with the Gnosticism 
characteristic of  the Mediterranean world in the late second century, of  the existence of  two supreme 
powers, good and evil, who reigned over their respective realms (heaven and hell respectively) for all 
eternity (McGrath 2011: 345; Trocmé 1993) 
68 Leibniz articulated a similar view on this when he stated his disbelief  that ‘even in the great future of  
eternity, evil should have the advantage over good, under the supreme authority of  him who is the 
sovereign good’ (Leibniz 1734: 132). 
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the salvation of  all men is the grand objective the bible scheme ‘has opened to our view, as now in 
prosecution, by the benevolent Deity, under the management […]of  Jesus Christ, who […] will go on 
prosecuting this design, till all the individuals[…]that ever had, now have, or ever will have existence’ shall 
attain a state of  perennial happiness (ibid., p.3). 
 He nonetheless acknowledges that this position is contrary to the common sentiments of  mankind 
in this matter, a predisposition that he believes to be linked with the undue sway some writers might have 
over us, and the imbibing of  certain doctrines that seem to favour an account where the majority of  men 
are to be essentially unhappy in the end. He advances as an infamous example of  such doctrines the theory 
of  double predestination espoused by Calvinists, and whose origins lay in the writings of  Godescalc (a.k.a. 
Gottschalk) of  Orbais69 (c.808-867), according to which only the elect are the ones divinity concerned to 
secure their salvation, while the vast majority of  mankind―a majority that, ‘He might have saved as well, 
had he so pleased’―are to be unavoidably condemned for all eternity, in order to ‘the praise of  the glory of  
his justice’ (ibid., p.4; McGrath 2011: 366). 
 Chauncy then marshals all the more important passages that he considers give countenance to his 
claim of  universal salvation for mankind, and in doing so also censures those who, like the Calvinist most 
eminently, would have Christ death effected only for an elected few. The sacred text, argues Chauncy, is 
explicit in that Christ died for us [1 Thes.5:10], for sinners [Rom. 5:8], but even more clear in that He died 
for the sins ‘of  the whole world’ [1 John 2:2]; indeed, ‘that he tasted death for every man’ [Heb. 2:9]. And so as 
to prevent any possible misconstruction of  his words, says Chauncy, He commissioned His apostles ‘to 
preach repentance, and remission of  sins’ to all the corners of  the earth (Chauncy 1784: 21). 
It is not only more reasonable that Christ died for us all, and not just for a selected few, but it also 
reflects greater honour on the deity; greater virtue is to be ascribed to the blood He shed on the cross, and 
a much more noble purpose is achieved than the rather fruitless perspective of  dying for an elected lot, ‘as 
to any real good that will finally be the event, with respect to the greatest part of  mankind’ argues our 
theologian (ibid., p.22).           
 As it is not altogether uncommon among contemporary universalists (e.g. John Hick), Chauncy 
 
69 Although one could trace the development of  this doctrine to Augustine’s insistence in the gift-character 
of  divine grace―one should bear in mind that, as mentioned previously in this work, Augustine 
articulated this understanding of  grace as essentially gracious in response to what he regarded as faulty 
doctrines of  salvation, viz., those associated with Pelagius―, it was not until the ninth century that the 
Benedictine monk Godescalc constructed a theory of  double predestination, as would come later to be 
associated with Calvinism (limited atonement) (McGrath 2011: 365-366). From his assertion that God 
had predestined some to eternal damnation (the most of  our race in fact according to this doctrine), 
Godescalc concluded that it would then be unwarranted to speak of  Christ as having died for these 
individuals; ‘[for] if  he had, he would have died in vain, for their fate would be unaffected’ (ibid., p.366). 
Thus, Christ’s atonement was aimed or intended only for those he had previously elected. 
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devotes considerable attention to the Pauline texts in Scripture, particularly to the fifth chapter of  Romans, 
from the 12th verse till the 21st. If  in verse 15 Paul had only mentioned, in general, that the gift of  grace 
through Christ ‘reached beyond’ the transgression of  Adam, in the 16th it exhibits in particular the aspects 
or respects in which this is so―if  by one transgression of  one man all were condemned not only to death, 
but to a frail bodily condition that made it inevitable for them to sin, then by the perfect obedience of  
Christ, that had the many offenses of  men, in fact all the transgressions of  all men as its origin, will finally 
terminate, ‘in opposition to the power and demerit of  them all, in their conformity to the rule of  
righteousness, and their being accordingly restored, not simply to life, but to reign in it forever’ (ibid., p.56). 
At this point Chauncy clearly shows his Reformed credentials in this respect as he clearly seems to 
favour a representational or federal understanding of  both Christ and Adam’s role with respect to 
ourselves. For it is one of  Reformed theology’s main convictions, particularly in connection to its intricate 
covenant doctrine, that ‘Adam was humanity’s representative under the old covenant of  works; [whereas] 
Christ has become our representative under the covenant of  grace’ (McGrath 2011: 328). It should 
therefore come as no surprise that such covenant theologies ‘are seen in their most fully developed form in 
New England Puritanism during the eighteenth century’ (id.). 
So upon the same comparison, if  in the previous verses the apostle had only generally mentioned 
the gift through Christ as going beyond the damage by Adam, in this 16th verse he proceeds to be more 
particular as to how this is so. If  the judgment to universal death and a liableness to sin took rise from one 
offense, and the gift of  grace took rise from many offenses unto justification, this justification must be 
aimed at mankind universally as well, otherwise, Chauncy argues, the antithesis the apostle is upon will be 
lost―‘for mankind universally are the object of  condemnation; the same mankind therefore must be the 
object of  the opposite justification’ (1784: 60). And in the 21st verse the apostle not only opposes ‘an 
eternal reign in life’ with the ‘reign of  sin by death’ and declares this reign in life to be as broad as the reign 
of  sin by death. The latter being peremptorily accepted as universal the former must be so as well (ibid., 
p.80). What we are to understand at this point, says Chauncy, are the ‘two grand counterparts of  the 
scheme of  providence’ in the correspondence they are represented to have (ibid., p.81). 
 On Adam’s side as already mentioned, the damage consists in the subjection to death of  all men, 
and a proclivity thereupon (based on their frail and mortal condition) to sin. On Christ’s side what Chauncy 
calls the super-abounding advantage consists in two things as well, viz., ‘a reign in life, and a being formed 
to a meetness for this mercy by being made righteous persons’, and this despite all the sins that they might 
be guilty for, as having been committed in their own persons, and as such as are consequent on the original 
lapse of  Adam (ibid., p.82). A super-abounding gift that extends to the same subjects who had suffered the 
corresponding disadvantages through Adam, that is, to mankind universally, without exception or 
limitation. This notion of  a super-abounding gift is connected to what is customarily called the 
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supererogatory nature of  Christ’s display at the cross, and which is meant to signify that such an act was 
both non-obligatory in character as well as capable of  generating ‘a merit sufficient to atone for human sin’ 
(Crisp 2009: 433). 
 This is particularly evident in both the 18th and 19th verses, where the advantages and disadvantages 
are treated separately. In the 18th where the damage is judgement to condemnation, its opposite advantage 
is justification to life, which is to ‘come upon the same all men that were under the judgement to 
condemnation’ (Chauncy 1784: 82). Whereas in the 19th verse, the disadvantage through Adam was sin, and 
the opposite advantage is righteousness through Christ, the advantage of  righteousness is to be ascribed to 
the same ones who were made sinners by consequence of  Adam’s transgression, which is the same as to 
assert that it will take effect for the whole of  mankind (id.). And so as to leave no room for doubt, 
Chauncy asserts that the advantages here spoken of  are ‘absolutely [the] free gift of  God through Jesus 
Christ, and will be carried into effect, sooner or later, with respect to the whole race of  men’ (ibid., p.83). 
An interpretation that he regards as the most plain and natural. 
Besides, if  in the final judgment the majority of  mankind, notwithstanding the gift through Christ 
and its abounding quality, are ‘left to perish eternally’, there will be more reason in speaking of  the damage 
through Adam as going beyond, surmounting, the gift through Christ. ‘It will demonstrably follow, that 
Adam has done more hurt than Christ has done good’, a thought not only contrary to what the apostle had 
in view to express, but also dishonourable to God, Chauncy argues (ibid., p.88). An argument very similar 
to the one worded some years ago by John Kronen and Eric Reitan. 
Chauncy is naturally not oblivious to the fact that his doctrine of  universal salvation seems to be at 
odds with what he calls the general run of  Scripture, ‘which threatens a misimprovement of  the gospel, 
and its means, advantages and blessings, with certain death after the resurrection at the great day’ (ibid., 
p.88). This being the principal reason, he says, that has made interpreters distort the words, and perplex the 
reasoning of  the apostle, ‘in order to reconcile what he has here said, with the Scripture account of  that 
death, or misery, which wicked men shall suffer after the general resurrection’ (id.). 
He likewise considers the words that begin the following chapter of  Romans (6th) as further proof  
of  universalism in matters of  salvation― ‘what shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may 
abound? God forbid!’. For if  the gift of  grace through Christ was only a conditional offer of  life, that is, in 
case men are obedient and actually ‘improve their Gospel advantages, which if  they do not, they must 
certainly perish notwithstanding this offer’, the apostle’s words in the sense of  warning against an ill use of  
the doctrine of  universal grace would seem out of  place (ibid., p.90). Whereas, in Chauncy’s scheme of  
universal salvation, this warning seems entirely proper and pertinent, as some might take too much comfort 
from it, and think that their continuance in sin is of  no consequence in their ultimate destiny (ibid., p.90). 
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 And in Corinthians there is a specification as to how such deliverance will be carried out according 
to our theologian: observing a ‘just decorum, [keeping] to rule, and order with respect to all men’ (ibid., 
p.202); but also that God, as ‘the first-fruits of  the dead’ (1 Cor. 20), that is, being raised firstly from the 
dead, His resurrection was a sort of  ‘pledge, or assurance to all men, that they should be raised to a like 
immortality, when it could be done in consistency with due order’ (ibid., p.203). 
The thought the apostle intended to convey here according to Chauncy, was that, though everyone, 
mankind universally will be raised from the dead, this will not be carried out all at once, but in a successive 
manner, according to ‘different ranks or companies’ (id.). He clarifies in a footnote what he means by these 
companies or ranks: as depending on how they become qualified for such a happy life ‘by being Christ’s, by 
being formed by him to a meetness for a blessed immortality’ (ibid., p.204). According to which the first 
rank would be composed by those who were prepared by Christ, ‘under the present administration of  his 
kingdom, for a reign in life when he shall appear the second time’ (id.). He likens this passage of  Paul with 
what the apostle John expresses in Rev. 20:5 by the first resurrection, and thereby describing them as blessed, 
an epithet that explains the fact that the so-called second death will ‘have no power over them, as it would 
have over the wicked’, but also because ‘they should be kings and priests, and reign with Christ a thousand 
years’–a clear allusion no doubt to the theory of  Millenialism, which will be dealt with at the end of  this 
chapter (ibid., p.205). 
Furthermore, by calling it the first resurrection, the apostle, despite not explicitly talking of  any 
further resurrections after this one, does lead our thoughts to believe or ‘hope for still others’ (id.); 
obviously insinuating, argues Chauncy, ‘that it would, in God’s way and time, be succeeded with others of  
the same kind’ (id.). 
 
7. Proportionality Objection 
At one point Chauncy puts forward one of  the main arguments hurled against proponents of  the 
traditional doctrine of  hell, and particularly to the retributivist theory of  punishment that undergirds it, viz., 
that there must be a proportion between the punishments inflicted, and the offenses committed―the 
modernly called proportionality objection―, for it is one of  the most important intuitions behind the 
retributivist theory, as Thomas Talbott points out, ‘that some offenses merit less severe punishment than 
others’ (1993: 12). Chauncy’s words are that this proportioning of  the torments of  wicked men to ‘all the 
various degrees of  their contracted stupidity, stubbornness, and moral degeneracy’, would be impossible to 
achieve on the assumption of  an eternity of  miseries, for such a concept clearly ‘swallows up all proportion 
[…] [for even if  there was] some difference in the degree of  pain, [it would be such] as will be scarce 
thought worthy of  being brought into the account, when the circumstance of  endless duration is annexed 
to it’ (Chauncy 1784: 309). 
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Elsewhere Chauncy likewise criticizes the traditional doctrine of  hell in ways that would become 
fairly common later on, particularly during the nineteenth century. And he does this by making evident the 
disparity in the orthodox account of  divine retribution between the offenses committed and the 
punishment inflicted in a way that reminds us of  Jeremy Bentham’s principle that the punishment ‘should 
correspond exactly in kind to the crime committed’ (Patsalidou 2012: 812). In whatever point of  light we 
consider sin, our author declares, it is in its nature, a finite evil―it is committed by a finite being, and it is 
‘the effect of  finite principles, passions, and appetites’ (Chauncy 1784: 320). To say therefore, that the due 
and just punishment in such cases would be infinite in character, reflects unfavourably on both God’s 
nature―on His infinite benevolence and mercy, no doubt―, but also on His justice (id.). Not to mention 
that the difference between those whom we would describe as moderately wicked or normally sinful 
(Chauncy uses the words wicked in the lowest sense), and those ‘to whom the character of  good is applicable in 
the like sense’, is so small, even to the point of  being sometimes imperceptible to ourselves, that it is 
indeed ‘incredible, that such amazingly great difference should be made between them in the future world’ 
(id.). 
 Furthermore, the majority or at least a considerable part of  those that will be miserable in the next 
state were far from being regarded as ‘incurably sinful’, and it might therefore not be inaccurate to claim 
that ‘if  they had continued in life, they might have been formed to a virtuous temper of  mind by a suitable 
mixture of  correction, instruction, and the like’ (ibid., p.321). So, could it be supposed that such an 
infinitely benevolent deity would, Chauncy asks, ‘without any other trial, in order to effect their 
reformation’, cast them into perennial (and rather pointless) misery? (id.) Once again, this will be an issue 
to elaborate further in the following chapter of  this work as ‘the notion of  eternal hell as a matter of  just 
punishment’ has largely been rejected by contemporary philosophers such as Jonathan Kvanvig, Marylin M. 
Adams, and Charles Seymour among others (Walls 2009: 495). 
 
8. The ‘Next’ State  
Firstly, it is important to highlight the fact that it is not the intention of  Chauncy to advance the idea ‘that 
all men will be admitted to the enjoyment of  happiness in the state that succeeds the present’ (ibid., p.7). 
Our author in fact cites various biblical passages that state that the greater part of  mankind will in fact miss 
out on happiness in the state that immediately follows the present one―‘strait is the gate, and narrow the 
way’ (Matt. 7:14); or in the conclusions of  some of  Jesus parables, ‘For many are called, and few are 
chosen’ (Matt. 22:14). If  indeed the state that immediately follows the present one was to be the final state 
of  men, then the common notions held by most Christians would be warranted by quotations such as 
these. But as Chauncy mentions it, this is not the case, but has been believed to be so to both the great 
distress of  mankind, and to the causing of  unflattering reflections upon the deity (ibid., p.8). 
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Elsewhere Chauncy contends that since Christ’s design to come into our world was to destroy sin, it 
will certainly be defeated, ‘and since it is not destroyed in this present state, we may reasonably look for 
another, when this design of  his mediatory manifestation shall be fully accomplished’ (id.). To think of  this 
issue in such a manner is the best way of  ‘reconciling present fact with the most obvious sense of  these 
texts’ says the Bostonian (ibid., p.173). 
After conceding that perhaps vast amounts of  men might not actually be, in this present life or 
state, prevailed or subjected upon so as to ‘willingly bow down before him as their Lord’, he mentions that 
this will certainly be carried into effect in the one to come (the next state) (ibid., p.191). Those who think 
this notion absurd or unreasonable, do so owing to the undue influence of  ‘previously imbibed notions’, 
according to which this present state, and this alone, was ‘intended for the recovery of  men to virtue’, 
while those who fail to be recovered in this state will surely be miserable in the next one, ‘which is a state 
of  endless torment’ (id.). But just as with Leibniz’s morally dynamic view of  hell in which the damned 
continue to sin in the afterlife, and therefore make themselves liable to further and accumulated penalties, 
this argument by Chauncy is vulnerable to the criticism of  diminishing the importance that this present 
earthly state has for us morally as a unique period of  evaluation or trial (Patsalidou 2012: 812). 
 For our author the punishment threatened under the present dispensation of  Christ, in order to 
dissuade men from disobeying His commands, ‘is the misery of  the same intermediate state, and not the 
misery that will have no end’ (ibid., p.191). 
 
9. Millennialism 
We end our present survey of  soteriological themes in Chauncy’s theological works by addressing a couple 
of  topics that although not directly related to our main concern in this part of  our work, might prove to be 
of  interest for those concerned in having a more complete understanding of  the Bostonian’s overall 
beliefs―his endorsement of  Millennialism, and his rebuttal of  a common and rather practical argument in 
favour of  the traditional or classical doctrine of  hell. 
 Absent from church history for at least fifteen centuries, the doctrine of  the millennium, of  a 
renewed worldly kingdom lasting roughly a thousand years between Christ’s second coming and ‘the 
establishment of  a totally new cosmic order’, reappeared in popular protestant theology, particularly that 
of  the United States during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (McGrath 2011: 460; Ferguson 1997). 
An idea, it should be noted, rather loosely based on Scripture, particularly that of  the book of  Revelation 
(20: 2-5). It did however enjoy considerable appeal during the early history of  the church (up until the fifth 
century), with writers like Irenaeus of  Lyon―for whom Christ’s promise in the Last Super to drink wine 
with His disciples once again warranted such a belief; and this since, Irenaeus thought, such a promise 
would be implausible if  thought in relation to ‘disembodied spirits’―or Tertullian, who conceived of  such a 
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concept as a sort of  reward or compensation aimed at those who had suffered here on earth for their 
faith70 (id.). 
Our author claims that even after the second coming of  Christ, there will be substantial work to be 
done, and for which reason a long period of  time is absolutely necessary. So one should guard oneself  
against the common mistake that some writers have run into, in the sense of  believing that the mediatorial 
kingdom of  Christ will be finished upon Christ’s second coming ‘by his then finally, and unalterably fixing 
the states of  men, whether good or bad’ (Chauncy, 1784: 208); for even though the apostle here speaks of  
the end of  this mediatory scheme―‘when Christ shall have delivered up the kingdom to the father’ 
(id.)―there will be still substantial work to be carried out as we will henceforth describe. 
The other period or dispensation affirms our author, will have Christ no longer for its head, as it is 
expressed in those words that state that then ‘God shall be all in all’, i.e., ‘shall govern all, influence all, 
make communications to all, immediately, and not through the hands of  a mediator’, for even Christ will 
then be subjected to God, the Father (ibid., p.217). Chauncy adds that the administration of  all will be in 
His hands, so that all duty, just as all favours and rewards will be ‘immediately communicated from him’ 
(ibid., pp.217, 222). He will be then directly and ‘immediately concerning himself ’ for the welfare of  
everyone, ‘so as that they shall be happy beyond conception and without end’ (ibid., p.222). 
Accordingly, final and everlasting happiness is not the reward promised under Christ’s mediatorial 
kingdom, in order to persuade mankind into subjection to God’s moral government―this will indeed, in 
the end, be the effect of  it, but it certainly is not the promise made in this present state. The reward is ‘the 
happiness of  that state which intervenes between the resurrection, and God’s being ‘all in all’’ (id.). 
 A couple of  pages onward he states that the main difference between those who exit this present 
state as the obedient subjects of  God from those who die in sin, lies in the fact that the former will be 
admitted, ‘at Christ’s second coming, to dwell with him in his kingdom of  glory for a certain period of  
duration’ (ibid., p.224). Once again a clear allusion no doubt, to a millennial period or dispensation, where 
the fortunate ones will be living and reigning in life with Christ by their side, while the rest will be banished 
from ‘his presence, to dwell in unspeakable torment till they are wrought upon to see their folly, [and] 
repent of  it’ (id.).          
 Chauncy naturally affirms that the Scripture account of  such reward perfectly coincides with the 
 
70 Tertullian writes that ‘a kingdom has been promised to us on earth, but before heaven: but in another 
state than this, as being after the resurrection. This will last for a thousand years, in a city of  God’s own 
making[...]’ (McGrath 2008: 648). He further writes that this city was, 
 established by God for the reception of  the saints at the resurrection, and for their refreshment 
with an abundance of  all blessings, spiritual blessings to be sure, in compensation for the blessings 
we have despised or lost in this age. For indeed it is right and worthy of  God that his servants 
should also rejoice in the place where they suffered hardship for his name (id.). 
149 
vision he has here advanced, for it is there described as enjoyment of  various sorts in the kingdom of  
Christ, that is, when He will still be carrying out His duties as mediator and governor of  this dispensation 
period. One example of  this is Rev. 5:10 where the promise of  this reward is expressed by their reigning on 
earth, which says Chauncy, clearly points our thoughts to the idea that this reward ‘will be bestowed on 
them in the new heavens, and the new earth, which will succeed the dissolution of  the present form of  this 
world by fire’ (ibid., p.223). And where the saints, ‘in their resurrection-state, shall live under the reign of  
Christ’, till the time comes when the ‘administration shall change hands’, and God himself  is ‘king and 
sovereign’ (id.). 
 
10. Social order and the traditional doctrine of  Hell 
In one of  his theological works Chauncy puts forth the very familiar argument customarily used against 
detractors of  the notion of  everlasting hell, namely, that it is a constraint against the naturally evil 
proclivities of  men to believe in such endless misery; that it is the most powerful deterrent against such 
unlawful tendencies. 
 Firstly, he argues, it would have to be shown that these doctrines do in fact ‘naturally and directly 
tend to encourage men in vicious practice’ (ibid., p.341). Besides, wicked men may, and in fact do, as it is 
evident with the grace of  the gospel as it is presently ‘perverted and abused by thousands’ (ibid., p.342), 
distort the ‘tendency of  anything, and take occasion, even from that which is naturally and strongly adapted 
to soften their hearts, and effect their reformation, to harden themselves in sin’ (ibid., p.341). 
 The truth is, for our author, that the doctrine of  finite sufferings in the afterlife, one that will last 
till the necessary change in their characters or hearts is effected, ‘is naturally and powerfully adapted to 
discourage them from going on in their sinful courses’ (ibid., p.342). Therefore, if  the abuse some men 
might make of  such a doctrine could be taken or construed into an argument against it, and conclude 
thereupon that the doctrine is false, then, Chauncy argues, no doctrine could ever be true, ‘for there is not 
one but what may be perverted and turned into ill use’ (id.). 
 If  it had been the case, our author claims, that the scheme here advanced pretended men to be 
admitted immediately after their earthly death into everlasting happiness, regardless of  what their moral 
deportment had been, then the objection here treated might carry with it some weight. But since it has 
been proved ‘that moral depravity is inconsistent with rational happiness’, and that the sufferings of  wicked 
men in the next state shall be ‘awfully great in degree as well as long in duration’, it cannot but be 
concluded that the doctrine of  universal salvation is not, ‘from its natural tendency [propitious to] give 
encouragement to vice’ (ibid., p.343); and that if  this was to be the case with respect to some, it is only 
‘because they will not harken to the dictates of  reason, and act up to their character as intelligent agents’ 
(id.). 
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 But as Chauncy clearly mentions it, the objections here discussed might not be so much directed 
against the truth of  the scheme of  universal salvation, but to the wisdom of  making it open to everyone 
(ibid., p.346). As previously stated, if  men behave according to their nature, that is, as rational moral agents, 
the scheme here advanced of  post-mortem, though finite torments will be enough to dissuade them from 
continuing to pursue their evil ways. But if  they do not, the prospect of  such distant sufferings, however 
endless they might be portrayed to be, will unlikely have a different effect on them. Chauncy’s words are: 
But if  they will not suffer so dreadful a punishment as this to have any influence upon them, by their 
thoughtlessness and inconsideration, there is certainly no good reason to suppose, was the 
punishment made greater by the increase of  its duration, but that the same thoughtlessness and 
stupidity would render it ineffectual (ibid., p.351). 
And it might be, our author argues, that despite the vulgar notions that wicked men might entertain of  the 
deity, their conception of  Him as a being of  infinite benevolence, run against the idea of  never-ending 
torments in the afterlife. For they seem to believe that a being of  such infinite goodness ‘will not be so 
severe with his poor, though sinful creatures’ (ibid., p.353). 
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Chapter 7. Philosophical Problems and Solutions to Chauncy’s Account of  the Afterlife 
 
I. Introduction. 
The problem of  hell concerns the seeming incompatibility between an orthodox conception of  God, on 
which He is both omnipotent and perfectly good, and an orthodox conception of  hell, according to which 
there are some human beings who, in the life to come, are eternally separated from Him. The 
incompatibility seems to arise because, if  God is omnipotent, it seems that He can save everyone, where 
salvation consists in eternal union with God in the life to come; and, if  God is perfectly good, He would 
want to do so. Now, if  God can do something and He wants to do something, it seems to follow that He 
will do it, in this case, that He will save everyone. But that seems not to be the case, given the orthodox 
conception of  hell. 
 By the traditional doctrine of  hell we refer to the position that states that once a person dies in a 
sinful condition, then that individual will be consigned for all eternity to a place characterized by both 
physical suffering (poena sensus), and separation from God (poena damni) (Cross 2009: 346, 350; Patsalidou 
2012: 811). Furthermore and as previously stated, the philosophical theory of  punishment underlying the 
orthodox account of  hell, viz., retributive or vindictive in kind, seems difficult to square with the idea of  
God as essentially loving (1 John 4:8, 16) (McGrath 2011: 458); and this since the concept of  the unending 
(and pointless) punishment of  sinners seems barbaric and utterly unlike the image of  God as a loving 
father that we find in the gospels. 
 There have been various attempts throughout history to try to preserve consistency with regard to 
this theological conundrum, as is eminently the case of  those classical theologians71 who rejected, or were 
at the least deceptive about their commitment to the idea of  God’s universal love for mankind; a group 
that Talbott labelled as hard-hearted theists (1990b: 21-22). Fortunately, very few theologians or philosophers 
nowadays have any sympathy for such grim views; and since it also lies outside the scope of  the present 
work, we will not concern ourselves with explicating this position. 
 The issue at stake in this debate could be framed then as a problem of  hell, and it revolves around a 
set of  three inconsistent claims that, although finding prima facie support in Scripture for all three, cannot, 
as a matter of  logic, be all true. As most theologians have historically done, if  you accept two of  them, 
then you must deny the third; a decision that reveals, as will become evident afterwards, significantly 
different conceptions of  the divine nature (Talbott 2014: 39). 
The propositions are: 
I. God desires to save everyone 
 
71 E.g. Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, et al. 
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II. God can save everyone 
III. Not everyone is saved 
 
Thus, the positions to be addressed in this chapter are first, William Lane Craig’s Arminian defence of  
the traditional account of  hell. In general lines, Craig’s argument is that because salvation must be freely 
chosen by human beings, it may not be within God’s power to save everyone, that is, there may be some 
people who, no matter how much God does to aid them in freely choosing salvation, will always freely 
reject it. The main advantage of  this position is that of  uncompromised freedom for those who choose to 
reject God. Whereas its principal drawback is that of  the happiness of  the redeemed in heaven being 
diminished by the knowledge of  the presence of  their loved ones in hell. Craig’s rejoinder to this is divine 
obliteration of  memories; that is, that divinity will erase from the minds of  the redeemed any memories of  
their loved ones. 
Our second position is the universalism of  Thomas Talbott, anchored in his conviction that because 
God loves all human beings with a perfect form of  love, it’s not possible for Him to allow any human 
being to be damned. The strength of  such a position is that there is no need for the erasing of  memories 
one encounters in Craig’s proposal, but carries with it the inconvenience of  compromised freedom for 
those who freely reject God. 
Finally, we have Chauncy’s solution to this problem. What’s forcing the choice between the two bad 
options above is that humans are given a finite number of  opportunities to accept or reject God. Let’s deny 
such assumption and say that God puts those who reject Him in Limbo and gives them infinite 
opportunities to accept Him. Furthermore, lest some creatures by endlessly rejecting God might hamper 
His plan for mankind, God, through His middle knowledge is aware of  this, and simply decides not to 
create them.72 
In this chapter I suggest a new way to reject (III). To do this, I will explain William Lane Craig’s way of  
rejecting (II), and Thomas Talbott’s manner of  rejecting (III). I will suggest that each has a significant 
problem, but if  we borrow elements from both we can avoid these problems and arrive at a dialectically 
superior solution to the problem of  hell. This solution, I think, is found in Chauncy’s eschatology, as I 
described in the previous chapter; and so, I think, is a Chauncian solution. So, let us begin with the 
unorthodox position and analyse Talbott’s rejection of  (III) which leads him to endorse both (II) and (I), 
that is, to the idea that everyone will be saved. 
 
 
72 We are not concerned here with the so-called intermediate state after death, and before the resurrection; 
but only with the state or condition that comes after this intermediate state. 
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II. Everyone is saved: Thomas Talbott 
We think it will be helpful to take on at this point some important definitions and distinctions regarding the 
different positions just mentioned. 
 A theist, generally speaking, could be said to endorse the following: 
(1) God exists 
(2) God is both omniscient and omnipotent 
(3) God loves every created person 
(4) Evil exists73 
 
But given that most Christians also advocate the following tenet, we must add to the previous set the 
following, 
 
  (5) God will irrevocably reject some persons and subject those persons to everlasting punishment. 
 
Following Talbott’s typology, any theist who in addition to propositions (1) to (4) also endorses (5) will be 
referred to as a conservative theist (1990b: 21). 
  Talbott argues however, that from the above set of  propositions, ‘together with certain necessary 
truths one can deduce, [...] an explicit contradiction’ (ibid.). Consequently, any reasonable theist will be 
forced to reject either (3) or (5) (ibid.), as was the case of  the classical theologians mentioned previously. 
 Unlike hard-hearted theists, the Arminian or free will theist need not commit himself  to the truth 
of  (5) in order to defend the traditional doctrine of  hell. Instead, he could claim that despite God’s sincere 
desire that everyone be saved and come to know the truth (1 Timothy 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9), since He created us 
with free will, and some of  us can use such freedom to reject Him forever, then He is unable to secure the 
salvation of  at least some of  His creatures (Talbott 1990: 227). 
 A free will theist will hence modify (5) for (5’) or what is also known as the Rejection Hypothesis 
(RH), to wit, 
 
 (5’) Some persons will, despite God’s best efforts to save them, finally reject God and separate          
themselves from God forever.74 
 
 
73 My presentation of  these propositions is drawn from Talbott 1990b. 
74 Talbott 1990: 227. 
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But let us go back to Talbott’s reasons for rejecting proposition (III), that is, with his attack on what he 
calls conservative theism. 
 Most Christians believe that up until the time of  physical death, divine grace is always available to a 
creature. Tradition states then that divine grace has a ‘built in time limit’ (Talbott 1990b: 23). If  one has 
died in a sinful state, then one will discover that all hope is lost; that the possibility of  redemption has 
passed and never to return (id.). This conservative Christian is thus committed to much more than (RH) 
and believes that God not only rejects the sins incurred in by certain individuals but likewise rejects the 
sinners themselves (ibid. p.24). They thus advocate (5). 
 With the intention of  clarifying what it might mean to say that God rejects some sinner, let us 
stipulate that, (a) a sinner freely and forever refuses to be reconciled to God, (b) that nothing God could do 
would bring it about (in Plantinga’s broad or weak sense75) that the sinner in question freely repents of  his 
sins, and (c) that the following conditional statements are true: 
 
(6) If  God could do something to bring it about that the sinner in question freely repents of  his sin,        
then God would do it, and 
 (7) If  the aforementioned sinner were to repent of  his sins freely, then God would accept him back as a 
prodigal son.76 
  
These conditions considered, it would be difficult to speak of  God rejecting some sinner, and we would be 
closer to the truth if  we were to say instead that the sinner freely rejects God (Talbott 1990b: 24). A helpful 
manner therefore of  distinguishing between (5) and (5’)/(RH) would be by adopting the following 
definitions: 
 
(D1) For any sinner S and time t, S finally rejects God forever at t if, and only if, (a) S freely resolves 
at t never to be reconciled to God and, (b) there is nothing both within God’s power to do and 
consistent with the interest of  all other created persons that would (weakly) bring it about, 
either at t or at some moment subsequent to t, that S freely repents of  S’s sin and is thereby 
reconciled to God. 
 
(D2) For any sinner S and time t, God irrevocably rejects S at t if, and only if, either (a) at t and 
every moment subsequent to t God would refuse to be reconciled to S even on the condition 
 
75 For Plantinga’s broad and weak sense of  bringing things about, see The Nature of  Necessity, pp. 171-173. 
76 Talbott 1990b: 24 
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that S freely repents of  S’s sin or (b) at neither t nor any moment subsequent to t does S freely 
repents of  S’s sin and the following conditions are met: (i) at t God knows of  something both 
within His power to do and consistent with the interest of  all other created persons that would 
(weakly) bring it about, either at t or at some moment subsequent to t, that S freely repents of  
S’s sin, and (ii) God’s immutable intention at t is not to exercise His power in this way.77 
  
 According to (D1), which speaks of  a sinner’s rejection of  God, and of  God’s incapacity to do 
anything about it, a sinner’s rejection must withstand or be sustained ‘in the face of  all that omnipotent 
love might do’ (Talbott 1990b: 25), an issue we will later take on. Whereas (D2) who establishes the 
conditions under which we might speak of  divine rejection of  a sinner, might prove problematic for those 
prepared to endorse (5), since it appears to imply that God is capable of  acting contrary to the interests of  
those He supposedly loves (id.). 
 Now the obvious issue to go over at this point is to define what it might mean to say that God 
loves a given individual. A necessary, though not sufficient condition according to Talbott would have God 
desiring the good of  such an individual, that is, 
 
 (P1) Necessarily, God loves a person S (with a perfect form of  love) at a time t only if  God’s  
         intention at t and every moment subsequent to t is to do everything within His power to  
         promote the best interest of  S.78 
 
 Now considered within the context of  human personal relationships, an obvious objection would 
be that, in order to be genuine, love for someone need not be everlasting, for we surely can think of  
examples of  genuine love that simply ceases to endure for natural causes (e.g. dementia late in life). But an 
objection such as this one has no bearing when it comes to the divine being. In the case of  an omniscient 
being it simply makes no sense to claim that such a being loved a person for a while, but afterwards ceases 
to do so (Talbott 1990b: 26). It is a necessary truth then ‘that God loves a person at one time only if  he 
loves that person at all subsequent times’ (id.). 
 The only possible caveat here would have the best interest of  someone in collision or in opposition 
to the best interest of  someone else. In which case God would be precluded from promoting the best 
interests of  both, and would be forced either to take sides in such an issue or to resolve the conflict ‘in 
 
77 Talbott 1900b: 24-25 
78 Talbott 1990b: 25 
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accordance with some principle of  justice’ (id.). Although Talbott believes that no such conflicts are even 
possible for God, he nonetheless introduces the following proviso for those that do, 
 
(P2) Necessarily, God loves a person S at a time t only if  God’s intention at t and every moment 
subsequent to t is to do everything within His power to promote the best interest of  S, 
provided that the interest of  S is consistent with that of  all others whom God also loves.79 
 
The main idea behind both (P1) and (P2) is that if  God sincerely loves a given person, then there 
must be some connection with this fact and His readiness to exercise His power in the interest of  such a 
person (Talbott 1990b: 26). 
 Naturally not just any interest would qualify as the one that God would seek to promote in His 
creatures. So what would constitute the best interest of  someone? Our intuitions here would likely point to 
the fact that a person’s best interest must ‘have some connection [...] with the conditions of  a happy life’ 
(Talbott 1990b: 27; Talbott 2014: 124). Needless to say, it would be nigh impossible to arrive to a 
consensus regarding what those conditions are, for though it may probably not contain instances of  
unpleasant sensations, Swinburne surely is correct in describing what he calls ‘supremely worthwhile 
happiness’ as not being ‘essentially a matter of  having pleasant sensations’ (Swinburne 1983: 39; cited in 
ibid.).   
 Borrowing from Swinburne, Talbott defines these conditions as being, (i) that such happiness 
cannot be the outcome or take its rise from a false belief  or from an immoral action; and (ii) that such 
happiness be able to endure forever, that is, that it must not lead to boredom or fade away with the passing 
of  time (Talbott 2014: 125). A couple of  conditions that will prove crucial for Talbott’s rebuttal of  the free 
will theist position later on. 
  Taking inspiration from the New Testament, Talbott asserts that such supreme happiness can only 
come about when ‘one is loved by others and is likewise filled with love for others’ (id.). It is then only by 
becoming part of  a community of  love that one can attain such supremely worthwhile happiness. And this 
leads Talbott to claim that: 
 
  (P3) Necessarily, God loves a person S at a time t only if  God’s intention at t and every moment  
        subsequent to t is to do everything within His power to promote supremely worthwhile  
 
79 Talbott 1990b: 26 
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        happiness in S, provided that the actions taken are consistent with His promoting the same  
        kind of  happiness in all others whom He also loves.80 
 
So, the logical inconsistency in conservative theism should be evident according to Talbott, for if   
conservative theism includes commitment to both (3) and (5), but given (P2), (3) entails, 
 
(8) For any created person S and time subsequent to the creation of  S, God’s intention at t is to          
do all that He properly can to promote the best interest of  S;81 
 
and taking (P3) into account, (3) entails 
 
(9) For any created person S and time t subsequent to the creation of  S, God’s intention at t is to do            
all that He properly can to promote supremely worthwhile happiness in S. 
 
And also (5) would seem to imply both, 
 
(10) There is a person S and a time t subsequent to the creation of  S such that it is not God’s                         
intention at t to do all that He properly can to promote the best interest of  S. 
     (11) There is a person S and a time t subsequent to the creation of  S such that it is not God’s    
  intention at t to do all that He properly can to promote supremely worthwhile happiness in S.82 
  
 Since both (8) and (10) are openly contradictory, as is the case with (9) and (11), conservative 
theism, according to Talbott, at least appears to be self-contradictory (1990b: 29). 
  
III. An Arminian take on Soteriology: William Lane Craig 
We mentioned previously that the Arminian perspective claims that despite God’s desire that everyone be 
saved, assumes that God is not almighty with regards to this issue, that is, that He is unable to ‘satisfy his 
own will or desire in this matter’ (Talbott 2014: 103). He simply does ‘the best He can to cut his losses, 
minimize the defeat, and to produce the most favourable balance of  good over evil that he can’ (ibid., p. 
42). Their defence of  the orthodox doctrine of  hell is thus based on (5’)/(RH). 
 
80 Talbott 1990b: 28 
81 Talbott 1990b: 28. The same applies to (9) and (10). 
82 Talbott 1990b: 29 
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 For Craig the main issue concerning the conflict between divine rejection of  some sinners, and 
divine benevolence, could be reduced to certain counterfactuals of  freedom concerning those persons 
who, though not responding to the light of  general revelation received, could have responded differently if  
they had been the subjects of  special revelation (Craig 1989: 176). It has to do with answers to questions 
such as: why did God decide to create a world in which so many of  His creatures would be lost?, and even 
more significantly, why did God not create a world in which everyone freely decides for communion with 
Him? (id.). 
 Craig claims that those who object to the exclusivity of  salvation through Christ are posing what he 
calls a soteriological problem of  evil, that is, that the combination of  propositions (2) and (3) above, which 
we shall group together in, 
 
 (12) God is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good (perfectly loving) 
 
is inconsistent with 
 
 (13) Some persons do not receive Christ and are damned.83 
 
And since (12) is essential to theism, then the putative objector must show (13) to be false. 
 Now one might express concern here for the manner in which Craig frames his so-called 
soteriological problem of  evil, since it appears to arise only for those who are familiar with the gospel 
(Knight, 2010: 10). For those who have heard of  the gospel but who remain unconvinced by it―either 
because they are committed to their own religious beliefs, or because it (the gospel) was handed to them by 
people who were far from exemplifying Christian virtues for instance―‘eternal damnation is the only thing 
to be expected’ (id.). A God that behaved in such manner could certainly be called sovereign, but it would 
seriously call into question His loving nature. 
 Talbott’s reasons for denying the possibility of  (5’) and the Molinist position more generally are: (I) 
first, that the choice specified in (RH) is incoherent, and (II) that even if  possible, God would necessarily 
not allow such a decision to be made by any of  His creatures (Talbott 1990: 227, 238). But before 
addressing in greater detail the exchange of  ideas between Craig and Talbott concerning the possibility of  
(RH), let us consider first the possibility of  God making actual a world in which all of  its creatures, out of  
their own free will, decide to be reconciled to Him; a possibility that is apparently subscribed by Chauncy. 
 
83 Craig 1989: 180. 
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 Although it is logically possible for God to actualize any possible world, it is not open to Him to 
actualize just any world; and this since the scope of  feasible worlds available to God in the moment 
logically prior to creation will be checked by those true counterfactuals of  creaturely freedom which He, 
through His Middle Knowledge, knows before His divine creative decree (Craig 1989: 180). So at this point 
one needs to know if  within the range of  feasible worlds for God to make actual, there is at least one in 
which everyone is freely reconciled to God and thus saved (ibid., p.181). 
 Those wishing to provide an affirmative answer to such a question would stipulate that, 
 
 (14) God knows for any individual S under what circumstances S would freely receive Christ.84 
 
But given a libertarian understanding of  free will,85 and the possibility of  some creatures being so obdurate 
and unrepentant as to reject God in whatever worlds He decides to put them in, the following could be put 
forward by an exclusivist, 
 
 (15) For some individual S, there are no circumstances under which S would freely receive Christ. 
  
The Universalist could, however, accept (15) and still maintain that there are congruent graces for 
everyone, and that God can in fact make actual a world containing only such individuals (Craig 1989: 182). 
 Craig’s position though, is to assert that in order to prove this option possible, it’s not enough to 
merely point to the fact that it is always open for God to find and make use of  circumstances under which 
various individuals would freely repent; it would be also necessary to show that such circumstances are 
compossible (id.). But even compossibility is not enough for Craig, for he believes that in order to avoid the 
‘counterfactual fallacy of  strengthening the antecedent, [one] must show that in the combined 
circumstances the consequent still follows’ (id.). 
 The position advocated by Craig is that God has disposed the world in such a way that those 
persons who would refuse reconciliation in any circumstances whatsoever (in every feasible world for God 
to make actual), are precisely the ones who are damned in the actual world. Taking once more inspiration 
from Plantinga, Craig speaks of  transworld damnation as the quality possessed by those persons who would 
 
84 Craig 1989: 181. The same applies to proposition (15). 
85 A libertarian understanding of  free will is taken to include the following two claims: (L1) an agent acts 
with free will only if  his act is not ultimately causally determined by anything outside of  himself; and (L2) 
an agent acts with free will only if  he could have done otherwise, or at the very least, the psychological 
possibility of  doing otherwise was a live option for him (Stump 2006: 125, 128). For our purposes here 
however, we will consider that libertarianism just is this power to do otherwise, which is usually termed the 
Principle of  Alternate Possibilities (PAP). 
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freely refuse reconciliation with God ‘in every world feasible for God in which that person exists’ (ibid., 
p.184). 
Based on all this, Craig believes to be in possession of  a premise which is consistent with (12), and 
would entail (13), that is,           
   
(16) God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved and unsaved, and 
         those who are unsaved suffer from transworld damnation.86 
 
Now returning to the issue of  the alleged incoherence of  (RH) according to Talbott, (I) the first thing 
to be said is that if  God is the preeminent source of  happiness as Christians have always believed, and if  
separation from God can only bring about increasing misery, then it is difficult to know what could possibly 
qualify as an intelligible reason for rejecting God (Talbott 1990: 228; Talbott 2014: 173). Talbott in fact 
expands the concept of  free will to include a minimum degree of  rationality, and complains of  the fact that 
Arminians and other free will theists operate as though the only requirement for a decision to be truly free is 
for it to be undetermined in the sense of  not being the outcome of  external sufficient causes.87 
 At this point Talbott draws a distinction between someone making a decision to reject God that is 
at least partly taken in ignorance, based on deception, as a consequence of  previous bad decisions, or as 
the outcome of  being in subjection to unhealthy desires; and that of  someone making a decision to reject 
God who is fully informed, not deceived, and who happens not to be in bondage to such baneful 
proclivities. In the latter case we would be talking of  someone making a fully informed decision to reject 
God, whereas the former would be better described as a less than fully informed decision to reject Him 
(Talbott 2014: 172). 
 For Talbott, if  the decision to reject God is less than fully informed, it will always be open for God 
to release such sinners from their ignorance, deception, or their bondage to unwholesome desires, without 
in any way interfering with their freedom. For we are here speaking of  those who owing to such bondage 
have forfeited their freedom of  will in the first place, and in releasing them from such bondage, God would 
in fact be restoring the possibility of  free choice in them (Talbott 1990b: 37). Whereas for Craig, this divine 
decision to ‘jump start’ sinners ‘by repeatedly removing them from their bondage and setting them on their 
course again until they go right’, is to be regarded as rather manipulative, and hence, as disrespectful of  
their freedom (Craig 1991: 300). 
 
86 Craig 1989: 184 
87 ‘If  without any motive for doing so’, says Talbott, ‘S consistently acts contrary to S’s own interest as well 
as contrary to the interest of  all others, then S is not a rational agent and is not capable, therefore, of  
performing free actions’ (1992: 501-502). 
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 Craig’s also replies that perhaps mere wickedness in some sinners might push them to reject God. 
Or it could also be that the will to self-rule in some persons is so strong, that no matter how irrational it 
may appear to us, they will choose to spurn divine love ‘if  that love requires worship and submission of  
one’s will’ (ibid., p.302). Craig as well charges Talbott’s claim of  the alleged incoherence of  (RH) as being 
question-begging. For it would seem that in Talbott’s view ‘any decision to reject God is by definition ‘not 
fully informed’’, and this owing to the fact that any person who thus acts is ‘by the nature of  the case 
deceived, and no ‘fully informed’ decision rests upon deception of  any kind’ (Craig 1993: 501). 
 Craig likewise deems Talbott’s idea of  limiting free choice to rational agents as question-begging. 
And this since Craig considers that a decision arising from either wickedness or plain stubbornness is 
totally unlike a random occurrence (owing to Talbott’ s characterization of  a choice such as (RH) as being 
similar to a quantum leap). The reason he offers for this is that ultimately such a choice takes its rise in 
agent causation. In the end, says Craig, it is hard to see how such a decision cannot be free ‘unless we 
simply define ‘free’ to exclude such irrational acts’ (ibid., p.502). 
 Let us concern ourselves now with Talbott’s other argument against the possibility of  (RH), that is, 
to the idea that even if  possible, God would necessarily not allow any of  His creatures to make such a 
choice (II). His love would preclude such possibility, though it is not love for those who would freely damn 
themselves that would spur God to action, but instead, it would be love for those who are saved. The idea 
being that the supreme happiness of  the saved in heaven would be diminished by the painful knowledge of  
the fate of  their loved ones who happen to be in eternal torment and separation from God (Craig 1991: 
305). His argument here revolves around what he calls the inclusive nature of  love, and how it binds 
people’s interests together so as to be inseparable (Talbott 1990b: 32). So, let us say a few words concerning 
Talbott’s concept of  such love. 
 First of  all, we need to bring here attention to a special feature about love with important 
implications for our purposes: though love makes possible such capacity within us for the relevant sort of  
happiness just mentioned, it can likewise render the attainment of  such happiness as utterly impossible 
(Talbott 1990b: 32; Talbott 2014: 126). And the reason for this lies in the fact that as social, gregarious 
agents that we are, our happiness is intimately connected with the life conditions of  those most close and 
dear to us. An example, inspired by Talbott will be enough to prove this point. If, as most fathers, I love my 
son as much as I love myself, then every possible evil that befalls my son will likewise bring misery and 
pain on myself. It would be preposterous, if  the love in question is of  such kind, to think that I could 
remain unaffected or utterly indifferent, or worse yet even happy, in the knowledge that a person who is so 
important to my own happiness is miserable. And, if  the issue at hand is the supreme misery associated 
with everlasting damnation, all the more so. For if, as Talbott remarks, ‘two persons are bound together in 
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love, their purposes and interests, even the conditions of  their happiness, are so logically intertwined as to 
be inseparable’ (Talbott 1990b: 32; Talbott 2014: 127).   
 So, if  God were not to do his very best (which in God’ case would be omnipotence) for, or worse 
yet, if  He acted contrary to the best interest (P2) or the happiness (P3) of  a person we love dearly, He 
would then also be doing less than His very best, and acting contrary to my own interest and happiness 
(Talbott 1990b: 32; Talbott 2014: 127). Such a thought has also implications for both our love and 
obedience towards God, for if  I disapprove of  what God does, then my will is certainly not in conformity 
with His; and, if  I disapprove of  His actions, then it would also be very difficult for me to speak of  either 
having a sincere love for God, or to worship Him in a wholehearted manner (Talbott 2014: 129). 
 With the intention of  illustrating the force of  these last two points, let us imagine what it would be 
like for God to love us, without at the same time loving those who are dear to us. So, if  God were to 
mislead me concerning the fate of  a loved one, who in reality happens to be spending his time in agony in 
hell, then ‘my blissful ignorance, being based upon a false belief ’, is not the sort of  relevant happiness we 
were discussing lines above (Talbott 1990b: 32; Talbott 2014: 127). And if  God were to bring it about that 
I no longer care nor love this person, then He would again be destroying the possibility of  attaining 
supremely worthwhile happiness in me. Either way, He would be acting in an unloving manner to both my 
loved one and myself  (Talbott 1990b: 32; Talbott 2014: 127-128). 
 A possible objection at this point would stipulate that although it is impossible for God to love and 
make us happy without at the same time loving and making happy those we love, there remains the 
possibility of  God loving us without necessarily loving those whom we don’ t love. In answer to this 
rejoinder Talbott mentions that if  a person S is not the object of  our love, then that could be for one of  
three reasons: (i) either I am unaware of  S’s existence, (ii) or I am aware of  S’s existence but just don’t 
know S very well, or (iii) it may be that ‘my capacity for love is not yet perfected’ (Talbott 1990b: 33; 
Talbott 2014: 128). If  (i) is the case, then my resulting happiness is better described as the blissful 
ignorance that is the outcome of  my false belief  about the post-mortem condition of  S; if  (ii) is the case, 
then I will nevertheless continue to wish the good for S despite not knowing him very well, ‘or my capacity 
for love is not yet perfected’ (Talbott 1990b: 33; Talbott 2014: 128); and if  (iii) is the case, then God 
‘should continue to teach me the lessons of  love until it is perfected’, that is, if  He wants me to experience 
supremely worthwhile happiness (Talbott 2014: 128). 
 So it is simply not possible on Talbott’s account for God to love me and make me supremely happy, 
unless He also makes everyone else happy; even those who are our enemies, as Jesus Himself  commanded 
us to do. 
Based on the preceding arguments Talbott offers us the following principles, 
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(P4) It is necessary that, for any two persons S and S’, if  S wills the good for S’, then God wills the 
good for S also if  God also wills the good for S’.88  
 
And with the intention of  fending off  a possible objection raised by the alleged incompatibility of  (P4) 
with a class of  persons who are neither loved by God nor by any of  God’ s creatures, let us include the 
following, 
 
(P5) It is necessary that, for any two persons S and S’, God wills the good for S only if  God wills 
that S be the kind of  person such that, were S to know of  the existence of  S’, S would will the 
good for S’ as well. 
(P6) It is necessary that, for any two persons, S and S’, if  (a) God wills that S be the kind of  person 
such that, were S to know of  the existence of  S’, S would will the good for S’ and (b) God 
Himself  wills the good for S, then God wills the good for S’ as well. 
 
Craig believes that one can escape such conclusions by stating that, once in heaven, the saved would have 
any memory of  their loved ones erased by God. So that their happiness would remain untinged by the 
painful knowledge of  the fate of  their loved ones. But he also adds that perhaps no such removal of  
knowledge would be needed, for it may be that the mere presence of  God (the Beatific Vision) will drive 
out from the minds of  the saved any conscious awareness of  the fate of  their loved ones who happen to 
be damned (Craig 1991: 306-307). Talbott in fact touches upon Craig’s first rejoinder only to dismiss it as 
an immoral deception on God’s part (Talbott 1990: 237-238). 
 Craig asserts that we can all think of  situations where we conceal or shield others from painful 
information; information that we consider unnecessary for them to have (Craig 1991: 306). But we believe 
some distinctions are appropriate at this point. 
 Since, as Talbott points out, the nature of  the created order is for Craig ultimately tragic, this would 
presumably justify God’s decision to deceive the redeemed concerning the fate of  their loved ones, lest this 
knowledge interferes with their capacity for supreme happiness that we take to be constitutive of  salvation 
(Talbott 1992: 508); and this just as a loving parent would withhold painful and unnecessary information 
from a child (id.). In such a case, this withholding of  information would be warranted on the grounds that 
such young individuals are simply psychologically or emotionally immature to grasp and deal with such 
hurtful facts. However, Talbott concedes as well to the possibility of  concealing information in cases where 
 
88 Talbott 1990b: 33-34. The same applies to propositions P5 and P6. 
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though mentally and emotionally mature, a person might nonetheless be in such a delicate physical 
condition that those in charge of  their physical recuperation (doctors), decide to withhold painful 
information until a later time (id.). 
 So, even if  we were to understand Craig’s argument in this latter fashion, the blissful ignorance that 
results from such deception is a far cry from the supreme worthwhile happiness alluded to in the first part 
of  this chapter (ibid. pp.508-509). As the excruciating reality afflicting a mother whose son or daughter has 
simply vanished reveals, no one who truly loves someone ‘would want to remain blissfully ignorant’ of  
their fate, and this notwithstanding how horrendous that knowledge might prove to be (ibid., p.509). 
 We feel inclined however, to regard Craig’s argument as something more than a mere pious 
concealment of  information, and to see it more in terms of  a kind of  divine lobotomy that expunges or 
obliterates from the mind of  the redeemed any knowledge of  their loved ones who happen to be damned. 
It is difficult not to recoil at the thought of  what such an action might imply, particularly in terms of  
personal identity; for if  we imagine a redeemed individual whose entire (or even a significant part of  his) 
family happens to be condemned, the argument put forth by Craig would signify that any memory of  his 
interactions with them would have to be erased; all the meaningful exchanges of  trust, love or forgiveness 
for instance, that shape to a significant degree who we are, would simply vanish (Talbott 2014). So it is 
warranted to wonder what damaging effects such an action by God would entail, and what kind of  person 
would the redeemed afterwards be. 
 Craig’s other proposal stated that this recourse to divine obliteration of  certain segments of  the 
memories of  the redeemed, might not be necessary since the beatific vision would simply drive off  from 
their minds ‘any awareness of  the lost in hell... [such that they] would still have such knowledge, but they 
would never be conscious of  it and so never pained by it’ (Craig 1991: 307). We find these suggestions 
problematic for various reasons. How can someone be in possession of  certain information and yet remain 
unaware (or unconscious) of  it in a protracted manner?, as the Christian idea of  salvation, coupled with 
Craig’s suggestion would entail; and more importantly, what would the difference then be between having 
knowledge of  a certain order lodged within one’s head and yet never conscious of  it, and the case of  
simply not having such knowledge whatsoever? 
 Ultimately, Talbott dismisses this last proposal by Craig on the same grounds that he dismissed 
what he calls hard-hearted theism―the likelihood of  the beatific vision driving away any knowledge of  the 
damned from the minds of  the redeemed is only possible if  the beatific vision makes ‘the redeemed less 
loving and thus more calloused’ (Talbott 1992: 510). An impossibility on Talbott’s narrative if  we 
remember that one of  the central elements of  his notion of  salvation was the idea that the redeemed are 
filled with love for others. 
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 There is another and probably more damaging critique to be made against Craig’s eschatology 
before we move to Chauncy’s ideas on the matter. While Talbott raised some concerns regarding the idea 
that under Craig’s scheme some individuals would serve as the means by which God secures a higher 
number of  the redeemed in heaven, Talbott viewed it from the standpoint of  the redeemed, and pointed to 
the likely rejection such a procedure would provoke in them. It is therefore natural for us to wonder as well 
what would the opinion of  those persons used by God in order to secure a higher quantity of  people in 
heaven could be. For it would appear that Craig’s molinist defence of  hell is not significantly different from 
that of  a theological determinist; and theological determinism is very difficult to square with the 
conception of  God as omnibenevolent (Knight 2010: 12). A Calvinist for example, holds that God creates 
people of  all sorts and determines as well that some will be saved, while others will be damned. After His 
resolution to create a given world, God knows exactly how things will turn out, and is nevertheless 
unperturbed by the fact that His creative decree guarantees that some persons will spend eternity in misery 
(ibid., p.14). Whereas on Craig’s molinist scheme, God also knows that prior to creation ‘there will be a 
certain ratio between saved and lost’ (ibid., p.15). So that, in the very act of  creating them, God will be 
guaranteeing a life of  eternal misery as well for them. 
 Although in this latter account God does not causally determine the choices that lead sinners into 
damnation, it is difficult not to share Gordon Knight’s opinion to the point that God would then be utterly 
manipulative in His attitude towards creation (id.). For even if  we concede that certain counterfactuals of  
freedom ensure that some sinners will freely reject Christ in whatever circumstances they are placed in, 
such freedom does not exempt God from responsibility in the eternal suffering of  these creatures (id.). 
One does not, says Knight, in general, ‘lose all responsibility for an action just because it involves a person’s 
free choice’ (id.). An example given by Knight will suffice it to prove this point: If  I knowingly give the car 
keys to a friend who happens to be drunk, and if  afterwards such friend is involved in an accident, I too 
share responsibility for the outcome, even though my friend acted freely in asking for his keys to drive 
home (id.). 
 
IV. Chauncy’s Scheme of  Universal Salvation 
We mentioned at the outset of  the present chapter that what was forcing the decision between unsavoury 
options―that is, between Talbott’s universalism and its apparent infringement on free will, and Craig’s 
exclusivism with its attendant erasability of  memories―was the orthodox premise that the opportunity for 
reconciliation (and hence union) with God was limited to our earthly sojourns. In what follows we will set 
aside such assumption and hold, with Chauncy, that God extends post-mortem and ad infinitum such a 
possibility for union with Him, and in this manner guarantees that everyone will be saved. 
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 There are, roughly speaking, three elements grounding Chauncy’s universalist scheme: (1) his 
conception of  the divine nature as essentially loving, which coupled with His omnipotence, and His 
omniscience, guarantees universalism; (2) Molinism, and its attendant conception of  a strong libertarian 
understanding of  free will; and (3) his endorsement of  what is now called the Argument from Infinite 
Opportunity (hereafter AIO). With the intention of  not repeating ourselves, we will not delve long on (1), 
and will instead direct the reader to the companion theological chapter where this issue is developed at 
large (Vid. Ch.6). It will be therefore the main subject of  the remainder of  the present chapter to explicate 
points (2) and (3). 
 So, with regard to (1), Chauncy believes the divine nature is essentially benevolent and loving and 
would not have thus created mankind unless He knew He could achieve the voluntary reconciliation with 
Him of  every single person. To put it simply and in his own words, no one is irreversibly under any doom 
of  God (Chauncy 1785: 104). Moreover, in sending His son, the chief  intention was to destroy or put an 
end to sin; a task that if  not realized in this stage (earth), will be carried into effect post-mortem. So how does 
God manage to achieve this? How does He obtain the free consent of  even the most recalcitrant of  
sinners? The answer to this leads us into (3), to which we now turn. 
 
IV.I Argument from Infinite Opportunity 
The reprobate after death will be sent to successive (if  necessary) stages of  limbo-like locations where, in 
accordance with AIO, God will guarantee three things: (i) He will work to remove all ignorance, deception, 
or bondage to non-rational affective states (hereafter salvation inhibitors); (ii) He will sustain the 
unregenerate in a temporal existence, until the time comes when they voluntarily choose communion with 
Him; and, naturally, (iii) He will leave open the possibility of  choosing for reconciliation with Him at any 
time (Kronen & Reitan 2011: 60). 
 AIO thus advances that, 
1. It is in God’s power to bring about (i) to (iii). 
2. In doing so God would not be doing anything morally unlawful. 
3. If  God brings about (i) to (iii), then everyone will voluntarily choose union with Him. 
4. Thus, God can bring about that everyone freely chooses union with Him in a way that is morally 
permissible.89 
We could think of  Chauncy’s ideas here as somehow akin to Kevin Timpe’s Limbo, where individuals are 
given the opportunity, post-mortem, to heal and grow in the manner required for union with God (Timpe 
2015: 277). For as Chauncy elsewhere describes it, we need to be made morally fit for salvation, and the 
 
89 Kronen & Reitan 2011: 160 
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only avenue for achieving such end is to improve in virtue, which he calls the only rational preparative for 
happiness (1784: 12). Moreover, this process by which we are made righteous in God’s eyes, let us 
remember, supposes the use of  means suitable to be employed with rational moral agents, which in 
Chauncy’s thought translates into the idea of  God not tampering with our capacity to freely choose 
anything. Our subjection to God must therefore be voluntary for it to have any worth. 
 Points (ii) and (iii) of  AIO specify the manner in which God could secure universalism even 
granted a libertarian understanding of  free will. If, as previously mentioned, (i) is met, then a free agent will 
most likely choose for union with God; but, let us assume, for our purposes here at least, that even if  free 
from all salvation inhibitors, the agent has an even chance (50/50) of  choosing union with God over 
alienation. Furthermore, if  (ii) and (iii) are met, then this decision will not be taken only once, but will be 
‘confronted every moment of  an existence of  potentially infinite duration’ (Kronen & Reitan 2011: 161). That 
is, at every moment of  such open-ended existence there is an even chance of  the agent choosing for 
reconciliation rather than continued estrangement from God. Under circumstances such as these, the 
agent’s decision to be reconciled to God becomes a mathematical certainty, as we will now explicate. 
 With the aim of  elaborating on the mathematical certitude of  salvation under AIO, we will make 
use of  the language of  possible words in the following manner, 
Let us call a complete possible state of  affairs at any particular moment a ‘possible moment’. A 
‘possible world’ is a totality of  temporally successive possible moments. A ‘possible world segment’ is 
a totality of  temporally successive possible moments up to a particular time. A ‘possible world tree’ is 
a collection of  possible worlds sharing the same possible world segment up to time T (the ‘trunk’ of  
the tree), after which they diverge. An ‘indeterminacy’ in a possible world segment is some random 
factor operative at T such that after T there is more than one possible world sharing the same world 
segment up to T. At any moment, there are a finite number of  possible world segments in a possible 
world tree. However, as the timeline moves towards infinity, so long as there are indeterminacies 
remaining within any possible world segment, the number of  possible world segments within a tree 
expands without bounds (Kronen & Reitan 2011: 161). 
Let us imagine then a possible world segment P1, where an agent is faced at T1 (a moment of  decision) 
with the choice (and hence an indeterminacy) of  choosing for communion or for alienation from God. We 
mentioned previously that for the sake of  argument we would be assuming that the odds of  the agent 
choosing for reconciliation with God were even (for simplicity’s sake we are also assuming that the only 
source of  indeterminacy up to this point is the agent’s decision for union or estrangement from God) (id.). 
Afterwards, at T2, we encounter two possible world segments belonging to ‘the possible world tree that has 
P as its ‘trunk’. In one of  these possible worlds segments (P2saved)’, the agent chooses for union with 
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God, while in the other (P2unsaved) the agent continues to refuse reconciliation with Him (id.). So, at T2, 
‘P2saved lacks any indeterminacy’ and this since according to Christian dogma, once saved it is impossible 
for an agent to fall back into sin (id.). This in turn leads to the possible world extending from P2saved into 
the future, as one in which the agent is thus confirmed in salvation at every subsequent moment. At 
P2unsaved though, the agent is faced at T2 with the same choice he encountered at T1, so that, afterwards 
at T3, ‘we have three possible world segments: P2saved-ext (the extension of  P2saved up to T3), P3saved 
and P3unsaved. This process continues indefinitely’ (ibid. p.162). As time advances however, the quantity 
of  possible worlds in which the agent remains unsaved becomes increasingly smaller; that is, ‘the 
percentage of  the possible world segments in the possible world tree branching from P1becomes 
progressively smaller’ (id.). 
 Additionally, on this account, while God would certainly be precluded from simply implanting in 
the unregenerate the appropriate desire for union with Him in a way that would simply bypass the agent’s 
intellect and will, we could assume that God could work on the unregenerate by simply letting them 
experience what they have in fact chosen, viz., alienation from Him (ibid., p.170). And, it should be 
remembered, within a Christian context, the ultimate source of  everything valuable and good is God. 
 Two images are encountered in Scripture to describe this estrangement from divinity: the lake of  
fire, and the outer darkness. By the hardships associated with the lake of  fire image, we include those 
grouped under both the physical torments category (poena sensu), and those resulting from separation from 
God (poena damni). But also, for those obdurate sinners who wilfully continue to reject Him post-mortem, 
God might well allow them to experience the full consequences of  alienation from Him in a way associated 
with the outer darkness image; that is, that of  ‘separation from every implicit experience of  God, including 
even an experience of  the material universe’ (Talbott 2014: 188). But also, as Chauncy elsewhere mentions, 
for those most vicious sinners, the physical torments of  a finite hell. 
 Such a leap into ‘sheer nothingness’ might prove to be the clincher for the recalcitrant sinner, for as 
Talbott argues, those who would initially attempt to cling to their illusions –such as Milton’s Satan who 
expresses his desire to reign in Hell rather than serve in heaven, would encounter no one to reign over, nor 
even a physical environment in which to do so (ibid., p.174). All of  which further contributes to the idea 
that under AIO, and given a long enough stretch of  time, even the most recalcitrant of  sinners will be 
brought to voluntary union with God. 
  The whole argument comes down to affirming that the possibility of  eternally rejecting God seems 
so unlikely, so low in its probability, that we need not worry about it being a real possibility. It would be the 
same as imagining that, although logically possible, the odds of  a coin landing heaps up every single time in 
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a million tosses is so unlikely, so far-fetched, that it practically entails an impossibility (Kronen & Reitan 
2011: 162). 
 
IV.II. Molinism and Free Will 
The understanding of  free will most consistently favoured by Chauncy, and in accord with other aspects of  
his thought, is a libertarian one. As for Molinism, our writer makes use of  it in various occasions, but 
particularly in his case against those who, like William Craig or Eleonore Stump, support what are now 
called Liberal Doctrines of  Hell (LDH); doctrines grounded on God’s alleged inability or unwillingness 
(for moral reasons) to tamper with a creature’s free decision to not be united with Him. 
 The rationale for LDH is based on the following argument, called the Argument from Freedom 
(AF), which runs as follows: 
 
1. God can guarantee the salvation of  all only by bringing about the salvation of  the unregenerate 
through some means that overrides their freedom. 
2. Either such a means is not available to God (it is not possible for God to save the unregenerate by 
overriding their freedom), or, if  it is available, it is morally impermissible for God to make use of  it. 
3. God will not do what is morally impermissible. 
4. Therefore, God either cannot or will not guarantee the salvation of  all (1, 2, 3).90 
 
It will be therefore one of  the main issues to go about when rediscussing AIO later on, to see if  it can be 
construed in a way that avoids conflict with AF(1), and if  it can’t be done, and it is indeed a clear instance 
of  overriding creaturely freedom, if  it is a case of  justified autonomy violation. 
 With the intention of  elaborating on AIO, let us now move to AIO’s premise (i), that is, the 
premise that in the afterlife God will work to remove or overcome all salvation inhibitors, and do so in a 
manner consistent with our character as free moral agents. 
 Let us recall from previous pages the issue of  whether a fully informed decision to reject union 
with God is indeed coherent or not. While Talbott considers that if  the agent is free from all salvation 
inhibitors, the decision to reject God is utterly inexplicable or incoherent, Craig appealed to stubbornness 
or the wilful rejection of  the agent to submit to God; for if, paraphrasing Craig here, divine love requires 
submission, it might be spurned by those unwilling to bend their knee to God (Craig 1991: 302; Craig 
1993: 516).            
 John Kronen and Eric Reitan argue that those who appeal to reasons such as the one just advanced 
 
90 Kronen & Reitan 2011: 127 
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(wilful or prideful rejection) are mistaken, since one of  the implications of  the judgement that union with 
God is preferable to estrangement from Him ‘is the judgement that satisfying one’s pride is infinitely 
inferior in value to achieving communion with God’ (2011: 155). And since we are assuming the person in 
question is free from all salvation inhibitors, we can claim such individual is not determined to act in a 
prideful manner. So, if  no deception, ignorance or bondage to other non-rational affective states explains 
the decision to reject God out of  pride, then the reason for such a decision remains inexplicable, since no 
reason could account for it (id.). And the same would be true, according to these authors, for any other 
alleged explanation to choose rejection over communion with God, and contrary to one’s best and 
informed judgements on the matter (id.). 
 The result is that we are led to conclude that humans can make choices for no reason whatsoever, 
and in fact contrary to clear reasons for not doing so. So described, this libertarian concept of  freedom 
commits us to the belief  that human choices are at least sometimes arbitrary or random in character (id.). A 
fact which renders human choices as subject to the same mathematical laws governing random 
occurrences, and which in turn helps to clarify how AIO functions. This moreover is problematic for those 
endorsing libertarianism, since it would appear to entail that those who are damned, are so (at least in some 
cases) because of  bad luck, and defenders of  libertarian free will want to make agents ultimately 
responsible for their choices and their outcomes (ibid., p.168). 
 If, when presented with equally appealing alternatives, or owing to ignorance of  which option to 
decide upon, I let chance decide, this can be defended as a rational alternative to paralysis (that is, if  I am 
to choose). But to let chance ‘decide between the very best conceivable thing [union with God], and the 
very worst [estrangement from God], is to leave to chance the very last thing any remotely rational being 
would leave to chance if  they could help it’ (ibid., p.156). Thus, if  chance does play a part in such a 
momentous decision, then it must be because it cannot be avoided; ‘there simply is a random element 
operating in human choice―one that, in a crucial sense, falls outside the person’s control’ (id.). 
 Chauncy at times seems to second this view, and sides with Talbott (and further back with Aquinas) 
in believing that a fully informed (free from all salvation inhibitors) decision to reject God is deeply 
incoherent. So now we must ask, under what conception of  free will, will God’s decision to work on our 
salvation inhibitors does not undermine our liberty as free moral agents? We will develop a brief  sketch of  
just such an account of  free will favoured by Thomas Talbott, and which in some ways resembles 
Chauncy’s ideas on the matter: Thomistic or Rational Freedom. 
 As mentioned already, Talbott, like Aquinas, believes that a decision in favour of  something against 
which one has every conceivable reason not to do, is deeply incoherent. If  all motives converge on one 
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choice, then such a choice becomes inevitable; though free, but only if, let us remember, all ignorance, 
deception, or bondage to non-rational affective states are done away with (ibid. pp.134-135). 
Ultimately, it might be the case, as John Kronen and Eric Reitan point out, that for a Thomistic or rational 
kind of  freedom, what we ‘call libertarian freedom is a coherent understanding of  freedom only when the 
creature confronts conflicting motives for action’ (ibid. p.132). In situations of  uniformity of  motives this 
libertarian understanding does not apply. For Talbott (like Aquinas) believes that despite the will being 
determined, the action remains wholly voluntary91 (Cfr. Aquinas’s necessity of  the end as an instance where the 
will is determined, but nonetheless the decision or action remains wholly voluntary [Stump, 2003: 299]). 
Clearly then, both Talbott and Aquinas deny that what is called the Principle of  Alternate Possibilities 
(PAP) is an indispensable element of  any free choice. 
 This rational or Thomistic freedom would then conform more closely, if  we are to assign some 
contemporary label to Aquinas’ views here, to what is now called compatibilist freedom (Kronen & Reitan 
2011: 132). Although Eleonore Stump came up with a new species of  libertarianism, which she labelled 
modified libertarianism, that comes very close to the position here described (Stump 2006: 125) 
 We are in position now to see how under a Thomistic conception of  free will, God could work on 
our salvation inhibitors so as to produce uniformity of  motives for choosing union with Him, and do so in 
a manner that would apparently not undermine our liberty as rational agents. But since for the likes of  
Craig or Walls and other free will theists, this might still not prove convincing, and this since they advocate 
a notion of  free will more robust, viz. libertarian, it is necessary that we return to AIO as the means by 
which Chauncy believes that God could guarantee universal salvation even assuming a libertarian 
understanding of  free will. 
 
V. Objections to AIO 
A first objection to AIO, to AIO(3) to be precise, would stipulate that our decision to reject God at some 
moment (call it T1) will influence the way we decide on the matter at a later time (T2). This so called 
‘hardening of  heart’ or ‘habit-forming’ critique to AIO is based on the empirical argument that, at least for 
some individuals, their present choices have the power or the outcome of  limiting the range of  possible 
choices that could be adopted in the future (Kronen & Reitan 2011: 163). The argument, endorsed in an 
albeit modified form by Swinburne, would have us imagine an individual S who chooses at T1 to reject 
communion with God; on such a narrative, the likelihood of  S continuing to reject God at T2 is 
 
91 ‘Just as the intellect is ordered towards the truth, that is, it cannot but believe a self-evident truth if  
presented with it, the will is ordered towards the good, and if  presented with the perfect good (viz. 
God) then the will simply cannot fail to love it in return’ (ST pt. 1, q.82, a.2). 
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strengthened by his previous negative decision (at T1) (Swinburne 1983: 48-49). Likewise at a later time 
(T3), the odds of  S continuing in his rejection of  God are even greater than at T2, and predicated by his 
previous negative decisions on the matter (at both T1 and T2); and this progressively as the timeline moves 
into the future.            
 So that, contrary to AIO’s contention that as the timeline progresses into the future, the probability 
of  the agent freely choosing estrangement from God is increasingly lower, this objection advances the idea 
that owing to certain facts rooted in our psychology, our choices tend to ‘produce habits which dispose us 
to make similar future choices’ (Kronen & Reitan 2011: 163). 
 Theistic defenders of  this position argue that such psychological feature might well be the outcome 
of  God’s decision, so as to enable ‘us to choose to become a certain kind of  person’; that is, that we are 
thus enabled to choose our own character (id.). Accordingly, were God to tamper with this character-
forming dimension of  ours, He would wrong us by meddling with our autonomy ‘to choose the kind of  
person we become’ (id.). 
 Before addressing the manner in which Chauncy would likely respond to such an objection, let us 
first remember that, since we are once again operating under the assumption of  libertarian freedom, then, 
once again we are lead to conclude that for at least some of  such obdurate rejectors, the reason for their 
decision actually lies in some random element outside their will or control; and hence, that for at least some 
of  them, their damnation is the consequence of  mere bad luck (ibid., p.164). Given such a view, we side 
with John Kronen and Eric Reitan in their disbelief  that God would feel obligated to respect such 
freedom, ‘even to the point of  letting persons be damned’ because of  it (id.). 
 However, if  for the sake of  our discussion, we take seriously the possibility of  Craig’s contention 
of  some creatures suffering from what he calls transworld damnation, or the latter hardening of  heart critique 
to AIO, Chauncy’s molinism would simply cast out such possibilities; for it is one clear conviction of  the 
Bostonian that all of  the persons ever brought into existence belong to the subset of  those possible beings 
that God knew―through His Middle Knowledge―will eventually be reconciled to Him owing to the means 
His wisdom saw fit to use either here on earth or in these post-mortem eschatological settings. 
 Other objectors however, instead of  challenging the guarantee of  universal salvation advanced by 
AIO(3), would question the moral permissibility of  ‘forcing’ on an agent an endless sequence of  
opportunities to be for or against communion with God; that is, they would challenge the lawfulness of  
premise AIO(2) (ibid., pp.170-171). Those who, like Michael Murray, would criticize AIO in this manner, 
argue in particular against the moral permissibility of  points (ii) and (iii) of  AIO; namely, to the ideas of  
both sustaining the unregenerate in a temporal existence until they choose for union with God, and to God 
leaving this option for union with Him as an open possibility at any time (ibid., p.171). For Murray, even if  
173 
successful, such a method for carrying universalism into effect would constitute a violation of  creaturely 
autonomy, and a God who is by definition morally perfect would not, the argument goes, proceed in such a 
manner, despite the desirability of  its outcome (id.).       
 At this point it seems important to say a few words regarding Murray’s conception of  autonomy―it 
would involve, says Murray, free decisions ‘expressed in actions that influence the course of  events in the 
world’ (Murray 1999: 58), Accordingly, autonomous free creatures are entitled not only to incur in evil 
choices if  that may be the case, but to the ensuing acts and consequences from these (id.). The central 
claim in Murray’s critique would be that, despite being free to choose alienation from God at any given time, 
this decision is not being respected in the sense of  allowing those who make it, to have what they in fact 
have chosen, viz., the consequences of  alienation from God; and are instead forced anew―and eternally it 
appears for those who continue endlessly to spurn such an offer―to decide upon the issue at a later time 
(Kronen and Reitan 2011: 172). 
 In making his case, Murray makes use of  an analogy where individuals in a drive-through restaurant 
have to decide upon either rotten burgers (alienation from God), and normal healthy ones (communion 
with God). Though we could imagine that experience would teach those opting for the rotten burgers that 
this decision was in fact contrary to their own interests, ‘Murray asks us to imagine someone who has 
cultivated a taste for rotten burgers through repeatedly choosing them, [that is] out of  a fixed state of  
character’ (ibid, p.172). 
 The response offered by John Kronen and Eric Reitan is based on the following distinction, a 
distinction they believe Murray failed to grasp―this dichotomy between healthy and rotten burgers could 
be understood to represent the choice ‘at any time T, between communion with God and alienation from 
God [or], it might represent the choice between eternal communion with God and eternal alienation from 
Him’ (id.). If, as we suspect, Murray understands his analogy as one representing the latter option, then 
AIO might indeed involve autonomy violation of  the creature’s choices. And this since if, at T1, the sinner 
chooses for eternal alienation from God, God would seem to reject this decision, and would thence send 
the sinner ‘back in line’ only to be forced to decide upon the matter at a later time. And again, if  at T2 the 
sinner continues to choose for eternal estrangement over eternal communion with God, the exact same 
result would ensue (id.). A process that would continue until the agent would choose at some time (Tn) for 
communion with God. So that, despite that in this last moment (Tn) the decision for communion with 
God is to all appearances voluntary, this is only because the alternative ‘has been consistently denied [to] 
them each time they tried to choose it in the past’ (id.). 
 In fact, this way of  framing the decision constitutes an ‘autonomy minimizing strategy’ for the 
following reason (ibid., p.173). If  I am to choose at T1 for union with God at all times or estrangement 
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from Him at all times, and if  my decision is accepted at this moment, then ‘I am deprived of  all future 
choice on the matter’ (id.); that is, I would be precluded from ever changing my mind on this issue. It 
would be only by having my choice rejected at this moment (T1), that I would have a choice at T2. So that, 
even if  per impossible, we could think of  an agent making a fully informed decision to reject God at any 
given time, in giving them what they have chosen, God would be effectively cancelling their capacity for 
future choice in this issue, and with it, their freedom and autonomy (id.). 
 However, if  we understand AIO as a choice between communion or alienation from God at any 
time T, then one could claim that at any time T ‘people always get what they choose with respect to their 
relationship with God’ (id.). The main issue here for us to grasp is that, instead of  conceiving AIO as one 
in which we are forced to decide until the time comes when we choose for union with God, God simply offers 
communion with Himself  as what Kronen and Reitan call a standing offer. So, what forces the decision is 
the fact that God never withdraws His offer, but we would be nonetheless free to reject it at any given 
time. However, given the nature of  AIO and the mathematics of  random events, to claim that we can 
reject it indefinitely is a whole different matter. 
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Conclusions 
 
It will not be our intention to tire our reader with a comprehensive review of  the contents of  this work. 
Instead we will cover a series of  central elements in our author’s theology and show them in the 
interconnectedness they share with other key elements of  his thought. We will also present these central 
ideas in the relation that they have with historical positions on these issues. After such an endeavour we will 
single out what we believe are the main contributions of  our theologian to current theological and 
philosophical discussion, and finally we will end this work by pointing out some possible areas for future 
research. 
 As this work has demonstrated, one conspicuous element in Chauncy’s theology is the importance 
of  rational agency, or, to use a more contemporary expression, of  practical reason. Practical reason is in his 
overall scheme the only foundation of  moral obligation, and in this respect, as in others, one can discern 
an Augustinian influence in our author’s conception of  moral evil. Just as for Augustine we sin when we 
misuse our freedom, that is, when we turn away from the (natural) role we were assigned in the divine 
arrangement or design, for Chauncy we sin when we neglect our faculties, and do not act up to our 
character of  rational moral creatures. This privative understanding of  evil (again baptized by Augustine 
from Neo-Platonism) is clear to see as well in Chauncy’s reliance on what some later Augustinians called 
the problem of  metaphysical evil, or the dreaded prospect of  finitude for (finite) creatures (Hick, 2010: 38). 
Chauncy’s DOS is largely based on it, for, let us remember, Adam’s primaeval lapse became the source for 
our own sinning in an indirect manner―by inheriting a mortal body that was the outcome of  a divine 
judicial sentence, we are pressed to seek and avoid those things that are either beneficial or detrimental to 
our lives respectively. Chauncy naturally does not draw the mistaken conclusion though, from such 
metaphysical analysis, that evils are empirically mere absences or a malfunctioning of  something good. For 
although he usually portrays them as means to our moral betterment (and in some instances as well as a 
sort of  divine reprimand), he never seems to attempt to diminish any of  their ghastly reality as an 
experience in the lives of  those going through them. As archbishop William King (and also as Catholic 
theology in general) expressed, finitude is an unavoidable element if  there is to be a creaturely realm at all; 
otherwise the lines between creator and creature become blurred. This is a view shared by Chauncy as can 
be also seen in his insistence that perfection, as an attribute, is incommunicable to creatures. 
 This privative understanding of  evil as privatio boni―in the sense of  existing only as the 
malfunctioning or absence of  something good―, helps to shed light on Chauncy’s soteriology, particularly 
for his belief  in the self-defeating nature of  evil, and in the instructive or formative role it can have for 
wrongdoers (Vid. ‘the divine pedagogy’ in the pages of  this work). Accordingly, evil is both absurd and 
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detrimental to the person it belongs to or harbours it, ‘for to the extent that it succeeds, it can only destroy 
that upon which it lives’ (ibid., p.48). We saw that for Chauncy (as it was for Irenaeus of  Lyon, Talbott, 
Hick, and many more), God brought about a world―and also post-mortem locations or stages―that are 
suited to make us learn, and through hard experience no doubt, this all-important lesson. Our redemption 
then requires our free engagement with a social (and hence moral) environment in which we are called to 
learn, above everything else, the basis of  those two last dictums our Lord bequeathed to his disciples―that 
love of  God and neighbour is the indispensable component of  our salvation. 
 It is clear that Chauncy is here as well providing a theodicy in the sense of  relating the hardships we 
endure and what we referred to as a developmental approach to redemption. In fact, most of  the topics 
covered in this work could be seen as falling under the rubric of  theodicy―the Fall, our redemption, and 
eschatological locations. But one concern here, as with like-minded theologies concerning the purpose of  
evil, is that it runs the risk of  losing sight of  just how inimical evil really is for God’s creation. As a true 
Christian, our author never ventures into any sort of  dualistic explanation for this intractable topic, but in 
his attempt to bring the hardships and sorrows we endure under the all-encompassing divine sovereignty, 
he could also be seen, as John Hick once put it, as domesticating evil within the divine household, and 
therefore of  losing sight of  its true nefarious nature. This however might just be an unavoidable 
consequence of  a truly monotheistic (monistic) theology in which God is seen as inherently good, and 
where creation is described as coming into existence ex-nihilo. 
 There are yet a couple of  other features of  Chauncy’s theology that could be regarded as belonging 
to the Augustinian tradition in theodicy―the principle of  plenitude, and the aesthetic theme. The principle 
of  plenitude is Augustine’s response to the presence in nature of  lower forms of  life. To the question of  
why God decided to create a living realm so variegated; and since infinite or immense variation of  species 
entails differences in strength, power, intelligence, and so on, another question arises as to why God 
decided for a world that contains such lower forms of  existence. Why didn’t He limit Himself  to the 
creation of  angelic beings? for instance (ibid., pp.70-71). As stated in the pages of  this work, Chauncy, 
sharing Augustine’s general outlook on this topic, believes that a creation containing all possible kinds of  
existence is a better testimony to the inexhaustible goodness and riches of  the creator. 
 And by aesthetic optimism, the idea that notwithstanding what might appear to us as evil, ‘from the 
ultimate standpoint of  the creator, the universe is wholly good’ (Billicsich 1952; cited in Hick 2010). 
Chauncy devotes some attention to this subject when he censures us for ill-judging of  divine benevolence 
from individual appearances of  evil, that is, from evil as it pertains or affects the existences of  individual 
creatures. We should instead, he argues, judge of  divine benevolence as it concerns not individual members 
of  species, but from the overall benevolent tendency that he sees displayed by the deity to species as a 
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whole, and even more comprehensively, to the entire structure of  species we refer to as the creaturely 
realm. Under this picture God makes ‘what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, 
except in relation to the whole...’ (Connellan 1947; cited in Hick 2010). 
 But Augustinianism (albeit in its eighteenth century form) is not the only current at work in our 
author’s revision of  New England Puritan theology; there is another important aspect of  his thought that 
connects to an ancient and ‘Greek’ tradition that has in writers like Irenaeus of  Lyon, Clement of  
Alexandria, and Origen, its most eminent representatives. And of  special relevance here were Chauncy’s 
similarities with Irenaeus’ views about the condition of  the first couple, in the way of  considering them as 
morally infants, and its repercussions in Chauncy’s take on the covenant the first couple were bound by 
with their maker. With the noteworthy element that Chauncy avails himself  of  Lockean epistemology to 
explicate this intellectual and moral state of  infancy in which the first couple found themselves in. 
According to this picture, let us remember, the first couple were images of  God in the sense of  being free, 
rational creatures, but they were still required to grow in the likeness of  God in the sense of  progressively 
acquiring those character traits that had in the Jesus of  history their most perfect expression. 
 Equally important in this respect and similar to the ideas of  Clement and Origen, Chauncy’s take 
on the Incarnation makes room for the belief  that the ‘Logos had created prophetic mediators in the past’ 
(Gibbs & Gibbs 1992: 227), and that therefore we are concerned here with a historical and progressive 
unfolding of  divine knowledge; a knowledge that, again, as Clement and Origen did, Chauncy believes to 
have reached its completion in the historical Jesus (Vid. Ch.4). Chauncy however ‘never fully equated the 
divine Logos with the Jesus of  history’ (ibid., p.223). On his opinion according to Norman Gibbs, even 
during the Incarnation the Logos never relinquished His ‘cosmological and universal functions’ (id.). This 
Logos moreover is the source of  both general and special revelation; and of  a universal revelation in 
history that is revealed in ‘science, philosophy, and the great religions of  mankind’, and in the advancement 
of  knowledge more generally (id.). 
 This last issue in turn leads into a topic not covered in this dissertation, but that became a source 
of  misunderstandings regarding Chauncy’s ideas on the Incarnation: the mistaken conceptions, particularly 
among the generation that succeeded him (e.g., Ezra Stiles, Nathaniel Langdon Frothingham, etc.) that 
portrayed him as an Arian (ibid., p.266). A revision of  some of  his writings (particularly his major work on 
Universalism: The Mystery Hid from...) makes it clear that both creation and redemption are the ‘exclusive 
work of  God’ (ibid., p.224). The Son, in Chauncy’s work, is usually set ‘alongside the Father’, where His 
role is that of  both mediator and executor of  the Father’s will in both its creative and redemptive aspects 
or dimensions (id.). And so as to dispel any possible charges of  Arianism, he criticizes in this same work 
the commentary on Col. 1:19 advanced by the Arian James Pierce by reminding his readers that although 
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the Father ‘is above all, in all... and worketh all in all; yet he does nothing by himself  immediately, but all 
through the intervening agency of  his Son Jesus Christ’ (Chauncy 1784: 125). 
 We have also seen that the epithet of  Arminian could rightfully be ascribed to our theologian, and 
in fact, most historians of  the period acquainted with Chauncy tend to share this appraisal; but since 
Pelagianism occupies ‘the same theological space as Arminianism’, it is only natural for us to wonder if  our 
theologian was not in fact a Pelagian. As with other aspects of  his thought, our author appears to be 
equivocal on this matter. At a minimum, and as the preceding work has indicated, we can certainly assert 
that he assigned an important role for divine grace in the process of  redemption.  
It could be as well, as Ava Chamberlain remarked, that since ‘the relationship between nature and 
grace that constitutes Puritan orthodoxy is dialectical […] God operate[s] through secondary causes in 
order to preserve a role for the creature in its own salvation…’ (p.344). And as we have seen in the course 
of  this dissertation, those secondary causes could be accurately described as an earthly moral environment, 
and afterwards limbo-like locations―and therein through the infliction of  finite physical torments, 
torments that moreover bear a proportion or correspond to the different degrees of  our moral corruption 
exhibited here on earth― where we are supposed to develop morally into the beings that divinity intended 
us to be. Therefore, the sorrows experienced here on earth, as well as in the next state(s), have a 
reformative and never a vindictive character to them.  
Another equivocal aspect of  his thought concerns the nature of  the limbo or purgatorial stage(s) 
he advocates, for at times he seems to portray it as a sort of  finite hell, characterized by physical torments 
(usually in connection with the worst type of  sinners), and in other passages of  his work he abstains from 
such description, and he would appear to convey the thought of  them being essentially a series of  
successive existences (the exact nature of  which he never specifies) deprived of  this tormenting nature or 
character. 
We had as well pointed during this work to a theological kinship between our author and some of  
the positions associated with the nineteenth-century German theologian F. D. E. Schleiermacher; it is time 
to be more specific on how this is so. A clear instance of  this is to be found in Chauncy’s ideas concerning 
original sin (and sin in general) (Vid. chapter 2), and his rejection that it could somehow be assigned or 
imputed to us through divine fiat ―no one can be made a sinner, let us remember, ‘without their own 
wicked choice’ (Chauncy 1785: 274); without the intervention or concurrence of  our own moral agency 
that is. Schleiermacher for his part had come to reject the traditional narrative of  the Fall, describing it as a 
magical view of  sin (and salvation), and according to which sin and redemption could be considered as 
‘actual metaphysical entities’ (Gordon 2017: 284). Entities that could be ‘magically moved around from 
person to person as if  they existed in abstraction from their actual forms in a lived life’ (id.). Sin and 
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redemption are thus, for both Chauncy and Schleiermacher, to be considered as unavoidably linked to the 
actual moral deportment of  the beings to which they are related to. Some years prior to Schleiermacher 
then, Chauncy was already advancing or reconnecting to a more liberal or rational manner of  theological 
reflection as we hope the pages of  this work have showed. 
However, the old and the new, the orthodox and the ‘liberal’ are a recurrent feature of  our author’s 
theology. This is evident in both his take on original sin, where despite renouncing the notion of  inherited 
guilt, he stops short of  denying the doctrine by regarding it as something that is rightfully attributed to us, 
as something that speaks about who we are and how we would have acted in like circumstances; but at the 
same time something we could never be accountable for. In his theodicy as well one can see that his 
country lies in the tradition that conceives of  this world as an adequate environment―with its apparent 
arbitrary mix of  happiness and misery―for our moral development into the creatures that divinity intended 
us to be. This however does not keep our theologian from sometimes making use of  a different historical 
strand of  theodicy; one that relies on a detached, aesthetic and impersonal outlook on creation as a whole. 
But as mentioned before, it is clear that the general thrust of  his writings, specially taking into 
consideration the centrality for his whole theology of  the concept of  divine benevolence (and his ideas on 
divine impassibility as well), place him in the former, developmental approach we documented in our work. 
A theodicy where the divine nature, in creating beings bearing His image (as indeterministically free 
rational agents) seeks not only goodwill between men but seeks as well to bring them into fellowship with 
Himself. 
 At the end of  this work we are afraid we have to agree to a certain extent with a phrase about our 
theologian uttered more than a century ago by the church historian Williston Walker―that Reverend 
Chauncy is indeed, a ‘hard man to classify’ (Walker 1901: 297-298; cited in Gibbs & Gibbs 1992). We have 
tried in this work to flesh out what we believe to be the main currents of  our author’s theological thought, 
and it is our belief  that although there are many traces of  Calvinistic-sounding utterances throughout his 
publications, these scattered references stand in contradiction to the rational, and ethical thrust of  his 
entire theology. Norman Gibbs called Chauncy a true agape theologian, and we have much sympathy for 
such an appraisal for we believe it to capture one of  the salient features of  his thought as we have 
attempted to make clear in the present work. 
 He was furthermore the intellectual leader of  a religious group (Old Lights) that ‘tended to move in 
the direction of  rationalism in theology’, and that expressed the views of  educated clergy at Harvard 
College in the second half  of  the eighteenth century (Hudson 1960: 379, 382). In many respects he is the 
perfect representative not only of  his camp, but of  a period in theological reflection that began to move 
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away from the dour Calvinism of  the colonies, and that in a relatively short period of  time would see his 
beloved First Church of  Boston make the transition from Congregationalism into Unitarianism. 
 Despite his historical relevance and his considerable theological production (there is sufficient 
evidence that he had finished most of  his new ‘body of  divinity’ many years before their publication in the 
middle 1780s, but that he stalled their publication for various reasons), there are few and scattered 
secondary sources of  our subject’s theology; so that, as Norman Gibbs rightfully observed, if  one desires 
to approach the theological ideas of  our preacher, one has to read and reread him in order to try to 
understand him (1992: 218). A task further complicated by the fact that his theological works are only 
available in a few libraries, and usually in rare formats (id.).  
Now as for areas of  future research on our author, his major work on theodicy (The Benevolence of  
the Deity…) presents an obvious opportunity in this respect. Although we have made frequent references to 
this work in the pages of  this dissertation, owing to the soteriological nature of  this thesis the ideas found 
in his major work on theodicy have served a rather complementary or supportive function. There are 
sufficient indications that, as both Norman Gibbs and Edward Griffin have suggested, once Chauncy had 
committed himself  to benevolence as the chief  defining feature of  the divine essence, he was forced to 
revise the rest of  the central features of  his theology. We thus believe that a detailed exposition of  this 
work, and of  the philosophical implications and concerns it might give rise to, is a worthy future 
undertaking. 
Another area of  possible future research is suggested by Chauncy’s developmental take on morality, 
and particularly of  some passages in his work that seem to anticipate, as E. Griffin remarked, later 
orthogenistic theories of  evolution, or what some call a philosophy of  creative evolution. For instance, 
when describing man as ‘one of  the lowest intellectual moral beings’, he adds that man is nevertheless 
‘designed for exalted perfection and happiness… [That he] is now in an infant state, compared with what 
this may be introductory to’ (Chauncy 1784b: 203). This however is something not circumscribed or 
limited to human beings; he believes that animals (the ‘higher’ ones anyway) as the ‘percipients of  
happiness, in the lowest and most imperfect degrees, may be designed for a much higher state of  existence’ 
(id.). And although these animals may ‘be supposed to be gradually rising in perfection and happiness, in 
proportion to their greater original capacities’, the distance between us and them ‘will still be preserved 
among the various orders of  creatures, and go on to be so, forever’ (id.). 
And as hinted in this last segment of  our work, there is still plenty of  fertile soil for future research 
as regards our author’s Christology (and its relation to the anti-trinitarian developments in his own 
congregation shortly after his death), and the Incarnation more generally. Moreover, the sheer amount of  
his publications (Griffin lists, in what is the most comprehensive account so far, over 61 recognized works 
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by Chauncy), and his many interests (in nature, science, politics, and so on), as well as the scarcity of  
reliable secondary sources on his thought, leave open a wide field of  future work on our subject. It has 
been the intention of  this work to attempt to fill this analytical void as concerns the theological ideas of  a 
historical character that was of  some relevance for his time. 
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Annex. 
Positions on the Original Sin92 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Was I in 
control of the 
original sin? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Is the original 
sin 
attributable 
to me? 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Am I 
accountable 
for the 
original sin? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Position(s) I was Adam and in 
virtue of which I 
sinned 
(Edwards/Rea); 
human nature, in 
which I 
participated, 
sinned 
(Anselm/Aquinas); 
I timelessly sinned 
(Kant) 
Variation on 
position 1 on 
which Adam was 
immature 
 Variation on 
position 1 on 
which Adam was 
immature 
Federalist alien-
guilt position 
 
Attributionist 
position (Adams) 
 
Counterfactual 
concurrence with 
Adam (Keith 
Wyma) 
 
 
Scanlon/Smith-style 
position: 
Charles Chauncy 
 Denial of the 
doctrine 
 
92 Adapted from a handout by David Efird for his module, ‘Philosophy of Christianity’. 
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Costs Requires heavy-
duty metaphysics: 
perdurantism for 
Edwards/Rea, a 
theory on which 
natures are agents 
for 
Anselm/Aquinas, 
and Kantian 
metaphysics for 
Kant 
Requires heavy-
duty metaphysics: 
perdurantism for 
Edwards/Rea, a 
theory on which 
natures are agents 
for 
Anselm/Aquinas, 
and Kantian 
metaphysics for 
Kant 
Requires 
implausible 
theory of the 
relation between 
attributability and 
accountability and 
requires heavy-
duty metaphysics: 
perdurantism for 
Edwards/Rea, a 
theory on which 
natures are agents 
for 
Anselm/Aquinas, 
and Kantian 
metaphysics for 
Kant 
Requires heavy-
duty metaphysics: 
perdurantism for 
Edwards/Rea, a 
theory on which 
natures are agents 
for 
Anselm/Aquinas, 
and Kantian 
metaphysics for 
Kant 
Complex theory of 
the relations 
between control, 
attributability, and 
accountability 
Complex theory of 
the relations 
between control, 
attributability, and 
accountability 
Requires 
implausible 
theory of the 
relation 
between 
attributability 
and 
accountability 
 
Rejection of 
Scripture and 
Tradition 
Benefits Simple theory of 
the relations 
between control, 
attributability, and 
accountability 
Simple theory of 
the relations 
between control, 
attributability, and 
accountability 
Simple theory of 
the relations 
between control, 
attributability, and 
accountability 
Simple theory of 
the relations 
between control, 
attributability, and 
accountability 
Simple 
metaphysics 
Simple metaphysics Simple 
metaphysics 
Simple 
metaphysics and 
simple theory of 
the relations 
between control, 
attributability, 
and 
accountability 
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